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Abstract 
Brazil is one of the leading producers of ethanol, sugar, and sugarcane. Increasing demand 
for biofuels aligned with public policies prompted the expansion of sugarcane into the Brazilian 
Cerrado, particularly, into the states of Goiás and Mato Grosso do Sul. The overall purpose of this 
dissertation, comprised of three essays, is to understand the impacts from the sugarcane expansion 
on farmers, processors, and the market. At the market level, the first essay, estimates the impacts 
of public policies and market factors on ethanol and sugar, supply and demand, in Goiás and Mato 
Grosso do Sul, using three-stage least squares. Results show that ethanol supply is sensitive to 
public policies whereas the sugar supply is sensitive to market prices. Sugar and ethanol were 
found to be complementary outputs. For ethanol expansion to be sustainable the ethanol market 
must be developed to the extent that it relies on market factors and is no longer dependent on public 
policies. 
At the farmer level, the second essay, examines farmers’ willingness to sign a sugarcane 
contract with a mill in the Brazilian Cerrado. A hypothetical stated choice experiment was 
conducted with farmers in Goiás and Mato Grosso do Sul. Respondents choose between three 
contracts (land rental, agricultural partnership, and supply) and two optout options (“keep current 
contract” or “not grow sugarcane”). A single and a two opt-out random parameters models were 
estimated. The two opt-out model allowed for a better interpretation of the status quo. Willingness 
to pay, direct and cross-elasticity measures for contract attributes were calculated. Results showed 
that farmers prefer contracts with higher returns, shorter duration and a lower probability of late 
payments. Farmers seemed to prefer to renting out their land to the mill than to produce sugarcane 
themselves, which could lead to consequences for rural development and the sustainability of 
sugarcane expansion. 
  
At the processor level, the third essay investigates the impact of vertical coordination on 
input-oriented technical efficiency using data envelopment analysis (first stage) and a Tobit 
censored model (second stage). 204 Brazilian mills were considered. The second stage controlled 
for vertical integration as well as other characteristics of the mill. Vertical integration was 
measured as the percentage of total sugarcane used, supplied by mills. A negative, though minimal, 
relationship between vertical integration and technical efficiency was found. Hence, technical 
efficiency is not the major driver of vertical integration. Other vertical coordination strategies may 
bring more benefits in terms of technical efficiency (e.g. contracts). Drivers of vertical integration 
seem to vary according to the characteristics of the location of the mill.  
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
Brazil has produced sugarcane ever since 1532 (BNDES 2008). Since its introduction, 
sugarcane production has expanded from the North-Northeast regions of the country to the Center-
South, becoming, over the past decades, a dominant crop in the state of São Paulo (Sant’Anna, 
Shanoyan, et al. 2016). Sugarcane is a main input in producing sugar, ethanol and even electricity. 
Brazil is not only a major sugarcane and ethanol producer, but also, a large sugar and ethanol 
exporter (MAPA 2013). The sugar-energy sector in Brazil is approximately 2% of the country’s 
Gross Domestic Product (Neves, Trombin and Consoli 2011), generating 900,000 direct and 
indirect jobs (Fagundes de Almeida, Bomtempo and de Souza e Silva 2008). 
From 2000 to 2013 the number of operating sugarcane mills in Brazil increased by 171% 
and the country’s daily sugarcane processing capacity reached 3.6 million metric tons (Reinhardt, 
Maurer and de Pinho 2009; Sant’Anna, Shanoyan, et al. 2016). There are three types of mills in 
Brazil (their distribution in percentage is in brackets): sugar mills (5%), ethanol mills (35%) and 
mixed mills (65%), which produce sugar and ethanol (Sant’Anna, Shanoyan, et al. 2016). A ton 
of sugarcane produces, on average, 140 kg of sugar or 86 liters of ethanol (State of São Paulo 
Government 2014).  
During the 21st century, Brazil increased its ethanol production capacity by expanding into 
the Cerrado region, located in the center of the country. The sugarcane expansion was more 
significant in the states of Goiás and Mato Grosso do Sul. The availability of cheaper and flatter 
land in these two states allowed for easy expansion and greater mechanization (Granco et al. 2015). 
From 2000 to 2012 over 40 mills have been constructed in these states (Procana 2013), such that 
Goiás and Mato Grosso do Sul, are catching up to São Paulo in terms of sugarcane production. 
Sugarcane expansion into Goiás and Mato Grosso do Sul has changed lands once known for 
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livestock and soybean production (Granco et al. 2015). Degraded areas, pasture and crop lands, as 
well as, Cerrado areas are being converted to produce sugarcane (Sant’Anna, Shanoyan, et al. 
2016). Figure 1.1 illustrates the increase in sugarcane areas and in mills from 2005 to 2012 in these 
two states. 
Goiás and Mato Grosso do Sul have increased their contribution to the Brazilian supply of 
sugarcane from 2% in 2000 to 10% in 2013 (IBGE 2014). Meanwhile São Paulo’s participation in 
the country’s sugarcane production has remained constant (Table 1.1). Data on the percentage 
distributions of planted areas, quantity and value of production in selected states illustrates the 
sugarcane expansion in the Cerrado region (Table 1.1). 
Among the drivers of sugarcane expansion are international demand for sugar and ethanol, 
national policies, technological changes in production and vertical integration by mills, from 
agricultural production into processing (Fischer et al. 2008; Shikida 2013). The Brazilian 
government has encouraged sugarcane expansion as it prompts rural development and economic 
growth. Given the role of public policies in the sugarcane expansion, it is important to estimate the 
impact of these policies on ethanol and sugar supply and demand. In addition to the impact of 
market prices on ethanol and sugar demand and supply, other factors that impact ethanol and sugar 
markets include: changes to the blending ratio of anhydrous ethanol with gasoline; the introduction 
of flex-fuel cars in 2004, allowing consumers to choose freely between ethanol and gasoline at the 
pump; the reduction to zero of the CIDE-fuel tax (Contribution of Intervention in the Economic 
Domain); variations in sugar and ethanol prices; and the launch of the Sugarcane Agroecological 
Zoning in 2009 (Brazil 2009; Manzatto et al. 2009) (Figure 1.2).   
The geographic expansion in sugarcane production driven by public policies, as well as 
market factors has instigated a competitive dynamic in the Brazilian ethanol industry (Sant’Anna, 
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Shanoyan, et al. 2016). In Brazil, sugarcane used in the production of ethanol is grown either by 
independent farmers (40%) or by the mills (60%) (MAPA 2013). Thus, processors expanding into 
the Cerrado must decide on the sugarcane procurement (i.e. from suppliers or to produce it 
themselves. Farmers, wanting to enter the sugarcane sector must decide between growing 
sugarcane or renting out their lands to mills. An evolution of the amount of sugarcane supplied by 
farmers and by mills can be seen in Figure 1.3. 
It is common for contracts to be signed between mills and farmers or landowners. Three 
types of contracts are currently used in Brazil: (1) land rental contracts – which give the local mill 
use of the land for sugarcane production for a fixed rental rate; (2) agricultural partnership 
contracts – which give the local mill use of the land for sugarcane production for a percentage of 
the harvested crop; and (3) supply contracts – by which farmers agree to supply sugarcane to the 
local mill for an agreed price and quantity (Brazil 1966). Mills may decide to sign a contract to 
guarantee their supply of sugarcane (Picanço Filho and Marin 2012a). On average contracts are 
signed for the duration of one or two sugarcane planting cycle (i.e. 6 or 12 years) (Picanço Filho 
and Marin 2012a). It is important to identify farmers’ and landowners’ preferences for contract 
attributes, as well as their willingness to pay for those contract attributes. This information can 
help farmers with contract selection and negotiation. Mills can be informed about ways to reduce 
their current transaction costs incurred during contract negotiation. 
As mentioned the mill may also decide to produce their own sugarcane, taking on the 
strategic decision to vertically integrate (backwards). In these cases, a land rental or agricultural 
partnership contract is usually negotiated. According to Picanço Filho (2010) landowners may 
prefer to rent the land to mills instead of growing sugarcane themselves for various reasons, 
including: high costs to form and maintain a sugarcane plantation; lack of stamina to migrate into 
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a new sector; restrictive labor regulations; and the guarantee of a fixed periodical payment with 
reduced risks. From the mills’ perspective, distance and harvest timeline limitations, along with 
the desire to guarantee sugarcane supply or to create barriers of entry to competing firms, make 
vertical integration enticing. Lower levels of vertical integration in Brazil are witnessed in the 
states with a longer tradition of growing sugarcane (e.g. São Paulo) while higher levels of vertical 
integration are present in states where sugarcane is a new crop (e.g. Goiás). Understanding the 
impact of vertical integration on mill production and efficiency can help mills with strategic 
planning and provide policy makers guidance on ethanol and sugar industry expansion. 
 
 
1.1 Research objectives 
The overall purpose of this dissertation, comprised of three essays, is to understand the 
impacts from the expansion of sugarcane production on farmers, mills, and markets in the Brazilian 
Cerrado. Each essay constitutes a chapter with its own objective, focusing on a level of the supply 
chain: 
1. Market level: To estimate the impact of public policies and market factors on ethanol 
and sugar supply and demand. 
2. Processor level: To assess the impact of vertical coordination strategies on efficiency. 
3. Farmer/Supplier level: To assess the incentive structure at the processor and producer 
interface of the sugarcane supply chain. 
Below is an overview of each the three essays. A summary of the methods used to achieve 
the objectives listed afore as well as the results are presented.   
 
5 
 1.1.1 First essay: What is driving the sugarcane expansion in Brazil?  
The impact of internal and external factors 
Brazil is one of the leading countries in the production of ethanol, sugar and sugarcane. 
Increasing demand for biofuels aligned with public policies prompted the expansion of sugarcane 
into the Brazilian Cerrado, particularly into the states of Goiás and Mato Grosso do Sul. This study 
estimates ethanol and sugar supply and demand elasticities for these states. It uses a system of 
equations and three-stage least squares method to estimate the impacts from market and policy 
drivers on sugar and ethanol markets. Results show that policies aimed at increasing ethanol 
production have a statistically significant impact on ethanol supply but little impact on sugar 
supply. Successful programs were the blend mandate, subsidized credits and mapping of areas 
suitable to grow sugarcane. The sugar industry was greatly impacted by market factors, though 
changes in prices of sugar and sugarcane affected exports more than domestic sugar supply. Sugar 
and ethanol were found to be complementary outputs. Results suggest that for ethanol expansion 
to be sustainable the ethanol market must be developed such that it relies on market factors and is 
no longer dependent on public policies.  
 
  1.1.2 Second essay: Sugarcane contracts in Brazil: How sweet is the deal? 
This essay examines farmers’ and landowners’ willingness to sign a contract with a local 
ethanol mill in the Brazilian Cerrado to produce sugarcane. This study contributes to the 
understanding of the extensive expansion in sugarcane production that has occurred in this region. 
A hypothetical stated choice experiment was conducted with farmers and landowners in Goiás 
(GO) and Mato Grosso do Sul (MS). The experiment involved them choosing between three 
contract options (land rental contract, an agricultural partnership contract, a supply contract) and 
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a status quo option. If the status quo option was chosen, individuals had to indicate the reason for 
this choice (“keep current contract” or “not grow sugarcane”). We ran a single opt-out model with 
one opt-out option and a two opt-out model. The two opt-out model is a novel approach that has 
not been used in past stated choice studies and has the advantage of allowing for a better 
interpretation of the single opt-out model, generally found in the literature. The two opt-out model 
was further extended to include the modeling of the random parameters with trust and welfare. 
Data from the stated choice experiment was analyzed using a random parameter model and the 
respondent’s willingness to pay for contract attributes was estimated. Elasticity measures were 
also calculated to interpret contract preferences due to changes in contract attributes. Results made 
it possible to identify which attributes gave farmers and landowners’ utility and disutility. Results 
showed that farmers and landowners are more likely to sign contracts that offer higher returns, are 
shorter in length and have a lower probability of late payments. Farmers and landowners seem to 
prefer land rental contracts over other contract options (except the option to keep their current 
contract). This, in turn, could have damaging consequences to rural development and the 
sustainability of sugarcane expansion.  
 
 1.1.3 Third essay: Assessing the relationship between vertical coordination strategy 
and technical efficiency: Evidence from the Brazilian ethanol industry 
The purpose of this essay is to estimate the impact of upstream vertical integration on input-
oriented technical efficiency using data envelopment analysis and a Tobit censored model. Inputs 
considered in the DEA model were the amount of crushed sugarcane and the daily sugarcane 
crushing capacities of the mill. Outputs were the quantities of ethanol and sugar produced. A 
sample of 204 Brazilian mills were considered in this study. In 2013, they produced half of total 
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amount of sugar and ethanol produced in the country. The Tobit censored model controlled for the 
percentage of crushed sugarcane produced on lands owned or rented by mills, if the mill could 
produce two goods, the age of the mill, dummies for locations of the mill and interaction terms. 
The interaction terms consisted of percentage of crushed sugarcane produced by the mill interacted 
with different locations (São Paulo, Center West region and Alagoas and Pernambuco).  
Vertical integration, by itself, has a, but minimal, negative marginal effect on efficiency. 
Vertical integration seems to be motivated by strategic reasons instead of operational purposes. 
The strategic reasons to vertically integration seam to vary between the locations. In areas with 
tradition in growing sugarcane, vertical integration may be used a strategy to increase the mills 
bargaining power with sugarcane suppliers. In the Cerrado region, where sugarcane has recently 
expanded into, vertical integration may be used to create barriers to entry to new mills. In areas 
where little sugarcane is grown, vertical integration may be a strategy to establish a procurement 
base. The industry should seek partnerships with farmers while policy makers can motivate input 
markets by offering extension services, financial incentives for the adoption of cutting edge 
technology, as well as, motivation for the institution of producer organizations. Findings from this 
study provide guidance to industries highly dependent on one input and with high location 
specificity. It provides policy makers with information to guide policies aimed at limiting vertical 
integration and on assuring farmer’s welfare.  
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Figure 1.1: Expansion of the area with sugarcane from 2005 to 2012 in Goiás and Mato Grosso do 
Sul. Source: Sant’Anna, Granco, et al. (2016)  
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Table 1.1: Percentage of the area planted, quantity produced and the value of production in relation 
to the total produced in Brazil in 2000 and 2013. 
 
Source: IBGE 2014 
 
  
2000 2013 2000 2013 2000 2013
Goiás Soybeans 10,9 10,5 12,5 10,9 12,0 10,5
Goiás Sugarcane 2,9 8,4 3,1 9,0 2,5 10,1
Goiás Corn 6,7 7,8 11,3 9,6 10,6 9,6
Mato Grosso do Sul Soybeans 8,1 7,1 7,6 7,1 7,3 6,9
Mato Grosso do Sul Sugarcane 2,0 6,3 1,8 5,5 1,6 5,5
Mato Grosso do Sul Corn 4,1 9,8 3,3 9,4 3,1 7,2
São Paulo Soybeans 3,9 2,2 3,6 2,3 4,0 2,4
São Paulo Sugarcane 50,9 53,0 58,0 56,5 50,7 53,8
São Paulo Corn 8,6 5,2 9,5 5,5 10,9 6,5
Fonte: IBGE - Produção Agrícola Municipal
State Crop (%) Area Planted
(%) Quantity 
Produced
(%) Value of 
Production
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Goiás 
Mato Grosso do Sul 
São Paulo 
ZAE Cana 
Federal District 
Figure 1.2: Map of Brazil with Goiás, Mato Grosso do Sul and São Paulo states and the Sugarcane 
Agroecological Zoning (ZAE-cana). Source: Sant’Anna, Shanoyan, et al. 2016 
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Figure 1.3: Origin of the sugarcane supplied to the mills per harvest year in million tons.  
   Source: MAPA 2013. 
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Chapter 2 - What is driving the sugarcane expansion in Brazil?  
The impact of internal and external factors 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Brazil is one of the world’s leading countries in the production of ethanol, sugar and 
sugarcane (MAPA 2013). The sugar-energy sector in Brazil accounts for approximately 2% of the 
country’s Gross Domestic Product (Neves, Trombin and Consoli 2011). In Brazil, ethanol and 
sugar are produced from sugarcane, a crop that since its introduction in the country, has expanded 
from the North-Northeast region to the Center-Southeast region of the country. An increasing 
demand for biofuels in conjunction with public policies has prompted this expansion into the 
Cerrado, the country’s second largest biome, especially in the states of Goiás (GO) and Mato 
Grosso do Sul (MS) (Shikida 2013). The Sugarcane Agro-ecological Zoning, launched in 2010, 
maps 12.6 million hectares in GO and 10.8 million hectares in MS as suitable areas for sugarcane 
production, promoting further expansion (Manzatto et al. 2009). Since the year 2000, more than 
40 mills have been constructed in these states (Procana 2013). In 2014, these states, once large 
producers of grains and livestock, contributed to 22% of Brazil’s total ethanol production and 9% 
of Brazil’s total sugar production (UNICA 2015). In 2014, producers in the two states planted a 
total of 1.5 million hectares of sugarcane and contributed to 15% of total sugarcane production in 
Brazil (IBGE 2016). 
As mentioned, the sugarcane/ethanol expansion into the Cerrado is the result of forces, 
internal and external, brought by government policies and regulations, technological innovations, 
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and changes in domestic and global demand, among others (Fischer et al. 2008; Granco et al. 
2015). Although sugarcane expansion in the Cerrado region has been the focus of many studies 
(Silva and Miziara 2011; CONAB 2013; Shikida 2013), few discuss its drivers (Granco et al. 
2015). That is not to say that there have not been studies on the Brazilian sugar and ethanol 
markets. Studies can be found describing the Brazilian ethanol economy (Barros 2013), analyzing 
the relationship among ethanol, sugar and gasoline prices (Balcombe and Rapsomanikis 2008), 
estimating ethanol demand (de Freitas and Kaneko 2011), ethanol and sugarcane supply (Costa et 
al. 2015), the impact of ethanol policies on land use (Nuñez, Önal and Khanna 2013) and import 
demand for Brazilian ethanol (Farinelli et al. 2009). In addition, there are studies that analyze the 
impacts from changes in public policies on ethanol markets. Drabik et al. (2015) use simulations 
to determine the effects on the price of ethanol from trade liberalization between Brazil and the 
U.S., as well as, from U.S. federal tax credit removals and changes in Brazilian public policies. 
Gorter et al. (2013) have conducted simulations involving sugar and ethanol markets to analyze 
the impact of polices and sugarcane supply on ethanol, sugar and sugarcane prices. They find that 
removing ethanol tax exemptions and blend mandates reduces ethanol prices by 21%. Elobeid and 
Tokgoz (2008) analyze the impact of trade liberalization between the U.S. and Brazil. They find 
that trade liberalization decreases U.S. ethanol and corn prices. In this paper, we propose a model 
that differs from past studies by: (i) estimating both supply and demand as a system of equations 
to capture interactions between markets; and (ii) using time series data instead of simulation 
analysis to estimate elasticities for two states in the Brazilian Cerrado, Goiás (GO) and Mato 
Grosso do Sul (MS), where sugarcane has predominantly expanded over the past decade. 
This study contributes to the discussion of sugarcane/ethanol expansion into the Cerrado 
by identifying and estimating the impact from the drivers of sugarcane expansion into the states of 
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MS and GO. These drivers are domestic and international market prices, as well as, public policies 
aimed at promoting sugar and ethanol markets. The novelty of this study arises from the estimation 
of supply and demand elasticities at the state level in Brazil, considering the interactions of national 
and international sugar and ethanol markets. This study also considers a longer time period, as well 
as using monthly time-series data over a ten-year period to estimate a system of equations 
modeling ethanol and sugar markets at the state level. Knowing how these forces impact the 
demand and supply of ethanol and sugar in Goiás and Mato Grosso do Sul is vital to understanding 
their role in ethanol and sugarcane expansion. Results from this study can pinpoint which policies 
or market factors have greater impact on sugarcane expansion within these states. This information 
can, not only, serve as a basis for future public policy debates, but also, facilitate the development 
of public programs aimed at the ethanol industry. It also aids the selection of public policies when 
financial resources are scarce. Results from this study will, furthermore, allow policy makers to 
analyze spillover effects from ethanol oriented policies on sugar production, as well as, the effect 
from changes in ethanol prices on sugar production and vice versa. Sugar and ethanol demand and 
income elasticities will provide the ethanol and sugar industry with information needed to better 
implement their marketing strategies. 
 
 
2.2 Drivers of the sugarcane-ethanol-sugar expansion in the Cerrado 
The Cerrado is Brazil’s second largest biome, occupying 98% of the state of Goiás and 
60% of the state of Mato Grosso do Sul (Granco et al. 2015). Sugarcane expansion in the Cerrado 
is driven by national and international demand for sugar and ethanol, as well as national policies 
promoting ethanol production and commercialization (Fischer et al. 2008). These national policies 
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include: the setting of a blending ratio of anhydrous ethanol with gasoline; the introduction of flex-
fuel cars in 2004, allowing consumers to choose freely between ethanol and gasoline at the pump; 
the reduction to zero, in 2004, of the CIDE-fuel tax (Contribution of Intervention in the Economic 
Domain) applied to ethanol; the increase of credit offered by the National Development Bank to 
sugar and ethanol producing mills; and the launch of the Sugarcane Agroecological Zoning in 2009 
(Manzatto et al. 2009; Granco et al. 2015). New technology has also facilitated the expansion of 
the sugar and ethanol industries (Fischer et al. 2008). Modern mixed mills in Brazil can easily 
switch between the production of ethanol and sugar from sugarcane within the same year (Gorter 
et al. 2013). In 2012, Goais and Mato Grosso do Sul had together 28 mixed mills, 27 plants that 
only produced ethanol and 1 that only produced sugar (CONAB 2013).   
Market factors that impact the production of ethanol and sugar are the prices of ethanol, 
sugar and gasoline, as well as interest rates. The prices of hydrous ethanol in Brazil have varied 
between US$0.26/L in 1999 and US$0.58/L in 2014. Anhydrous ethanol prices always have been 
higher than hydrous ethanol though, following the same pattern (Figure 2.1). A similar story occurs 
with domestic and international sugar prices (Figure 2.2). In the same period, the prices of sugar 
varied between US$0.13/Kg in 1999 and US$0.42/Kg in 2014. The national prices of sugar have 
followed the same trajectory as international prices. In 1999, a kilo of sugar cost US$0.14, whereas 
in 2014 the same kilo cost US$0.38. Prices of gasoline in Brazil are controlled by the Brazilian 
government with the intention of curving inflation. This policy, though, affects the ethanol industry 
by reducing the competitiveness of ethanol fuel prices, which are not regulated (Granco et al. 
2015). Keeping gasoline prices below international prices prevents ethanol being sold at higher 
prices. As substitute goods, one would expect ethanol and gasoline prices to be related. Balcombe 
and Rapsomanikis (2008) find that oil prices are the principal long-run drivers of ethanol and sugar 
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prices. The ethanol industry has benefitted when the prices of gasoline in Brazil are higher than 
international prices (Granco et al. 2015). 
Another market factor is the Brazilian interest rate, which is based on the Special System 
for Settlement and Custody (SELIC). Set by the Brazilian Central Bank, variations in the SELIC 
affect the level of interest rates used in banking loans (BCB 2016). The interest rate was at its 
highest in the year of 1999, decreasing overtime (Figure 2.3). When analyzing agricultural 
commodity producers in Brazil, de Castro and Teixeira (2012) argue that greater access to rural 
credit allows farmers to increase output. Similarly, we expect that increases in interest rates may 
decrease mills’ access to loans reducing their sugar and ethanol supply. 
In Brazil, hydrous ethanol (E100) is demanded as a substitute for gasoline in flex-fuel cars, 
which entered the market in 2004, and currently make up more than 60% of the country’s fleet 
(UNICA 2015). Before 2004, two types of cars were sold, those that ran on ethanol and those that 
ran on gasoline. Flex-fuel cars allow gasoline and E100 to be used interchangeably. Due to 
ethanol’s lower mileage, consumers choose E100 over gasoline when the price of ethanol is 70% 
or less than that of gasoline (Granco et al. 2015). Anhydrous ethanol is demanded by fuel 
distributers to be mixed into gasoline in order to fulfill the blend mandate set by the government 
(Granco et al. 2015). Hydrous consumption varied more than that of anhydrous in the period 
considered. Greater variations in hydrous ethanol consumptions occur between 2010 and 2013, 
possibly due to changes in gasoline prices and oscillations in ethanol production. Anhydrous 
consumption increased from 20 million liters to 40 million liters from 1999 to 2014 (Figure 2.4).  
A number of public policies in Brazil have motivated the expansion and production of 
ethanol and sugar. Through the National Development Bank, the Brazilian government provides 
subsidized loans to the sugar and ethanol industry. The loans for ethanol production increased from 
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US$1.3 million in 1999 to US$385 million in 2014. Loans to the sugar industry were also higher, 
increasing from US$1.8 in 1999 to US$135 million in 2014 (BNDES 2015) (Figure 2.5).  In 
particular, new lines specifically directed towards the sugar and ethanol sector were created: the 
PRORENOVA (Program to support the renovation and implementation of new sugarcane fields), 
directed towards the renewal or expansion of sugarcane fields, and the Pass program (Program to 
Support the Sugar and Ethanol Sector), directed towards ethanol storage (Granco et al. 2015). 
Complementing the subsidized loans is the blend mandate. The blend mandate began in Brazil in 
the 1930s with the requirement of a mixture of 5% of ethanol with gasoline fuel (Sant’Anna, 
Shanoyan, et al. 2016). The blend mandate is set by the government making it mandatory that all 
gasoline sold in Brazil has a determined percentage of anhydrous ethanol in it (Figure 2.6). In 
2015, the federal government increased the mandated amount of ethanol to be mixed into gasoline 
from 25% to 27% (Amato and Matoso 2015). 
A further public policy aimed at benefitting the ethanol industry was the removal of the 
CIDE-fuels tax (Contribution of Intervention in the Economic Domain) applied on ethanol. The 
CIDE, a tax applied on commercialized fuel, was created in 2001 by law #10,336. In 2004 the 
CIDE-fuels tax applied on ethanol was reduced to zero, while that applied on gasoline varied 
between US$96.91/m3 in 2004 to US$54.62/m3 in 2011 (Maciel 2011). After 2011, the CIDE was 
removed from gasoline until the end of 2014. Figure 2.7 presents the CIDE fuel taxes per liter on 
both fuels (i.e. ethanol and gasoline).  
Lands suitable to sugarcane production were delimited by the Sugarcane Agroecological 
Zoning program in 2009. The program was developed to avoid the conversion of native Cerrado 
regions into sugarcane plantations, while identifying areas suitable for sugarcane cultivation and 
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mechanization (Granco et al. 2015). Farmers that produce sugarcane in this delimited area have 
easier access to governmental programs, such as subsidized loans from BNDES.  
 
 
2.3 Ethanol and sugar markets – A general modeling framework 
The supply and demand model for the markets of sugar and ethanol follows the set up 
proposed by Lin (2005). These markets are interconnected, through the prices of sugar, ethanol 
and sugarcane prices, to account for the effects of the ethanol market on the sugar market and vice 
versa. There are M markets of sugar and N of ethanol occurring at times t = 1,..,T. Although markets 
of sugar and ethanol are modelled we suppress the index for each market to simplify notation. At 
each time t, 𝑝𝑡 is the price of the product, 𝑞𝑡 the quantity transacted, and 𝑥𝑡 a vector of market 
characteristics, including direct and cross-price effects. The quantity demanded of each product is 
𝑞𝑡
𝑑 while the quantity supplied is 𝑞𝑡
𝑠. Both quantities are a function of prices and market 
characteristics. It is assumed that both producers and consumers are price-takers. In equilibrium, 
markets clear, such that: 
 
  𝑞𝑡
𝑑(𝑝𝑡 , 𝑥𝑡) =  𝑞𝑡
𝑠(𝑝𝑡 , 𝑥𝑡) (2.1) 
   
At each time period t only equilibrium prices and quantities are observed in each market. 
Prices and quantities are determined simultaneously making it hard to identify supply and demand 
(functions) independently. Let the structural equations for supply and demand in each market, with 
𝜀𝑡
𝑑 and 𝜀𝑡
𝑠 representing residuals, be given by (Lin 2005):   
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 Demand: 𝑞𝑡
𝑑 = 𝑓(𝑝𝑡
𝑑, 𝑥𝑡
𝑑 , 𝑥𝑡
𝑚, 𝜀𝑡
𝑑) (2.2) 
 Supply: 𝑞𝑡
𝑠 = 𝑓(𝑝𝑡
𝑠, 𝑥𝑡
𝑠 , 𝑥𝑡
𝑚, 𝜀𝑡
𝑠) (2.3) 
 Market Clearing: 𝑞𝑡
𝑑 = 𝑞𝑡
𝑠 = 𝑞𝑡 and  𝑝𝑡
𝑑 = 𝑝𝑡
𝑠 = 𝑝𝑡  (2.4) 
 
where 𝑥𝑡
𝑑 are factors that only shift market demand (e.g. income), 𝑥𝑡
𝑠 are factors that only shift 
market supply (e.g. input prices), and 𝑥𝑡
𝑚 are factors that affect both market supply and demand. 
These factors are elements of the vector 𝑥𝑡  (i.e. 𝑥𝑡 = (𝑥𝑡
𝑑, 𝑥𝑡
𝑠, 𝑥𝑡
𝑚)), which allows for the 
identification of supply and demand functions (Lin 2005). Substituting in the market clearing 
conditions, equations (2.2) to (2.4) can be further simplified to:  
 
 Demand: 𝑞𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑝𝑡, 𝑥𝑡
𝑑 , 𝑥𝑡
𝑚, 𝜀𝑡
𝑑) (2.5) 
 Supply: 𝑞𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑝𝑡, 𝑥𝑡
𝑠 , 𝑥𝑡
𝑚, 𝜀𝑡
𝑠) (2.6) 
   
Following economic theory, we expect the coefficient related to the price in the demand 
equation to be negative, so that demand is downward sloping, and the coefficient related to the 
price in the supply equation to be positive, so that supply is upward sloping. Since 𝑥𝑡
𝑑 only impacts 
supply through its effect on the equilibrium price 𝑝𝑡 it can be used to instrument the price in the 
supply equation (Lin 2005). Analogously, 𝑥𝑡
𝑠 can be used as an instrument for the price in the 
demand equation. The exogenous vector of components that affect both equations 𝑥𝑡
𝑚, serves as 
instruments to both equations. It is assumed that these instruments have a non-zero correlation 
with price and a monotonic effect on price to obtain estimates of the coefficients of the structural 
system that are consistent and identified (Lin 2005).  
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2.4 Empirical model 
A multi-equation, multi-product economic model was developed to study the impact of the 
various factors on the supply and demand for sugar and ethanol in Mato Grosso do Sul and Goiás. 
The model is composed of six equations: three for the ethanol market and three for the sugar market 
(Equations 2.8 to 2.12). The empirical model can be represented as: 
 
Sugar Demand: 
𝑙𝑛𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼1 + 𝛼2𝑙𝑛𝑝𝑠𝑢𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑙𝑛𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑓𝑒𝑏 + 𝛼5𝑙𝑛𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡−2 +
𝛼6𝑙𝑛𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡−3 + 𝛼7𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑
2 + 𝜀𝑡     (2.8) 
Sugar Supply: 
𝑙𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝑝𝑠𝑢𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛𝑝ℎ𝑦𝑑𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑠𝑏𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑠 + 𝛽5𝑙𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑙𝑛𝑝𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑡 
+𝛽7𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑒 + 𝛽8𝑙𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝑑𝑠𝑢𝑔𝑠𝑢𝑝 ∗ 𝑙𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑡−1 + 𝛽10𝑑𝑢𝑚3 + 𝛽11𝑑𝑠𝑢𝑔𝑠𝑢𝑝 + 𝜀𝑡   (2.9) 
Sugar Supply to the Rest of the World: 
𝑙𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑡 = 𝛾1 + 𝛾2𝑙𝑛𝑝𝑠𝑢𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡 + 𝛾3𝑙𝑛𝑝𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑡 + 𝛾4𝑙𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑡−1 + 𝛾5𝑑𝑢𝑚3 + 𝛾6𝑑𝑢𝑚4 +
𝛾7𝑑𝑢𝑚7 + 𝛾8𝐷𝑠𝑏𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑠 + 𝛾9𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑒 + 𝜀𝑡 (2.10) 
Ethanol Supply: 
𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑡 = 𝛿1 + 𝛿2𝑝𝑠𝑢𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡 + 𝛿3𝑝𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑡 + 𝛿4𝑝ℎ𝑦𝑑𝑡 + 𝛿5𝑝ℎ𝑦𝑑𝑡
2 + 𝛿6𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑒 + 𝛿7𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑠 +
𝛿8𝑙𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑐 + 𝛿9𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒 + 𝛿10𝑙𝑛𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑑 + 𝜀𝑡 (2.11) 
Demand for Anhydrous Ethanol: 
𝑙𝑛𝑎𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 = 𝜇1 + 𝜇2𝑙𝑛𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 + 𝜇3𝑙𝑛𝑝𝑔𝑎𝑠𝑡 + 𝜇4𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑚 + 𝜇5𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑
2 + 𝜀𝑡   (2.12) 
Demand for Hydrous Ethanol: 
𝑙𝑛ℎ𝑦𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 = 𝜑1 + 𝜑2𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑡 + 𝜑3𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 + 𝜑4𝑑𝑢𝑚ℎ𝑦𝑑𝑒𝑚 + 𝜀𝑡      (2.13) 
Table 2.1 provides definitions for all variables. 
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Sugar demand is a function of international sugar prices and the gross domestic product 
per capita. The international sugar price and the domestic price of sugar are highly correlated, such 
that the choice of one of them was made in order to avoid multicollinearity problems. The 
international price was chosen over the domestic price since over 50% of Brazilian sugar 
production is exported. Unfortunately, it was not possible to find domestic prices for sugar 
substitutes and therefore these were not considered.  
Sugar supply is a function of international sugar prices, the price of ethanol, price of 
sugarcane, a dummy representing the years when subsidized loans were low or zero, the interest 
rate and a dummy representing the launch of the Sugarcane Agro-ecological Zoning in 2010. We 
consider only the price of hydrous ethanol since hydrous and anhydrous prices are highly 
correlated. Anhydrous ethanol prices are equivalent to the price of hydrous ethanol plus the extra 
cost of dehydration (Elobeid and Tokgoz 2008). Sugar supply to the rest of the world relates sugar 
exports from these states with international sugar prices, sugarcane prices, and public policies (i.e. 
subsidized credit and zoning).  
Turning to the ethanol market, ethanol supply is a function of the international price of 
sugar, hydrous ethanol price, price of sugarcane, a dummy representing the launch of the zoning 
policy, a dummy representing when the amount of subsidized credits was low or zero, the blending 
requirement of ethanol into gasoline, the interest rate and the difference between the fuel tax 
applied on ethanol and the fuel tax applied on gasoline.  
Ethanol demand is split between demand for hydrous and demand for anhydrous ethanol. 
Demand for anhydrous ethanol is a function of the gross domestic product per capita and gasoline 
prices. Since anhydrous ethanol can only be consumed through gasoline consumption, consumers 
ultimately look at gasoline prices when deciding how much anhydrous ethanol to consume. 
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Demand for hydrous ethanol is a function of the ratio of hydrous ethanol prices to gasoline prices 
and the gross domestic product per capita.  
Although mills in Brazil produce and sell electricity, this product was not considered in 
this study. Supply of electricity is not considered since energy in these states are mostly used as 
an input by the mill in sugar and ethanol production. The price of other crops, such as soybeans, 
were not considered as a factor since the farmer cannot easily switch from sugarcane production 
to grain production. Sugarcane is a perennial crop with a cycle of up to six years. Furthermore, 
farmers that decide to produce sugarcane in the states of Goiás (GO) and Mato Grosso do Sul 
(MS), do so, usually, under contract, increasing the transaction cost of changing crops. In a survey 
conducted in GO and MS, Sant’Anna, Granco, et al. (2016) find that 89% of farmers and 
landowners agree that it is impossible to grow sugarcane in these states without a contract.  
The excess supply of ethanol to the rest of the world is not modelled, since most of the 
ethanol production in Brazil is for domestic consumption. Brazil exports around 10% of its total 
ethanol production, whereas it exports over 50% of its sugar production (MDIC 2016). In 
particular, the states of MS and GO have a greater history of exporting sugar instead of exporting 
ethanol. Evidence of ethanol exports from these states is very sporadic, with most of the exports 
occurring from 2013 onwards (MDIC 2016) (Figure 2.8). In contrast, sugar exports in these states 
have ranged from 154 million kilos in 1999 to 160 million kilos in 2014. Thus, the excess supply 
of ethanol to the rest of the world is not believed to have a significant impact on the expansion of 
ethanol in MS and GO.  
Supply and demand equations are traditionally estimated as simultaneous equation models 
using three stage least squares (3SLS) to correct for endogeneity. Endogeneity arises from the fact 
that prices and quantities are determined jointly with the dependent variable via an equilibrium 
25 
mechanism (Wooldridge 2009). 3SLS is a method using structural disturbances from two stage 
least squares estimation to simultaneously estimate the coefficients of a whole system (Zellner and 
Theil 1962). 3SLS allows for gains in efficiency in the presence of contemporaneous covariance 
as long as the system has over-identified equations (Zellner and Theil 1962). It allows for 
endogenous variables on the right-hand side of the equations to be corrected by using generalized 
instruments made up of the exogenous variables in the model as well as additional exogenous 
variables chosen by the modeler. Prices of sugar, gasoline, anhydrous and hydrous ethanol, as well 
as the quantities of sugar and ethanol supplied and consumed are considered endogenous. 
Exogenous variables outside of the model are the population and the production of ethanol and 
flex-fuel cars in MS and GO. A detailed description of the variables and respective transformations 
is provided in Table 2.1. 
Estimations were conducted in STATA 13. Prior to running the 3SLS, the single equations 
were run individually using ordinary least squares and misspecification tests were conducted. The 
normality of the residuals was tested using the Shapiro-Wilk and the Shapiro-Francia tests 
(Royston 1983; Royston 1993). Functional form was tested using the Ramsey regression 
specification-error test (Ramsey 1969) and the link test (Pregibon 1979).  Heteroskedasticity was 
tested using a test which is built on three versions of the Breusch and Pagan (1979) and Cook and 
Weisberg (1983) tests and an information matrix test suggested by Cameron and Trivedi (1990). 
Autocorrelation was tested by estimating the correlation between the residuals in the current month 
and in the previous month using Kendall’s rank correlation (Kendall 1938). To correct for 
violations to these properties interactions, dummies, lags and trends were added to equations 
and/or the data was transformed by taking logs. For instance, dsugsup was added as a dummy to 
account for a structural change in the data. Graphical analysis of the relationships among the 
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variables were also used when deciding on the inclusion of trends, interactions or data 
transformations. The objective was to properly represent the relationship between the dependent 
and independent variables with statistical reliability (McGuirk, Driscoll and Alwang 1993) (see 
Appendix A for full results and detailed explanations).  
After the 3SLS system was estimated the residuals for each equation were checked for 
normality using the Shapiro-Wilk and the Shapiro-Francia tests (Royston 1983; Royston 1993). 
An over identification test was also conducted using Hansen-Sargen test coded by Baum et al. 
(2006). A Hausman’s specification test was used to test for the importance of the instruments, as 
well (Hausman 1978). 
Own-price, Cross-price, input and income elasticities were estimated for supply and 
demand markets, where applicable. When the equations had logarithmic values of the dependent 
and independent variables (e.g. equation 2.12), the elasticity will be equivalent to the value of the 
respective coefficient. In cases of log-linear specification such as equation (2.11) the coefficient 
was multiplied by the mean of the variable. For instance, the own price supply elasticity of ethanol 
is calculated as (𝛿4 ∗ 𝑝ℎ𝑦𝑑̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅). Similarly, cross-price elasticities were calculated as the coefficient 
times the mean of the variable (e.g. cross-price supply elasticity of the price of sugar is  
(𝛿2 ∗ 𝑝𝑠𝑢𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ). Compensated demand elasticities are calculated following Deaton and 
Muellbauer (1980). For example, the sugar compensated demand is calculated as: 
 
[𝛼3 ∗ (
𝑠𝑢𝑔𝑎𝑟 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠∗𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑑
𝐺𝐷𝑃
) + 𝛼2]                                                                     (2.14) 
 
Standard errors for elasticities were estimated using the delta method (Greene 2008). 
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2.5 Data 
This study considers the period from January 1999 to December 2014. Secondary data was 
collected for Goiás and Mato Grosso do Sul and summary statistics are presented in Table 2.2. The 
period considered is important since it encompasses the introduction of flex-fuel cars in 2004 and 
the implementation of national policies such as the Agro-ecological Zoning of Sugarcane and the 
elimination of the fuel tax on ethanol. In general, information that was only available on a yearly 
basis was transformed into monthly by dividing the yearly amount by twelve. In order to account 
for inflation, current values were converted into real values. Variables related to the consumption 
of sugar or ethanol (e.g. income or the price of ethanol) were converted using the consumer price 
index (Eurostat 2016). The prices of inputs (e.g. sugarcane) were converted into real values using 
the producer price index (Index of the Broad Producer – IPA) (IPEA 2015).  
Data on gasoline prices and the consumption of hydrous ethanol comes from the Brazilian 
National Agency of Petroleum (ANP 2014). Data was gathered for both states and then the average 
of both prices were used in the final model. Consumption of anhydrous ethanol was estimated 
using the information on gasoline consumption and on the blend mandate. Gasoline consumption 
data is available at the Brazilian National Agency of Petroleum (ANP 2014).  Sugar exports from 
both states were collected from the Brazilian Ministry of Industry, Foreign Trade and Services 
(MDIC 2016). Total sugar exports were calculated by adding monthly sugar exports from both 
states. The aggregated quantity of sugar consumed in Brazil per year was obtained from the 
Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) from the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA 2017). Sugar 
consumption per capita was calculated by dividing the total sugar consumption by the Brazilian 
population (IBGE 2016). Sugar consumption per capita was then multiplied by the populations of 
the states of Goiás (GO) and Mato Grosso do Sul (MS) to calculate sugar consumption in these 
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states. Monthly sugar consumption was calculated by dividing the total amount of yearly sugar 
consumption in MS and GO by 365 and then multiplying the daily sugar consumption by the 
number of days in each month. The amount of sugar and that of ethanol supplied were set as the 
equivalent to the quantities demanded. This equivalence was chosen since there is no information 
on storage of sugar and/or ethanol for the time period. We only had information on ethanol and 
sugar production and consumption. Thus, our model accounts for storage since it sets quantity 
supplied equal to quantity demanded.  In other words, the amount of sugar supplied each month is 
the sum of sugar demanded and sugar exported. The total amount of ethanol supplied is the sum 
of the consumption of hydrous and that of anhydrous ethanol.  
Sugarcane prices come from the Union of Bioenergy Producers (UDOP) and are in Reais 
(R$) per kilo of TRS (Total Recoverable Sugar). The TRS represents the quantity of sugar in the 
sugarcane minus the losses occurred during industrial processing (UNICA 2015).  Information on 
foreign prices of sugar were collected from the U.S. Department of Agriculture sugar and 
sweetener tables (USDA 2013). Brazilian prices of ethanol, hydrous and anhydrous come from the 
Center for Advanced Studies in Applied Economics (CEPEA 2015). The prices for the state of 
Alagoas were chosen as a proxy for the price of both states as it was the longest time series 
available. The interest rate (SELIC – Special System of Liquidation and Custody) time series come 
from the Brazilian Institute of Applied Economics Databank (IPEA 2015). Information on gross 
domestic product per capita came from the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE 
2016). Missing months were estimated as a percentage of the total population of Brazil. 
Information on the sales of flex-fuel and ethanol cars came from the National Association of 
Automotive Vehicle Producers (ANFAVEA 2015). This information is only available at a national 
scale therefore state level was estimated by calculating production per capita, using the country’s 
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population and then multiplying by the population of the states of MS and GO. The amount of 
subsidized loans received by ethanol and sugar producers was acquired from the Brazilian National 
Development Bank (BNDES 2015). A dummy variable (Debndes) was created where 1 represents 
the months with no or low amounts of subsidized credit. For the subsidized credit for the sugar 
industry Dsbndes = 1 from January 1999 to January 2006, while for the ethanol industry  
Debndes = 1 from January 1999 to March 2007. Information on the blend mandate came from the 
Brazilian Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Supply (MAPA 2010). This information was the 
same for the whole country and did not change monthly. It is set by the government. Information 
on the CIDE fuel tax came from the research conducted by Maciel (2011). From 2001 onwards 
ethanol fuel was not taxed with CIDE. After 2012 the CIDE tax was also removed from gasoline, 
returning after 2014. Similar to the case of the blend mandate, changes in these taxes are set by the 
government and do not necessarily change on a month to month basis.  
 
 
2.6 Results 
In general, the signs of the coefficients correspond to those expected from economic theory 
(Table 2.3 and 2.4). For instance, increases in the price of a good increase the quantity supplied, 
while decreasing the quantity demanded. Equations in the sugar and ethanol markets have R2 of 
0.75 up to 0.96 indicating a good fit for the data (Table 2.3 and 2.4). The Hausman test rejects the 
null hypothesis at a statistically significance level of 5% indicating that the 3SLS estimation 
explains better the model than an OLS estimation.  
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 2.6.1 Public policies 
According to Moraes and Zilberman (2014) the sugar market did not fully rely on public 
policies in the late 1990s due to its marketing mechanisms and product differentiation strategies. 
In turn, the same authors conclude that, ethanol markets are more dependent on public policies 
than either sugar or sugarcane markets. Results from this study point to similar conclusions. Public 
policies appear to have a greater impact on ethanol than on sugar supply. The Sugarcane Agro-
ecological Zoning program (ZAE-Cana) has a statistically significant impact on ethanol supply 
but not on sugar supply (Table 2.5). It increases ethanol supply by 0.57%, which is equivalent to 
a growth of 284 thousand liters in the quantity supplied of ethanol. The fact that the ZAE-Cana 
only has a statistically significant impact on ethanol supply is not surprising. It was created by the 
Brazilian National Plan of Agro-energy 2006-2011 to map areas for agro-energy (Brazil 2006). 
ZAE-Cana was created with the intent of motivating ethanol production (Oliveira and Ramalho 
2006; Brazil 2009). 
Sugar and ethanol supply are both impacted by subsidies. Lack of available subsidized 
credit (i.e. BNDES) impacts ethanol supply more than sugar supply, in percentage terms. Lack of 
subsidized credit decreases ethanol supply by 0.84% or 419 thousand liters and sugar supply by 
0.08% or 57 thousand kilos. This difference in impact may be due to the fact that incentives for 
sugarcane expansion towards the center of the country have focused on ethanol rather than sugar 
production. In the period considered, the total amount of subsidized loans assigned through the 
BNDES programs for sugar production was US$1 billion, while that for ethanol production was 
US$2.93 billion (BNDES 2015).  
It is not surprising that ZAE-Cana and the BNDES subsidized credits do not have a 
statistically significant impact on the supply of sugar to the rest of the world since these programs 
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are aimed at domestic production. Results show that sugarcane prices impact sugar supply to the 
rest of the world and sugar prices impact the quantity supplied (Table 2.3). 
Apart from the ZAE-Cana and the BNDES subsidized loans there are other public policies 
in place to motivate ethanol supply (e.g. the blend mandate and the differences in taxes applied on 
ethanol and gasoline fuels). Results show that these policies do have an impact on ethanol supply. 
A one percent increase in the difference between the taxes applied on ethanol and the taxes applied 
on gasoline results in an increase in ethanol supply by 1.25% or 623 thousand liters. An increase 
in the blend mandate by one-percent, that is of 0.23%, results in an increase in ethanol supply by 
3.14% equivalent to 1.6 million liters. Thus, among the policies studied the blend mandate has the 
greatest impact on ethanol supply. This is may be due to the fact that an increase in the blend 
mandate automatically increases demand for ethanol, for it is required to be mixed into gasoline.  
These results compliment Moraes and Zilberman (2014)’s argument for the blend mandate policy 
over the policy on eliminating the CIDE fuel tax. The same authors cite the complexity of 
simultaneously regulating gasoline and ethanol prices, such as the Brazilian government has done. 
The government has controlled gasoline prices to curb inflation while it has reduced fuel taxes on 
hydrous ethanol for it to be competitive with gasoline.  
 
 2.6.2 Sugar and ethanol supply 
The own-price supply elasticities for domestic sugar and ethanol supply are inelastic, while 
sugar exports are elastic. There is larger fluctuation in the sugar quantities exported than in the 
quantities supplied domestically. This variation may be due to changes in the exchange rates. 
Another reason for the larger impact maybe due to the reduction of protectionist policies in 
importing countries in 1999 which increased Brazilian sugar exports (Moraes and Zilberman 
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2014). A one-percent increment in the sugar price leads to a 0.64% increase in the amount of sugar 
supplied, equivalent to 319 thousand kilos of sugar. This result is in the range of elasticities 
estimated in previous studies. These studies found short-run sugar own-price supply elasticities 
between 0.33 and 1.89 (Arend 2001; Caruso 2002). In terms of the ethanol market, a one-percent 
increase in the price of hydrous ethanol (i.e. R$0.01) results in an increase of 0.43% in the quantity 
of ethanol supplied. This coefficient, though, is not statistically significant. A similar result is also 
found in Shikida et al. (2007). They find the impact of sugar prices on sugar quantities supplied to 
be statistically significant, while the impact of ethanol prices on ethanol quantities supplied to be 
statistically insignificant. They attribute the statistical insignificance of the coefficient to the 
instability in ethanol prices during the 1980s. In our case, government control of gasoline prices, 
setting them below international prices, may be the cause of the statistical insignificance for the 
ethanol price coefficient. The own-price ethanol supply elasticity is close to those from previous 
studies. These range from 0.207 to 0.75 is the literature (Oliveira, Alencar and Souza 2008; Costa 
et al. 2015).  
In terms of sugar exports, an increase of one percent in the price of sugar increases the 
quantity of sugar supplied to the rest of the world by 2.28%, or 751 thousand kilos of sugar. This 
impact may be due to changes in the exchange rate. Alves and Bacchi (2004) find that a one percent 
increase in the exchange rate in four months causes a variation of 2.18% in sugar exports. Sugar 
and sugarcane prices have a larger impact on foreign sugar supply and the quantity supplied than 
on the domestic supply and quantity supplied of sugar. An increase of R$0.01 (US$0.003) in the 
price of sugarcane decreases sugar supply by 0.87% or 617 thousand kilos and sugar supply to the 
rest of the world by 2.43% or 800 thousand kilos. The larger impact on export supply may come 
from extra transport costs involved in exporting sugar, such that increases in sugarcane prices 
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cause greater impacts on production costs for exported sugar. The input price supply elasticity of 
sugarcane on ethanol lies between that of domestic sugar supply and sugar exports. A one percent 
increase in the price of sugarcane or a raise of US$0.003 decreases ethanol supply by 1.07% or 
534 thousand liters. This elasticity is a little lower than that found by Marjotta-Maistro and Barros 
(2003) of -1.45, though not statistically significant. 
Results indicate that ethanol and sugar are compliments in production in the sugar and 
ethanol industry. A one percent increase in the price of sugar increases the amount supplied of 
ethanol by 2.11% or 1.05 million liters. If the real price of hydrous ethanol increases from R$1.05 
to R$1.06 (i.e. US$0.400 to US$0.403) the amount of sugar supplied grows by 0.35%, equivalent 
to 175 thousand kilos. This result can be explained by the fact that mixed mills, those that can 
produce both ethanol and sugar, usually produce a mix of both (Drabik et al. 2015). Also, mills 
can produce ethanol from molasses, a by-product of sugar (Elobeid and Tokgoz 2008). The 
percentage of ethanol and sugar that a mill produces is decided at the beginning of the year. Since 
our data is monthly, it would be expected these two outputs are complimentary instead of 
substitutes during a particular year. As there are more months than years in the data, the results 
pick up the positive correlation between the variables rather than the potential substitution 
relationship. In addition, the ratio of ethanol to sugar product does not exhibit much variation 
throughout the year. The ratio of sugar/ethanol production in Brazil is generally set to 40:60 
(Barros 2015). In fact, in 2011/12 around 28% in GO and 37% in MS of the sugarcane produced 
was destined for sugar production and 72% in GO and 63% in MS of sugarcane went to produce 
ethanol (Santos 2013; CONAB 2013). The larger ratio in the production of ethanol to sugar may 
explain why increments in sugar prices appear to have a larger impact on ethanol supply than 
changes in ethanol prices have on sugar supply.  
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The preference for a higher percentage in the amount of ethanol supplied over that of sugar 
may be due to the lower variation in ethanol prices compared to that of sugar and, to the blend 
mandate ensuring that a minimum amount of ethanol is demanded. Another reason for mills 
preferring to produce more ethanol than sugar may be due to the fact that public policies motivating 
the sugarcane expansion into the Cerrado are aimed at expanding ethanol rather than sugar 
production. Nevertheless, it is important to notice how a growth in ethanol prices has spillover 
effects in the quantity of sugar supplied and vice versa (i.e. a growth in ethanol prices increases 
the quantity of sugar supplied). This result has important implications for public policies (i.e. you 
can invest in public policies in one industry and impact both industries).  
 
 2.6.3 Ethanol and sugar demand 
Gasoline prices have a high influence on the demand for hydrous ethanol (Moraes and 
Zilberman 2014). Consumers make their decision about purchasing hydrous ethanol at the pump 
by looking at the ratio of the price of hydrous over that of gasoline. Employees at the gas station 
may also suggest which fuel customers should buy based on the prices. It is economic to purchase 
hydrous ethanol when its price is 70% or less of that of gasoline. An increase in the real ratio 
reduces the quantity demanded of hydrous ethanol by 2.58% or 691 thousand liters (Table 2.7). 
The use of flex-fuel cars, which currently accounts for 90% of the Brazilian fleet, allows gasoline 
and hydrous ethanol to be used interchangeably (Moraes and Zilberman 2014). This may explain 
why we find hydrous ethanol demand to be elastic. This result is comparable to Santos (2013), 
who finds that ethanol and gasoline are imperfect substitutes. The cross-price elasticity of gasoline 
to ethanol is 0.099 while that of ethanol to gasoline is 1.182. Santos (2013), also finds that ethanol 
has an own-price elasticity of -1.252, making our result of an elastic demand for ethanol plausible. 
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As can be seen by the result, consumers are very sensitive to fuel price changes. Brazilian 
consumers’ purchasing decisions are constantly influenced by news reports on fuel prices and on 
when hydrous ethanol should be preferred (e.g. Estadão Conteúdo 2015). This result highlights the 
consequences of fuel pricing policies. The government’s current aim of controlling gasoline prices 
irrespectively of the variation in international oil prices or production costs affects the 
competitiveness of hydrous ethanol prices (Moraes and Zilberman 2014). Moraes and Zilberman 
(2014) point to the complexity of trying to stabilize gasoline prices while influencing hydrous 
prices by eliminating CIDE fuel tazes.  
In terms of consumer demand for anhydrous ethanol, it is the price of gasoline that 
influences their purchasing decision since anhydrous can only be demanded through gasoline 
consumption When the real price of gasoline increases by 1% (i.e. from R$2.89 to R$2.92 per liter 
or US$1.10 to US$1.11), the quantity of anhydrous demanded declines by 0.75% or 173 thousand 
liters. As Santos (2013) found, gasoline is a necessary good with a short-run price elasticity of -
0.39. The inelastic demand for anhydrous ethanol compliments Moraes and Zilberman (2014)’s 
argument for the production of only anhydrous ethanol and no other ethanol. Moraes and 
Zilberman (2014) favor the public policy of the blend mandate over that of the pricing policy of 
the elimination of the CIDE fuel tax.   
 In terms of the sugar market, an increase of R$0.07 (US$0.03)1 in real prices causes a 
decrease in 0.01% in the amount of sugar demanded (i.e. 3.8 thousand kilos of sugar). The 
uncompensated own price elasticity of the demand for sugar is -0.01 but is not statistically 
significant. Thus, demand for sugar appears not to be affected by its price. The values of the 
compensated (-0.009) and uncompensated own price elasticities are very close, and are both 
                                                 
1 Exchange rate used is that of December 2014 where US$1=R$2.6387. 
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statistically insignificant. The value of the sugar demand elasticity, though inelastic, is smaller 
than that found in previous studies -0.08 (FAPRI 2016). In the month of February, the demand for 
sugar was lower, possibly because this month has less days than the rest. Demand for sugar in 
February decreases by 0.08% or 30 thousand kilos. Increases in sugar consumption in previous 
months, causes increases in the current month. There seems to be an increasing pattern in sugar 
consumption though lagged sugar consumption was added in the model to control for 
autocorrelation. 
 
 2.6.4 Expenditure elasticities 
Expenditure elasticities for hydrous, anhydrous and sugar are varied (Table 2.8). An 
increase of one-percent in the real gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, or R$23.85 (US$9.04) 
results in an increase of 0.17% in the amount of sugar demanded, equivalent to 65 thousand kilos 
of sugar. The expenditure elasticity for sugar is 0.17 and is significant at the 1% level of 
significance (Table 2.8). It is only slightly larger than that found of 0.15 found by FAPRI (2016). 
Thus, sugar is a normal good.  
In the ethanol market, a one-percent increase in real GDP reduces the demand for 
anhydrous ethanol by 0.63%. In other words, when GDP increases by R$23.85 (US$9.04) 
anhydrous demand falls by 145 thousand liters. An increase of one percent in GDP causes the 
consumption of hydrous ethanol to rise by 3.99% or 1.07 million liters. This impact is greater than 
that found by de Freitas and Kaneko (2011) of 0.944 for the Center-South region. De Freitas and 
Kaneko (2011), though, model ethanol demand without considering simultaneous effects from 
ethanol supply and sugar markets, which may explain the different results.  
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Moraes and Zilberman (2014) argue that low fuel prices are the concern of low and middle 
income consumers. Here we find hydrous ethanol to be a luxury good. Perhaps as consumers with 
flex-fuel cars move to an upper income class they become more concerned with the  environment 
and opt for hydrous ethanol instead of gasoline. Similar to what Anderson (2012) finds for the 
U.S., where consumers are willing to pay a premium of US$0.24 to purchase E85, a mixture of 
85% ethanol and 15% gasoline (Anderson 2012). 
 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
This study estimates the impacts from internal and external factors on the ethanol and sugar 
expansion in the Cerrado region, particularly in the state of Goiás and Mato Grosso do Sul. Once 
market and policies drivers were identified, a system of demand and supply equations for sugar 
and ethanol markets was estimated using 3SLS. Elasticities were then calculated using the 
estimated coefficients. Results show that ethanol supply is more sensitive to changes in public 
policies than sugar supply. From the public policies applied, the blend mandate had the largest 
impact in ethanol supply and the BNDES subsidized credit had the largest impact on domestic 
sugar supply. Sugar exports do not seem to depend on public policies and they are more sensitive 
to sugar and sugarcane prices than domestic sugar supply. Sugar and ethanol were found to be 
complimentary outputs, that is, positive changes in ethanol prices cause increases in sugar supply 
and vice versa. In terms of demand, demand for hydrous ethanol was found to be sensitive to 
changes in gasoline prices. While own price demand for hydrous ethanol was elastic, own price 
demand for anhydrous ethanol was inelastic. As consumer income increases the preference for 
hydrous ethanol increases instead of gasoline.  
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Spillovers from the sugar market into the ethanol market and inversely imply that policy 
makers must be cautious when deciding on pricing policies that should only impact one market. 
This spillover result is a consequence of technology allowing mills to produce both inputs 
simultaneously. Sugar markets not being sensitive to public policies points to the sustainability of 
the industry and to how appropriate the current sugar market structures might be. Therefore, we 
believe that in order to promote sugarcane expansion in Brazil the government should focus its 
resources on the ethanol industry. Results from this study help the Brazilian government to decide 
on which policy to invest in when faced with limited resources. Out of the programs analyzed the 
blend mandate had the largest impact and the zoning the smallest.  
The dependence of ethanol supply on public policies can have serious implications for the 
sustainability of the ethanol expansion in the Cerrado region. The sustainability of the ethanol 
industry is important since it can bring rural development, environmental benefits and energy 
security to the country (Moraes and Zilberman 2014). Given limited financial resources, the 
sustainability of ethanol production in the Cerrado could be threatened by other competing policies 
(e.g. controlling of gasoline prices). Therefore, the Brazilian government should aim at developing 
a stable long-term demand for ethanol to ensure the sustainability of the ethanol market, making it 
is less dependent on public policies. 
Ethanol exports could be a solution to the sustainability of ethanol production. Ethanol 
exports have been underutilized when compared to ethanol consumed domestically. Afterall this 
region has only started exporting ethanol since 2013 and only 10% of Brazil’s total ethanol 
production is exported. Moraes and Zilberman (2014) believe that Brazilian ethanol has the 
potential of replacing around a quarter of the world’s gasoline supply. For this to be feasible, Brazil 
must provide ethanol importers a constant ethanol supply allowing importing countries to 
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implement blend mandates (Moraes and Zilberman 2014). To this end, Brazilian policies could 
aim at subsidizing ethanol storage costs, such that mills may be able to provide a constant flow of 
ethanol supply, as suggested by Moraes and Zilberman (2014). Another solution is the financial 
support for technological advances in second generation ethanol production or even the production 
of ethanol from other feedstocks (e.g. the use of corn as a feedstock in between sugarcane harvest 
seasons). 
It appears the Brazilian government’s act of juggling pricing policies (e.g. control of 
gasoline prices and the removal of CIDE fuel tax from ethanol) is not very beneficial to the ethanol 
industry and is impacting public revenue. There are policies that provide a higher impact on ethanol 
supply (e.g. blend mandate) than eliminating taxes. Perhaps efforts should be placed on the 
production of anhydrous ethanol instead of hydrous ethanol, as suggested by Moraes and 
Zilberman (2014). Nevertheless, if the government wishes to promote the production of hydrous 
ethanol then it should focus on policies that increase income. As shown, consumers become more 
willing to switch from gasoline to hydrous ethanol as they become more wealthy. In this sense, 
education on the environmental benefits of ethanol as a fuel could be beneficial. 
Findings from this study can guide biofuels expansion in other countries (e.g. ethanol 
expansion in Mozambique). It was found that for ethanol expansion to be sustainable, the ethanol 
market must be developed up to the point where it is dependent on market factors and no longer 
sensitive to public policies. Therefore, potential markets may need to be identified (e.g. Brazil 
increasing its ethanol exports). The challenges of applying pricing policies at the same time to 
substitutable fuels (e.g. gasoline and hydrous ethanol), point to the benefits of potentially only 
producing one type of ethanol. In this case, the blend mandate would promote anhydrous ethanol 
production. Similarly, the implementation of blend mandates in other countries would guarantee a 
40 
demand for ethanol promoting ethanol production. Further studies would be required to estimate 
the consequences of eliminating public policies, except for the blend mandate, on rural 
development and on the sustainability of the ethanol expansion into the Cerrado. 
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Figure 2.1: Evolution of domestic hydrous and anhydrous ethanol prices in dollars per liter 
(US$/L) from 1999 to 2014 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Evolution of domestic and international sugar prices in dollars per kilo (US$/Kg) from 
1999 to 2014 
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Figure 2.3: Brazilian interest rate (SELIC) between 1999 and 2014 
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Figure 2.4: Hydrous, anhydrous and sugar consumption in Goiás and Mato Grosso do Sul between 
1999 and 2014 
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Figure 2.5: Loans granted through the BNDES program towards investments in sugar and ethanol 
production in millions of dollars to the states of Goiás and Mato Grosso do Sul between 
1999 and 2014 
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Figure 2.6: Blend ratio percentages in practice between 1999 and 2014 
 
 
Figure 2.7: CIDE fuel tax charged per liter in US$ between 1999 and 2014 
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Table 2.1: Description of the variables in the econometric model 
Variable Description 
Lnscons log of the quantity of sugar demanded 
lnpsugrow log of the real international price of sugar 
Lngdp log of the real GDP per capita 
dummyfeb dummy for sugar consumption in the months of February* 
Trend trend variable 
Lnssup log of the quantity of sugar supplied 
Lnphyd log of the real price of hydrous ethanol  
Dsbndes dummy for times when credit subsidies for sugar production were low 
Lnselic log of the interest rate for loans in Brazil 
Lnpcane log of the real price of sugarcane paid to the producer 
Zone dummy for the start of the Agroecological Zone 
Dsugsup dummy to control for months when sugar supply was above 100 million Kg 
dum3 dummy to control for months (Jun, Aug, Sep, Dez) in 1999 and March, 2001 
when sugar consumption was much higher 
Lnsexp log of the quantity of ethanol exported 
dum4 dummy to control for months when sugar exports were above 56 million Kg 
dum7 dummy to control for months when the log of sugar exports was negative 
Lnesup log of the quantity of ethanol supplied 
Psugrow real international price of sugar 
Pcane real price of sugarcane 
Phyd real price of domestic hydrous ethanol 
Debndes dummy for time periods when credit subsidies for ethanol production were low 
Diffcide the difference between the tax on ethanol and the tax on gasoline 
Lnblend log of the percentage of ethanol that needs to be mixed into gasoline as 
determined by the Brazilian blend mandate 
Lnpgas log of the real domestic price of gasoline at the pump 
Lnacons log of the quantity of anhydrous ethanol supplied 
Dumadem dummy to control for year 1999* 
Ratio the real price of hydrous ethanol divided by the real price of gasoline 
dumhydem dummy to control for when consumption was lower than normal: Feb. 2010, 
Mar. and Apr. 2011* 
*Please refer to the appendix for more information on the variables added. 
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Figure 2.8: Sugar and ethanol exports from Goiás and Mato Grosso do Sul from 1999 to 2014 
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Table 2.2: Summary statistics of the variables of the model 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
deviation Unit 
Price of sugar 0.71 0.16 R$/Kg 
Zoning (dummy) 0.31 0.46 Zoning start =1 
Selic 1.15 0.41 % 
GDP per capita 2.40 0.56 R$1,000 
Sugar Consumption 38.05 3.5 1,000,000Kg 
Sugar Exports 32.92 49.66 1,000,000Kg 
Anhydrous Consumption 23.09 6.54 1,000,000 liters 
Hydrous Consumption 26.79 12.93 1,000,000 liters 
Blend mandate 23.00 1.67 % 
Difference between fuel taxes -0.21 0.17 R$ 
Ethanol Supply 49.88 17.5 1,000,000 liters 
Sugar Supply 70.97 51.55 1,000,000Kg 
Price of hydrous 1.05 0.13 R$/liter 
Price of gasoline 2.89 0.33 R$/liter 
Price of Sugarcane 0.38 0.07 R$/Kg TRS 
Ratio 0.37 0.06 
hydrous price/gasoline 
price 
Debndes (dummy) 0.52 0.5 Low subsidies = 1 
Dsbndes (dummy) 0.43 0.5 Low subsidies = 1 
Sales of Ethanol and Flex cars 5600 4706 1 car 
Population 674 33 1000 people 
All prices in Reais (R$) of 2010.       
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Table 2.3: Results from the 3sls model for the sugar market 
 
Std Err
Constant -0.87 *** 0.187
log real price of sugar -0.01 0.009
log real gdp 0.17 *** 0.029
dumfeb -0.08 *** 0.005
lnsconn t-2 0.62 *** 0.032
lnsconn t-3 0.27 *** 0.034
trend
2
-0.000003 *** 0.000
R
2
0.96
Constant 2.235 *** 0.203
log real price of sugar 0.636 *** 0.147
log real price of sugarcane -0.873 *** 0.133
Dsbndes -0.080 * 0.043
log pride of hydrous 0.354 *** 0.146
log interest rate 0.001 0.052
Zone 0.041 0.042
dsugsup -0.642 *** 0.246
lnsugarsupt-1 0.272 *** 0.044
dsugsup*lnsugarsupt-1 0.271 *** 0.055
dum3 0.418 *** 0.084
R
2
0.857
Constant 0.479 0.446
log real price of sugarcane -2.429 *** 0.548
log real price of sugar 2.283 *** 0.593
lnsexpt-1 0.185 *** 0.037
dum3 1.516 *** 0.335
dum4 1.379 *** 0.173
dum7 -2.068 *** 0.143
Dsbndes -0.192 0.142
zone 0.100 0.152
R
2
0.756
*** Significant at 1% level of significance
* Significant at 10% level of significance
Coefficient Estimates
Sugar Demand
Sugar Supply
Sugar Supply to the Rest of the World
Endogenous variables: sugar consumption, sugar supply, sugar supply 
to the rest of the world, price of hydrous ethanol, price of sugar
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Table 2.4: Results from the 3sls model for the ethanol market 
 
  
Coefficient Estimates Std Err
Constant 11.07 *** 2.440
real price of sugar 2.98 *** 0.392
real price of hydrous 0.41 4.213
real price of hydrous
2
-0.46 1.915
real price of sugarcane -2.86 *** 0.635
Zone 0.57 *** 0.091
Debndes -0.84 *** 0.094
log interest rate -0.08 0.123
Difference in fuel taxes 1.25 *** 0.184
log of blend mandate 3.14 *** 0.406
R
2
0.895
Constant 8.55 *** 0.992
log real gdp per capita -0.63 *** 0.120
log real price of gasoline -0.75 *** 0.147
dumadem 0.12 *** 0.030
trend
2
0.00 *** 0.000
R
2
0.924
Constant 2.20 *** 0.188
real ratio -7.03 *** 0.910
real gdp per capita 0.0017 *** 0.000
dumhydem -0.13 0.199
R
2
0.756
*** Significant at 1% level of significance
Hydrous Ethanol Demand
Anhydrous Ethanol Demand
Ethanol Supply
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Table 2.5: Public policy elasticities 
    Public Policies 
    
Zae Cana 
Subsidized 
Loans 
(Ethanol) 
Subsidized 
Loans 
(Sugar) 
Interest 
Rate 
Blend 
Difference 
in fuel 
taxes 
Q
u
an
ti
ty
 
Sugar 
0.04       -0.08 * 0.001         
  (0.04)       (0.04)             
Sugar 
Exports 
0.1       -0.192             
(0.15)       (0.14)             
Ethanol 0.57 *** -0.84 ***     -0.08 3.14 *** 1.25 *** 
  (0.09)   (0.09)       (0.12) (0.41)   (0.18)   
Note: Standard errors are in parenthesis. Significant levels: *** is 1%, ** is 5%, * is 10%.       
 
 
Table 2.6: Supply elasticities 
  Prices 
  Sugar Hydrous Sugarcane 
Q
u
an
ti
ty
 
Sugar 0.64*** 0.35** -0.87
*** 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.13) 
Sugar Exports 2.28***  -2.43
*** 
 (0.59)  (0.55) 
Ethanol 2.11*** 0.43 -1.07
*** 
 (0.28) (4.42) (0.24) 
Note: Standard errors are in parenthesis. Significant levels: *** is 1%, ** is 5%, * is 10%.  
 
Table 2.7: Compensated and uncompensated demand elasticities 
 
Uncompensated Compensated  
Prices  Prices  
Sugar Ratio Gasoline Sugar Gasoline 
Q
u
an
ti
ty
 
Sugar -0.01     -0.009  
  (0.01)     (0.01)  
Anhydrous     -0.75***   -0.77*** 
      (0.15)   (0.15) 
Hydrous    -2.58***     
 
   (0.33)      
Note: Standard errors are in parenthesis. Significant levels: *** is 1%, ** is 5%, * is 10%.  
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Table 2.8: Expenditure elasticities 
Good 
Gross Domestic 
Product 
Sugar 0.17*** 
  (0.03) 
Anhydrous -0.63*** 
  (0.12) 
Hydrous  3.99*** 
  (0.21) 
Note: Satndard errors are in parenthesis. Significant levels: *** is 
1%, ** is 5%, * is 10%. 
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Chapter 3 - Sugarcane contracts in Brazil: How sweet is the deal? 
 
 
3.1 Introduction   
Brazil is one of the world’s leading ethanol producers, primarily from sugarcane, and was 
responsible for almost half of the world’s sugarcane production in 2012 (MAPA 2013). The sugar-
energy sector in Brazil accounts for approximately 2% of the country’s Gross Domestic Product 
(Neves, Trombin and Consoli 2011). Brazilian ethanol is produced from sugarcane, a crop that 
since its introduction in the country, has expanded from the North-Northeast Region to the Center-
Southeast, particularly into the Cerrado area, the country’s second largest biome. In the Cerrado, 
this expansion has been most significant in the states of Goiás (GO) and Mato Grosso do Sul (MS) 
(Shikida 2013). From 2000 to 2012 over 40 mills have been constructed in these states (Procana 
2013). Although over 50% of Brazil’s sugarcane production is located in the state of São Paulo, in 
2014, these two states (GO and MS) had 1.5 million hectares planted with sugarcane and 
contributed to 15% of the total amount of sugarcane produced in the country (IBGE 2014). In 
addition, the Sugarcane Agroecological Zoning, launched in 2010, mapped 12.6 million hectares 
in GO and 10.8 million hectares in MS as suitable areas for sugarcane production and expansion 
(Manzatto et al. 2009). 
Access to sugarcane is a vital factor in the location and operation of an ethanol plant 
(Queiroz 2008). Sugarcane in GO and MS is obtained by (i) mills contracting directly with farmers 
or (ii) mills renting farm land and producing sugarcane themselves. These procurement methods 
help mills guarantee a supply of sugarcane (Picanço Filho and Marin 2012a). Thus, sugarcane is 
produced on land managed by autonomous farmers (40%) and, by ethanol companies (mills) 
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(60%) (Brazil, 2013). Due to time limitations between sugarcane harvesting and processing, as 
well as, transportation costs, mills acquire their sugarcane supply from lands within a certain 
distance from the mill (e.g. 50km) (Neves, Waack and Marino 1998).  
Transition to sugarcane production in the states of MS and GO has not been smooth. In 
fact, in Jatai, a County in Goiás, grain farmers lobbied to pass a law restricting the amount of land 
planted to sugarcane (O Popular 2011). This attempt to restrict production of sugarcane was a way 
to prevent increases in land and labor prices. The installation of the mill increased demand for both 
inputs, increasing the price of land and labor (Sant’Anna, Shanoyan, et al. 2016). Hence, it is 
important for the mill to design contracts that are attractive to farmers and landowners, making 
them willing to grow sugarcane. Knowing the attributes and contract types farmers and landowners 
prefer, is pertinent for sugarcane expansion in the Cerrado region.  
Although sugarcane expansion in the Cerrado region has been the focus of many studies 
(Silva and Miziara 2011; CONAB 2013; Shikida 2013) few have considered contracting and the 
relationship between sugarcane producers and mills (Sant’Anna, Granco, et al. 2016; Picanço Filho 
and Marin 2012a; Picanço Filho and Marin 2012b). In fact, most of the Brazilian data on contracts 
comes from case studies (de Almeida and Buainain 2016). No study has investigated farmers’ 
willingness to produce sugarcane under different contractual conditions. In broad terms this study 
contributes to the understanding of farmer preferences towards different contracts (i.e. land lease, 
supply and cropshare contrats). It provides researchers with methodology to consider cases where 
each choice has an unbalanced number of attributes and there are multiple opt-out options. In terms 
of Brazil, this study provides guidance to mills and farmers about contract design and to the 
Brazilian government on contracting policy. In particular, the government could design policies 
aimed at strengthening contract enforcement, protecting the rights and well-being of both parties. 
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The government has a special interest in motivating sugarcane expansion, as the installation of a 
mill brings benefits to the local community: economic development, infrastructure improvement, 
and increase in job opportunities for the local population, among others (Roberto 2012). Sugarcane 
expansion has potential environmental benefits and is part of the Brazilian National Policy on 
Climate Change, aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions from 36.1% to 38.9% by 2020 
(Brazil 2009).  
The purpose of this study is to examine landowners’ and farmers’ willingness to produce 
sugarcane under different contractual arrangements using a hypothetical stated choice experiment. 
In order to capture farmers’ preferences for each contract we propose a new model that has two 
opt-out options allowing for a better understanding of remaining with the status quo in comparison 
with traditional stated choice models with only a status quo or an “opt-out” option. The objective 
is to capture respondents’ choice preferences with regards to marginal changes in contract choices. 
Respondent’s willingness to pay for certain contract attributes is estimated from stated choice 
model results. The study uses data collected by a survey conducted in 22 Counties throughout the 
states of Goiás and Mato Grosso do Sul – Brazil, in June/July of 2014.  
The paper is divided into seven parts. In the first section, we introduce the topic and explain 
the purpose of the paper. Section two examines sugarcane contracting in Brazil and the advantages 
and disadvantages of different contracts is highlighted. The third section presents the data gathered 
and compares it with that of the Brazilian Census in order to illustrate the representativeness of the 
sample. The fourth section, goes over the conceptual model for this study, while the fifth section 
presents the empirical estimation of the models. The sixth section presents the results, comparing 
it to the expectations presented in the conceptual model section, while the last section wraps up 
the article by highlighting the conclusions and possible implications of the study. 
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3.2 Sugarcane contracting 
A contract is a legal document constraining signing parties. It is a means for an exchange 
to occur in the presence of transaction costs, asymmetric information and irreversible investments 
(Vavra 2009). Contracts vary by crop, available technology, market development, and other socio 
and demographic characteristics (Eswaran and Kotwal 1985). An increase in the use of contracts 
in agriculture arises due to forces such as market consolidation, variations in trade patterns, 
technological developments, and logistic issues (Vavra 2009). These forces, present in the 
sugarcane market in the Cerrado, make it difficult for a farmer to market and produce sugarcane 
without a contract (Picanço Filho and Marin 2012a).  
A mill may seek to sign various types of contracts with farmers and landowners in order to 
balance the risks for both parties (Feltre and de Oriani e Paulillo 2015). Three types of contracts 
are currently used in Brazil: (1) land rental contracts – which give the local mill use of the land for 
sugarcane production for a fixed rental rate; (2) agricultural partnership contracts – which give the 
local mill use of the land for sugarcane production for a percentage of the harvested crop; and (3) 
supply contracts – by which farmers agree to supply sugarcane to the local mill for an agreed price 
and quantity (Brazil 1966). Numbers from the last Agricultural Census in 2006 relate that from 
135,683 farms in GO and 64,862 farms in MS, 4.6% of producers in MS and 3.2% in GO have a 
land rental contract (IBGE 2006). The percentage of producers with an agricultural partnership is 
smaller: 0.31% in GO and 0.43% in MS for all types of agricultural commodities (IBGE 2006; 
Almeida and Buainain 2016). Though the 2006 Agricultural Census has no information on supply 
contracts we can have an idea of how many could be on a supply contract by looking at producers 
working on their own property. The percentage of producers using their own property is 87% in 
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GO and 75% in MS (IBGE 2006). Keep in mind that these facts are for all agricultural commodities 
and livestock and reflects information from 2006. 
 
 3.2.1 Advantages and disadvantages of each contract type 
Land rental contracts allow mills to select the optimal amount of inputs for sugarcane 
production. The mill controls all stages of production, minimizing the risk of losing sugarcane 
suppliers to a competing plant (Feltre and de Oriani e Paulillo 2015). The landowner transfers all 
risks associated with the production process to the mill. However, the landowner incurs the risk of 
the mill potentially over-utilizing the land or natural resources associated with it (Almeida and 
Buainain 2016). Landowners and farmers may prefer a land rental contract because (Picanço Filho 
2010): (1) they are undercapitalized due to previous crises in the rural sector; (2) the costs to form 
and maintain a sugarcane plantation are high; (3) they are resistant to entering a new sector; (4) 
current labor regulations are too restrictive; (5) they are averse to climate and fire risks; or (6) they 
prefer a guaranteed periodic fixed payment under contract (Almeida and Buainain 2016).  
In the agricultural partnership contract the mill and the farmer share production risks. There 
is an incentive for the producer to use less factors of production than under the land rental contract 
and over-utilize the landowners’ factors of production (e.g. land and soil nutrients). This situation 
arises because the producer only receives a share of the harvest (Almeida and Buainain 2016). 
Preference for an agricultural partnership may be due to the fact that higher revenue may be 
achieved depending on the quality or yield the of sugarcane, providing, potentially, greater return 
than the land rental contract at a lower risk than entering into a supply contract. 
The supply contract transfers the production costs and risks from the mill to the producer, 
enabling the mill to concentrate solely on ethanol and sugar production. The payment of the supply 
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contract depends on the yield and the quantity supplied. The choice of the supply contract over 
other options may be due to producers wanting more autonomy over sugarcane production and use 
of their land. In the case of the supply contract, the producer and the landlord are usually the same 
person. The over-utilization of land may not be in the producer and landowner’s best interest. 
While the mill reduces their risk, they become reliant on the quality of the sugarcane supplied from 
the producer (Feltre and de Oriani e Paulillo 2015).  
 
 3.2.2 Factors associated with sugarcane contracting in the Cerrado region 
The Cerrado region has a long tradition in grain and livestock production. A factor that 
motived farmers to produce sugarcane in the past was soybean rust (2004) and low cattle prices 
(Picanço Filho and Marin 2012a; Sant’Anna, Granco, et al. 2016). Farmers are willing to enter into 
sugarcane production due to the lower risks and high returns it has in comparison to other 
agricultural or livestock activities (Picanço Filho and Marin 2012a). In addition, mills have 
provided free seedlings, technical assistance, and product delivery subsidies to attract sugarcane 
suppliers (Sant’Anna, Granco, et al. 2016).  
Mills seek farmers and/or landowners whose land lies within 50km from the mill to sign 
contracts (Neves, Waack and Marino 1998). Harvested sugarcane must be delivered and processed 
within 72 hours (Neves, Waack and Marino 1998). The distance limitation helps to avoid high 
transportation costs and to prevent saccharose losses from the harvested sugarcane.  
Common clauses in contracts signed between mills and farmers are: (1) compensation for 
the sugarcane not bought by the mill called “cana bisada”; (2) payment methods (i.e. 80% upon 
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delivery and 20% at the end of the harvest year); (3) and fidelity2 in sugarcane sales (Picanço Filho 
and Marin 2012a).  
On average, contracts last for one or two sugarcane cycles (i.e. 6 or 12 years) (Picanço 
Filho and Marin 2012a). At the end of the sugarcane cycle the land must be remediated (e.g. by 
rotating with soybeans or peanuts) for its productivity to be restored (Feltre and de Oriani e Paulillo 
2015). Farmers have historically been willing to sign longer contracts with financially stable mills 
(Feltre and de Oriani e Paulillo 2015).  
Farmers willingness to sign longer contracts can also be motivated by a strong presence of 
the State. By enforcing contracts, the State prevents opportunistic behaviors from either party (i.e. 
the agent or the principal) (Watanabe and Zylbersztajn 2014). When contract enforcement is weak, 
firms may opt to vertically integrate, internalizing all activities (Watanabe and Zylberstein 2014). 
In the agribusiness system, state intervention is focused on the farmer, the economically weaker 
party. This protects the farmer from rules imposed by the agro-industry, who generally holds more 
power (Watanabe and Zylberstein 2014).  
In terms of bargaining power, farms closer to the mill and/or larger in size may hold more 
bargaining power than other farms when signing a contract (Picanço Filho and Marin 2012a; 
Sant’Anna, Granco, et al. 2016). Closer farms to the mill provide less saccharose losses during 
transportation. Larger farms can guarantee a larger amount of sugarcane supply in one contract 
(Picanço Filho and Marin 2012a). Mills, though, also hold bargaining power due to the presence 
of asymmetric information (Picanço Filho and Marin 2012a). Since this area has only recently 
started to produce sugarcane, mills generally have a broader understanding of sugarcane 
production and quality, as well as, of ethanol and sugar markets. Knowledge of these factors 
                                                 
2 By fidelity we mean that the farmer can only supply sugarcane to a particular mill, though a mill may buy from 
many suppliers (Neves, Waack and Marino 1998). 
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influences expected sugarcane yields and the expected prices of sugar and ethanol, giving them an 
advantage over the producers who may not have the same information.  
 
 3.2.3 Previous studies on contracting 
Studies on contracts with varying autonomy and risk (Lusk and Hudson 2004), and on 
biofuel contracts have been conducted in the United States (Bergtold, Fewell and Williams 2014) 
and in Australia (Windle and Rolfe 2005). Bergtold, Fewell and Williams (2014) examined 
farmers’ willingness to produce biofuel under different contract options using a stated choice 
experiment. Farmers were presented with different scenarios and asked to choose a contract from 
a set of alternatives with varying attributes and a do not adopt option. The authors found that 
farmers prefer contracts with shorter lengths, higher net returns and with the option of the bio-
refinery harvesting needed biomass and replacing lost soil nutrients. Although only supply 
contracts are considered, we expect our results to be similar to theirs, as both studies consider large 
commercial farming operations.  
Hudson and Lusk (2004) determined how certain contract attributes make farmers, in Texas 
and Mississippi, more likely to choose a particular contract. Farmers had the option of contracts 
with different levels of autonomy and price risk. Results showed farmers derive utility from input 
provision (i.e. provision of seeds), shorter contract lengths, autonomy in decision-making, and 
from shifting price risk to the contractor. The authors concluded that risk avoidance plays an 
important role in contract choice. Producers were willing to forgo 4% of their annual income 
($5,950.78) in order to pass on the full risk to the contractor (Hudson and Lusk 2004). Although 
producers want more autonomy, they would need to be compensated $9800 per year to give up 
that autonomy (Hudson and Lusk 2004). When the marginal utility of transaction cost attributes 
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outweighs that of risk avoidance, transaction costs will guide contracting decisions. In contrast to 
Hudson and Lusk’s (2004) research, we capture the preference for attributes that are specific to a 
type of contract. Our contract options differ from that in Hudson and Lusk (2004): (1) each contract 
has its own particular set of attributes; (2) the level of autonomy is determined by the contract 
type; (3) the risk is assessed in terms of a probability of receiving a late payment, and (4) the 
respondent must indicate the reason for choosing the status quo option by indicating whether they 
wish to keep their current contract or to not grow sugarcane. 
Windle and Rolfe (2005) used a stated choice experiment to estimate Australian sugarcane 
grower’s willingness to diversify farm income. The authors argue that understanding farmers’ 
willingness to diversify is vital when predicting the speed at which an industry can restructure (e.g. 
farm agglomeration). Farmers’ attitudes to risk, tactical opportunities and institutional 
impediments3 may result in less diversification than expected (Windle and Rolfe 2005). The 
authors concluded that in order to avoid risk, producers may not be willing to diversify production, 
even though gross margins play an important role in decision making.  
 
 
3.3 Data 
Data was collected using face-to-face enumerated surveys with landowners and farmers in 
22 counties in the states of Goiás (GO) and Mato Grosso do Sul (MS) in Brazil. Survey design 
was based on studies conducted in Quirinopolis, in GO (Picanço Filho and Marin 2012a; Picanço 
Filho 2010). The survey and stated choice experiment were tested by experts and farmers within 
                                                 
3 E.g. the sugar quota production system stopped producers from leaving the sugar industry for there was no guarantee 
of regaining the quota afterwards. 
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the study region prior to its application in the field. The counties surveyed in each state were chosen 
based on: (i) geographic location of sugarcane production in 2012 using the National Institute for 
Space Research (INPE) Canasat Project (Rudorff et al. 2010); and, (ii) sugarcane production 
growth obtained from the Brazilian survey of county-level agricultural production – PAM  
(IBGE 2014).  
Landowners and farmers from sugarcane growers’ associations, rural syndicates, the Goiás 
and the Mato Grosso do Sul Federation of Agriculture and Livestock (FAEG and FAMASUL) 
were contacted to participate in the survey. Information was collected on participants’ 
demographics, farm characteristics, landownership, sugarcane production and contracts, 
perceptions of mills’ interaction with the local community, and land use. The stated choice 
experiment was the last portion of the survey.  
Surveys were conducted in 2014 from June to July. The team that applied the survey was 
composed of 10 enumerators (graduate and undergraduate students), a Professor from the State 
University of Sao Paulo and a Professor (the Co-Principal Investigator) from Kansas State 
University. The team was split in three cars which ran over 1864 miles. Each survey lasted about 
an hour to complete. A total of 148 landowners and farmers were interviewed, a considerable size 
given the limitations and difficulties faced: (1) landowners residing in another state; (2) dirt roads; 
(3) isolated and extensive farms; (3) respondents cancelling or not showing up for the survey. Of 
those, 104 either produced sugarcane or rented land for sugarcane production. From the survey, 
there were 110 landowners and farmers that responded to the hypothetical experiment, 69 of which 
were either sugarcane producers or rented land for sugarcane production.  
Though our survey may not represent the entire farmer population in Brazil, respondents 
fall into the group of commercial farmers that would likely be approached by mills to supply 
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sugarcane or to rent out their land. This is explained by the sample consisting largely of farmers 
belonging to associations, rural syndicates, and/or cooperatives involved in sugarcane production. 
Farmers belonging to one of these organizations tended to manage mostly commercial farms, 
which tend to be larger in size. The average size of the farm in our sample is 913 hectares while 
that of the 2006 Agricultural Census4 is 415 hectares (IBGE 2006). This difference is due to the 
census comprising a much larger number of smaller farms than the survey. The percentage of male 
farmers in the census is similar to that of the survey. The census reports 92% of farmers are male, 
while 96% of our survey respondents were male. In terms of education, our survey has a higher 
percentage of farmers with high school and college degrees than the census. In our survey, 37% of 
the respondents had completed high school and 28% college. In the census 4% had completed high 
school and 3% college. The average sugarcane production value and yield is also higher in the 
survey compared to CONAB (2013). CONAB (2013) reports an average yield of 70.30 tons/ha in 
this region, while our respondents have a yield of 87.71 tons per hectare  
(Table 3.1).  
 
 3.3.1 Stated choice experiment 
Stated choice methods were chosen to investigate farmers’ preferences for a certain 
contract type (land rent, agricultural partnership, supply). Stated choice methods were chosen over 
revealed preference methods. It provided more variation than revealed data, given the presence of 
only a single mill in proximity to a respondent farm most of the time. In addition, contract 
information is usually classified. For example, farmers and landowners could not provide 
information on contract payment amounts. Another reason for choosing stated choice data over 
                                                 
4 The 2006 Agricultural Census is the most current census. 
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revealed preference is that there could be a tendency for mills to provide mainly one type of 
contract (e.g. land rental contract). The stated choice data allows us to assess a potential change in 
behavior when farmers and landowners would hypothetically have more contract options.  
In order to capture choice differences specific to each type of contract we conducted a 
labelled stated choice experiment. This planned process generated stated choice data, in which 
choices and attribute levels of three contract types (land rent, agricultural partnership, supply) were 
pre-determined and then varied to create choice alternatives. Table 3.2 shows all the contract 
attributes for the three different contract options examined in the stated choice experiment.  
The full factorial design, which considers all possible combinations of all attribute levels 
and contract options (Table 3.2), amounted to 884,736 (= (4 ∗ 3 ∗ 2) ∗ (4 ∗ 4 ∗ 2 ∗ 3) ∗ (4 ∗ 2 ∗
3 ∗ 2 ∗ 2 ∗ 2 ∗ 2)) combinations. Due to the many combinations in the full factorial design and 
concerns about respondent burden, a fractional factorial design was created from the full factorial 
using PROC OPTEX in SAS 9.3. The fractional factorial considered only main effects. From the 
fractional factorial design, 48 profiles were chosen by PROC OPTEX, yielding a D-efficiency 
score of 92%5.  
The generated profiles were grouped into blocks of 8, such that the survey consisted of 8 
versions, each with 6 different contract scenarios. Each scenario provided the respondent the 
option of choosing between a: land rental contract, agricultural partnership contract, supplier 
contract, or the status quo option. Respondents who chose status quo then had to determine if they 
wanted to keep their current contract or if they wanted to not grow sugarcane (Figure 3.1). From 
                                                 
5 The D-efficiency score ranges between 0% and 100% and provides information about the efficiency of the 
experimental design. The aim is to determine a design that provides balance and orthogonality, therefore a higher D-
efficiency score is desired (Kuhfeld 2005).  
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the 148 farmers and landowners surveyed only 110 answers were complete and usable for this 
study.  
Generally stated choice studies use one of two kinds of opt-out options: a “do not adopt” 
(or “do not purchase”) and “keep my current brand” (or “status quo”) (Banzhaf, Johnson and 
Mathews 2001). In this study, we expand the stated choice model to include two opt-out options 
resembling these. They are “keep my current contract” and “not to grow sugarcane”. This unique 
design has the benefit of eliminating uncertainty about why a respondent chooses the status quo 
option, making it possible to distinguish between the preferences to not grow sugarcane and to 
keep their current contract (Figure 3.1). For example, in our case, out of a total of 660 responses, 
18% of respondents chose the land rental contract, 20% the agricultural partnership, 10% the 
supply contract and 51% the status quo option. At a first glance once could ironically interpret 
these preliminary results as the farmer preferring not to grow sugarcane. When considering the 
two opt-out model, the status quo option is split into 40% preferring their current contract and 11% 
opting not to grow sugarcane. The two opt-out model is a novelty that has not been explored in 
previous studies to the author’s knowledge. Previous studies (Adamowicz et al. 1997; Carson et 
al. 1994) have focused on how different opt-out options (e.g. status quo or keep my current brand) 
can impact the results from the study but no study to the author’s knowledge has been designed to 
include both opt-out options. 
In general, all contract options had information on payment, contract length, and risk of 
late payment. The probability of late payment was added to reflect the current situation in which 
financially unstable mills are paying landowners/farmers late, representing a risk attribute of 
entering into a contract. In 2008/2009 Picanço Filho and Marin (2012a) note that mills paid 
producers late, which resulted in financial burden to them as these farmers were not able to make 
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the payments to their input suppliers and for third party services (e.g. fertilization services). In 
addition, results from this survey indicate that late payments occur at least once a year and 20% of 
respondents complained that the mills did not fulfill their role in the contract (Sant’Anna, Granco, 
et al. 2016).  
Payment type varied by contract. The land rental contract payment is a percentage of the 
value of the land. The agricultural partnership contract payment is a percentage of the sugarcane 
production. The percentage levels of the land rental and agricultural partnership contracts were 
chosen following Brazilian legislation and the National Agricultural Council contract manual 
(CNA 2007; Brazil 1966).  
The agricultural partnership and the supply contract payments both depend on sugarcane 
yield and TRS (total recoverable sugar) levels. TRS pricing is set by the Council of Sugarcane, 
Sugar and Ethanol producers of the state of São Paulo – CONSECANA (Valdes 2011). TRS levels 
determine the value of the sugarcane. In this experiment TRS levels are the minimum, average and 
maximum observed in the two states (CONAB 2013; Picanço Filho 2010). Apart from the TRS 
levels, the supply contract has other attributes that affect payment such as: the mill only buying 
part of the sugarcane produced, the provision of seedlings and that of harvesting, hauling and 
delivery services. These attributes are part of the common clauses found in current supply 
contracts. Mills that only buy part of the sugarcane produced must compensate at cana bisada the 
remaining sugarcane in the field. Mills, in GO and MS, usually offer services, such as harvesting, 
hauling and delivery and the provision of seedlings or a loan, to motivate farmers into producing 
sugarcane (Picanço Filho 2010). The services were included in the experiment as binary attributes 
(i.e. they are offered or not) (Table 3.2).  
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3.4 Conceptual model 
In our study, we focus on the farmer and landowner’s utility. The conceptual framework is 
based upon research conducted by Hudson and Lusk (2004) and Bergtold, Fewell and Williams 
(2014). Farmer i derives utility from each of the attributes in contract j (Hudson and Lusk 2004). 
That is: 
 
 𝑈𝑖𝑗 = 𝑢𝑖𝑗(𝑅𝑗 , 𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑒, 𝐿, 𝐶𝑆𝑗 , 𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑒1) 
 
(3.1) 
where R refers to the returns from contract j, Late refers to the probability of receiving payments 
late, and L refers to the length of the contract. Each contract has contract specific attributes denoted 
as 𝐶𝑆𝑗 (see Table 3.2). Lastly, More1 is a dummy that takes on the value 1 if there is more than 
one mill in the area that the farmer can sell to.  
A farmer will choose the contract which maximizes their utility given by equation (3.1). 
We hypothesize that farmers prefer higher returns( 
𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝑅𝑗
> 0) and lower probability of late payment 
 (
𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑒
< 0). The preference for the length of the contract is ambiguous. Given the irreversible 
nature of start-up costs for growing sugarcane and sugarcane being a perennial crop, it can be 
expected that farmers may prefer longer contracts ( 
𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝐿
> 0). Profits from sugarcane production 
can be achieved by spreading out the initial investment over time (Picanço Filho and Marin 2012a). 
Longer contracts can help to avoid renegotiation costs and quasi-rental appropriation, as well 
(Lusk and Hudson 2004; Joskow 1987; Crocker and Masten 1988). Farmers, though, may also 
prefer shorter contracts in order to have more management flexibility or due to weak contract 
enforcement ( 
𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝐿
< 0) (Bergtold, Fewell and Williams 2014).  
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Contract specific (CS) attributes include the TRS values in the supply and agricultural 
partnership contracts. In the supply contract, CS attributes also include planting, harvesting, 
hauling and delivery and “mill buys all” (see Table 3.2). A higher TRS value for the sugarcane 
implies a higher return for the farmer, since the sugarcane sold is of higher quality. Due to the high 
costs associated with entering into sugarcane production (Silva and Miziara 2011), a contract with 
the mill providing financial aid for planting is preferred to one that does not. Due to the machinery 
and infrastructure needed for harvesting, hauling and delivery, it is likely that farmers will prefer 
a contract that offers these services over a contract that does not. Finally, the farmer would prefer 
that the mill buys all of the sugarcane they produce and not just a part of it. Thus, the CS attributes 
are expected to be seen as beneficial to the farmer ( 
𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝐶𝑆𝑗
> 0). Lastly, the number of mills located 
close to a farmer to which he/she can supply sugarcane to, may impact his/her choice between 
different contracts or the status quo option. In counties with more than one sugarcane buyer, 
farmers may have more bargaining power allowing them to demand better contract conditions and 
higher payments. Hence, it is expected that More1 brings disutility in the stop growing sugarcane 
option  (
𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑒1
< 0) for the farmer could bargain for a higher payment, making the option to not 
to grow sugarcane a bad one. Using the same rational, we would expect More1 to bring utility to 
the other contract options (
𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑒1
> 0)since it would increase farmers’ bargaining power. 
 
 
3.5 Empirical model and estimation 
The empirical model follows the random utility modelling (RUM) framework, given the 
researcher can only observe the actual contract choice by a respondent. RUM defines the utility 
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function given by equation (3.1) as having both an observed (V) and a random component (𝑒), 
such that the utility of farmer i choosing contract j is (Hudson and Luck 2004; Bergtold, Fewell 
and Williams 2014): 
 
 𝑈𝑖𝑗 = 𝑉𝑖𝑗(𝑅𝑗 , 𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑒, 𝐿, 𝐶𝑆𝑗) + 𝑒𝑖𝑗 (3.2) 
 
where 𝑉𝑖𝑗 is the nonrandom component of utility, which is a function of the observed attributes of 
contract j, and 𝑒𝑖𝑗 is a random component of utility and is assumed to be independent and 
identically distributed extreme value Type 1 (Train 2009; Bergtold, Fewell and Williams 2014). 
The functional form of the observed component of utility, 𝑉𝑖𝑘, will vary according to the 
contract chosen. Each contract has contract-specific attributes (e.g. planting and harvest assistance) 
and general attributes, that are common to all of them (e.g. length of contract and probability of 
late payment). In the case of the model with the two opt-out options there are five random utility 
functions that are compared, one for each option and the opt-out choices. Following Bergtold, 
Fewell and Williams (2014), the observed component of utility for each option (land rental (LR), 
agricultural partnership (AP), supply (S), not to grow sugarcane (NS) and keep current contract 
(KC) is given by:  
 
𝑉𝑖𝐿𝑅 =  𝑎0𝑖 +  𝑎1𝑅𝐿𝑅 + 𝑎2𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑒 + 𝑎3𝐿 + 𝑎4𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑒1,          (3.3) 
 
𝑉𝑖𝐴𝑃 = 𝑏0𝑖 +  𝑏1𝑅𝐴𝑃 + 𝑏2𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑒 + 𝑏3𝐿 + 𝑏4𝑇𝑅𝑆 + 𝑏5𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑒1,          (3.4) 
 
𝑉𝑖𝑆 =  𝑐0𝑖 + 𝑐1𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑒 + 𝑐2𝐿 + 𝑐3𝑇𝑅𝑆 + 𝑐4𝑃 + 𝑐5𝐻 + 𝑐6𝐷 + 𝑐7𝐵 + 𝑐8𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑒1, 
 
(3.5)            
𝑉𝑖𝑁𝑆 = 𝑑0𝑖 + 𝑑1𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑒1, and (3.6) 
 
𝑉𝑖𝐾𝐶 = 𝑒0𝑖 + 𝑒1𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑒1 
 
               
(3.7) 
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where 𝑽𝒊𝒋 are linear additive functions in the attributes pertaining to each option, where j=LR, AP, 
S, NS, KS (Louviere, Hensher and Swait 2000).  The intercepts or alternative specific constants 
(ASC) (𝑎0𝑖, 𝑏0𝑖, 𝑐0𝑖,𝑑0𝑖, 𝑒0𝑖) in equations (3.3) to (3.7) are contract and individual specific, 
allowing the ASC to capture individual specific preferences for each option in relation to a “base” 
case. This approach allows for the average marginal utility to vary among each individual and 
allows for each contract type to be viewed on average differently due to its nature. We assume that 
each ASC varies across the sample following a normal distribution and is modeled as (Louviere, 
Hensher and Swait 2000): 
 
𝑎0𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝜎𝑎𝜇𝑎𝑖, 
𝑏0𝑖 = 𝛽 + 𝜎𝑏𝜇𝑏𝑖, 
𝑐0𝑖 = 𝜏 + 𝜎𝑐𝜇𝑐𝑖, 
𝑑0𝑖 = 𝛿 + 𝜎𝑑𝜇𝑑𝑖, and 
𝑒0𝑖 = 𝜀 + 𝜎𝑒𝜇𝑒𝑖. 
  (3.8) 
  (3.9) 
(3.10) 
(3.11) 
(3.12) 
  
Equations (3.8) to (3.12) indicate that the ASC is a function of the unconditional mean 
(𝛼, 𝛽, 𝜏, 𝛿, 𝜀)  and a random term (i.e. 𝝁𝒂𝒊, 𝝁𝒃𝒊, 𝝁𝒄𝒊, 𝝁𝒅𝒊, 𝝁𝒆𝒊), which is assumed to have a normal 
distribution N(0,1).  𝝈𝒂, 𝝈𝒃, 𝝈𝒄, 𝝈𝒅, 𝝈𝒆 represent the standard deviation of the distribution of each 
ASC (Louviere, Hensher and Swait 2000). To estimate the proposed model, the utility 𝑉𝑖𝐾𝐶 is set 
as the base and, as such, it is normalized to be zero (i.e. 𝑉𝑖𝐾𝐶 = 0). This is possible given that 
utility functions are ordinal and, as such, the preference relation is not distorted by affine linear 
transformations of the utility function. In a separate analysis, as an extra step, we introduced 
76 
heterogeneity in the means by modelling the random parameters using trust and welfare indices to 
see how these could affect the contract choices (see Appendix B)6.  
In this study, we run both the single opt-out model, resembling stated choice models 
commonly found in the literature, and a stated choice model with two opt-out options. The 
objective is to account for omitted choices, such as the case of the choice to keep the current 
contract. If only the one opt-out model is run, then the coefficients may be biased due to omitted 
variables (choices). In the results section, we compare both models to show how controlling for 
the choice not to grow sugarcane is important to explain the estimates. 
In the case of the single opt-out model, there are four observed utilities, one for each 
contract and a fourth for the status quo option. The status quo option is the combined observed 
utility of not to grow sugarcane and of keep my current contract. Hence equations (3.11) and (3.12) 
are combined to form the status quo option (i.e. 𝑓0𝑖 = (𝜀 + 𝛿) + (𝜎𝑒𝜇𝑒𝑖 + 𝜎𝑑𝜇𝑑𝑖)). The status quo 
option is set as the base case of the single opt-out model (i.e. 𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠𝑞𝑢𝑜 = 0). The coefficients of 
the variable More1 captures the marginal utility of a farmer or landowner in an area with more 
than one mill to sell to, signing a contract7. A description of the variables used in the empirical 
model is presented in Table 3.3. 
The observed data indicates the choice made by a respondent. The probability that farmer 
i chooses option k instead of j is given by the probability that the utility derived from k is greater 
than or equal to that derived from j, from a set of alternatives C (Hudson and Lusk 2004):  
 
                                                 
6 Details on the method, related studies and results are described in Appendix B. 
7 A dummy for the state was also considered as there have been studies (e.g. Bergtold, Fewell, Williams 2014) that 
have noted a difference between willingness to grow biofuels between respondents in different regions. In our case, 
over 60% of respondents in Goiás and 13% of the respondents in Mato Grosso do Sul had more than 1 mill to sell 
their sugarcane to. We believe this effect is also being captured by the More1 dummy, so to avoid collinearity we have 
decided to keep only the More1 dummy. Also in previous modeling the dummy state was not statistically significant. 
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 𝑃𝑟{𝑘 𝑖𝑠 𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑛} = 𝑃𝑟{ 𝑉𝑖𝑘 + 𝑒𝑖𝑘 ≥  𝑉𝑖𝑗 + 𝑒𝑖𝑗;  ∀ 𝑗 ≠ 𝑘;  𝑗, 𝑘 ∈ 𝐶}    (3.13) 
 
The unconditional probability of choosing k can be obtained from the integral of the 
conditional multinomial choice probability over all possible values of 𝜃0 (Train 2009; Bhat 1998):  
 
 
Pr(𝑘𝑖) = ∫ [
exp(𝜃0𝑘 + 𝜃𝑘′𝑥𝑖𝑘)
∑ exp(𝜃0𝑗 + 𝜃𝑗′𝑥𝑖𝑗)𝑗
] 𝑓(𝜃0)𝑑𝜃0 
(3.14) 
 
where 𝜃0 is a vector containing all random ASC’s and 𝜃𝑘 is a matrix containing the other 
parameters in each utility function, 𝑘 = land rental, agricultural partnership, supply, keep current 
contract and not grow sugarcane. The distribution of 𝑓(𝜃0) is assumed to be iid multivariate normal 
(𝑁(𝟎, 𝛀)), where 𝛀 is the covariance matrix of 𝜃0 (Train 2009). Equation (3.14) is a form of mixed 
logit probability (Train 2009). The advantage of using the mixed logit is that it is not sensitive to 
the independence of irrelevant alternatives (Swait 2006). The mixed logit also has the benefit of 
allowing 𝜃0 to vary among individuals accounting for their individual specific “tastes” or 
heterogeneous contract preferences (Broch and Vedel 2011; Train 2009). Estimation of the model 
was done using NLOGIT 4.0 and a simulated maximum likelihood with 1000 Halton draws and 
the BFGS Quasi-Newton Algorithm.  
In order to capture how changes in common attributes across the contracts (i.e. probability 
of late payment) affect the probability of choosing a competing contract we calculated cross 
elasticity measures. Cross elasticity measures provide information on how percentage changes in 
one attribute in a type of contract can impact the probability of the respondent choosing a 
competing contract. Cross elasticity and direct elasticity measures are calculated using the 
following formulae (Louviere, Hensher and Swait 2000): 
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𝐸𝑋𝑗𝑠𝑖
𝑃𝑘𝑖 =
𝜕𝑃𝑘𝑖
𝜕𝑋𝑗𝑠𝑖
∙
𝑋𝑗𝑠𝑞
𝑃𝑘𝑖
 
(3.15) 
𝐸𝑋𝑗𝑠𝑖
𝑃𝑗𝑖 =
𝜕𝑃𝑗𝑖
𝜕𝑋𝑗𝑠𝑖
∙
𝑋𝑗𝑠𝑞
𝑃𝑗𝑖
 
(3.16) 
The cross elasticity measure (𝐸𝑋𝑗𝑠𝑖
𝑃𝑘𝑖 ) is the elasticity of the probability of individual i choosing 
option k with respect to a marginal change in the sth attribute describing the utility from contract 
j, where 𝑗 ≠ 𝑘, by the individual i. The direct elasticity measure (𝐸𝑋𝑗𝑠𝑖
𝑃𝑗𝑖
) is the elasticity of the 
probability of the individual i choosing option j with respect to a marginal change in the sth 
attribute describing the utility from contract j, by the individual i (Louviere, Hensher and Swait 
2000).  
 In order to calculate the value of the contract attributes to the individual, results from the 
estimation were used to calculate the willingness to pay for certain attributes. Willingness to pay 
(WTP) for a particular contract attribute follows the calculations proposed by Hensher, Rose and 
Greene (2015). Normally, the coefficient associated with net return or price is used. In this study, 
the coefficients used to represent these returns differs from one contract to the other. In the land 
rental contract, WTP is found by dividing the coefficient of the attribute (𝛽𝑖) by that of the payment 
rate (𝛽𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒): 
 
 𝛽𝑖
𝛽𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒
 
(3.17) 
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Similarly, willingness to pay for a particular contract attribute in both the agricultural 
partnership and the supply contracts is found by dividing the coefficient of the attribute (𝛽𝑖) by 
that of the TRS (𝛽𝑇𝑅𝑆):   
 𝛽𝑖
𝛽𝑇𝑅𝑆
 
(3.18) 
 
Hence, when referring to the land rental contract, willingness to pay is expressed in terms 
of percentage of the land value the farmer or landowner is willing to forgo per year for that 
attribute. In the supply and agricultural partnership contracts, willingness to pay is expressed in 
units of TRS the farmer or landowner is willing to give up for more or less of a particular attribute. 
Asymptotic standard errors were estimated using the delta method (Greene 2008). 
 
 
3.6 Results 
The results for the single opt-out model (i.e. the model with the three contract options and 
a status quo) and those for the two opt-out model are presented in tables 3.4 and 3.5, respectively. 
They are similar to those from previous studies (Bergtold, Fewell and Williams 2014; Hudson and 
Luck 2004) and also confirm the assumptions made in the conceptual model section 3.4. The 
McFadden Pseudo R2 of 0.36 and 0.41, respectively, indicate a decent fit to the data. The random 
alternative specific constants (ASC) are all statistically significant at a 1 percent level of 
significance. The statistical significance of the random components of the ASC’s (standard 
deviation) indicate the presence of preference heterogeneity across farmers for different contract 
types.  
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 3.6.1 Single versus two opt-out 
The single opt-out model and the two opt-out model present similar parameter values, 
though the two opt-out model provides more explanatory power. The two opt-out model explains 
the status quo option by distinguishing between the individual’s choice not to grow sugarcane or 
to keep their current contract. Results from the single opt-out (Table 3.4) might lead us to conclude 
that farmers in Goiás and Mato Grosso do Sul may prefer not to sign contract nor produce 
sugarcane. Yet, the marginal disutility of choosing not growing sugarcane is the highest among all 
other choices. This result is in line with Picanço Filho and Marin’s (2012a) findings that farmers 
in this area are willing to grow sugarcane due to lower risks and higher returns. If there is more 
than 1 mill buying sugarcane, then disutility is even higher. The coefficient for the variable 
indicating if the farmer has the option to sell sugarcane to more than one mill (i.e. More1) was 
only statistically significant for the option not to grow sugarcane. This is expected since when 
there are multiple sugarcane buyers, landowners and farmers are more likely to grow sugarcane as 
they have more bargaining power and the mill has no monopsony power. More bargaining power 
means more flexibility in contract negotiations and, possibly higher returns. Over 90% of 
sugarcane in these states is procured through contracts. Sugarcane spot markets in this region are 
nonexistent. Around 2% of what mills acquire in sugarcane comes from spot markets.  
Differently from Hudson and Lusk (2004) the random alternative specific constant for each 
contract type (intercepts) are statistically significant and negative. This indicates farmers’ and 
landowners’, in general, receive higher utility from their current contract to the ones in the 
experiment. This may be a result of individually specific contract peculiarities that could not be 
accounted for in this study. Another reason for the negative intercepts could be the respondent’s 
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systematic preference for a contract, a result that Hudson and Lusk (2004) did not find in their 
study.  
Differences in terms of the coefficients between the two models are: (1) the marginal utility 
of hauling and delivery in the supply contract is statistically significant in the single opt-out model 
but not in the two opt-out model; and (2) the parameters of More1 differ in signs between the two 
models, though they are not statistically significant.  
 
 3.6.2 Contract preferences 
Given the better fit and explanatory power the discussion will concentrate on the results 
from the two opt-out model (Table 3.5). In terms of preference for autonomy, our study finds a 
different result than that of Hudson and Lusk (2004). These authors found that farmers are more 
willing to sign contracts with more autonomy than that with less, while our results point to a 
preference for land rental contracts over the other contracts, where the landowner has no say in 
sugarcane production. The land rental contract, where the agent has less autonomy, brings less 
disutility to the farmer than the supply or the agricultural partnership contracts, where the farmer 
has more control over sugarcane production. This stronger preference for the land rental contract, 
may be due to a preference to minimize production risks. Hudson and Lusk’s (2004) find that 
farmers and landowners prefer options with less risk. The land rental contract, in comparison with 
the other two contract options, has the lowest production risk and a fixed payment. In their study, 
Picanço Filho and Marin (2012a) also find that sugarcane producers are tempted to switch to land 
rental contracts once their contracts expire due to late payments made by mills.  
When the mills pay late, farmers cannot meet payment deadlines of input suppliers causing 
them financial hardship. The preference to avoid risk is also present in the preference for a lower 
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probability of late payment. As mentioned this is a common event in the sugarcane industry in this 
area that can bring financial hardship to the producer. The attribute, probability of receiving a late 
payment, was negative for all three contracts, though only statistically significant in the land rental 
and supply contracts. To see how landowners and farmers value this attribute the willingness to 
pay (accept) for a reduction in the probability of a late payment was calculated. Landowners are 
willing to accept a contract with a 1% higher probability of late payment as long as the land rental 
rate received increases by 0.37% per year. Willingness to pay for a lower probability of late 
payment was not significant in the cases of the agricultural partnership and supply contracts. The 
reason for the statistical insignificance of the willingness to pay may be because agents signing 
these contracts usually are paid at the end of the growing season, which is dependent on harvest 
timing.  
Although sugarcane has high start-up costs and is a perennial crop with a life cycle of 6 
years, longer contracts reduce the marginal utility from farmers and landowners signing a contract. 
The coefficients of the contract length attribute were negative and statistically significant for all 
three types of contracts. In the land rental contract, farmers and landowners were willing to accept 
a payment reduction of 6.25% per year, to sign a six-year contract instead of a twelve year one.  In 
the agricultural partnership, farmers and landowners were willing to sign a longer contract if they 
received an extra 27.8 units of TRS per kilo yearly. Reasons for the preference for a shorter 
contract may vary. According to Bergtold, Fewell and William’s (2004) the preference for shorter 
contracts stems from the farmer’s preference for more flexibility in their farming activities. 
Watanabe and Zylberstein (2014) argue that weak contract enforcement by the State may prompt 
agents to prefer shorter contracts. Another reason may be due to concerns about the financial 
stability of the mill. In fact, Sant’Anna, Granco, et al. (2016) find that 72% of sugarcane producers 
83 
and landowners in Goiás and Mato Grosso do Sul state as their main concern about sugarcane 
production is the mill’s financial situation. 
The coefficients related to attributes that affect the contract payment (i.e rate of LR, share 
payment, TRS and mill buys all) were all positive and statistically significant, indicating that 
farmers and landowners, as rational agents, receive utility from higher net returns. In the land rental 
contract, returns are represented by the percentage of the value of the land. At a 1% level of 
statistical significance, an increase in the percentage of the value of the land increases the 
landowner’s marginal utility from signing a land rental contract. In the agricultural partnership and 
supply contracts, returns are represented by the level of TRS used in the calculation of sugarcane 
prices and revenues. Increases in TRS levels increases the marginal utility of a farmer or landowner 
signing an agricultural partnership or supply contract. Further attributes that impact returns from 
the contract are also positive and statistically significant. If the mill is willing to buy all production 
instead of only buying what it requires, then the farmer’s utility increases. The same occurs with 
increases in the share of the production received by farmers in agricultural partnership contracts. 
In fact, with a statistical significance level of 5%, farmers and landowners are willing to accept 
1.26 units less of TRS per kilo for a one percentage increase in the percentage of the sugarcane 
production received. These results are like those found in Bergtold, Fewell and Williams’ (2014), 
who point out the importance of the level of net returns as a contract attribute.  
Although there have been reports (Picanço Filho and Marin 2012a) of the mills in Goiás 
and Mato Grosso do Sul attracting sugarcane suppliers by offering certain services (e.g. planting, 
harvesting, hauling and delivery), results show that farmers are not willing to pay for these 
services. In fact, results show that although the coefficients associated with these attributes are 
positive, as previously expected, only planting is statistically significant. Hence, as Hudson and 
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Lusk (2004) find, the provision of inputs does increase the farmer’s marginal utility from signing 
a contract, but differently from Bergtold, Fewell and Williams (2004), services do not appear to 
be a deciding factor in the farmer’s willing to sign a supply contract. 
 
 3.6.3 Substitutability between contracts 
Cross and direct elasticity measures from the two opt-out model were calculated for 
attributes with continuous variables and arc elasticities for dummy attributes. Direct elasticities 
capture how changes in an attribute in a given contract affects the probability of an individual 
choosing that contract over a competing option (Tables 3.6 to 3.9). Cross-elasticities allows for 
the analysis of the substitutability between contract options.  
Cross-elasticity measures for the option not to grow sugarcane show that changes in 
attributes in the agricultural partnership and supply contract have a greater impact in the probability 
of not choosing to grow sugarcane than in choosing to grow (Table 3.9). For example, an increase 
of one percent in the TRS per kilo of sugarcane decreases the probability of choosing not to grow 
sugarcane by 0.05%. Increases in length and risk in the contracts, in turn, induce an increase of 
less than 0.001% in an individual choosing not to grow sugarcane. When there is more than one 
mill in the area, the likelihood of choosing not to grow sugarcane decreases by 0.11% while the 
likelihood of choosing any of the other options is around 0.03% (Table 3.9).  
When considering the substitutability between contract options in the experiment (e.g. land 
rental, agricultural partnership and supply contracts), a one percent increase in the rate of land 
rental payment increases the probability of the land rental contract being chosen by 0.66%. This 
change decreases the probability of agricultural partnership and supply being chosen by 0.15% 
and 0.16%, respectively (Table 3.6). A one percent increase in the TRS value increases the 
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probability of the agricultural partnership agreement and the supply contracts being chosen by 
1.57% and 1.20%, respectively (Tables 3.7 and 3.8). This increase in TRS decreases the chance of 
the land rental and the supply contracts by 0.30% and in 0.20%, respectively, being chosen over 
the agricultural partnership agreement (Table 3.7). For the supply contract, an increase in one 
percent of the value of the TRS reduces the chance of the land rental agreement or the agricultural 
partnership agreement of being chosen by 0.10% and 0.13%, respectively (Table 3.8). 
We may want to understand what changes in attributes would make the farmer willing to 
switch from his current contract. Among the attributes analyzed, changes in TRS appear to be the 
deciding factor for respondents to switch from their current contract to one in the experiment. A 
one percent increase in TRS per kilo decreases the probability of an individual to prefer his current 
contract instead of an agricultural partnership by 0.58% (Table 3.7). A one percent increase in TRS 
per kilo decreases the probability of a farmer preferring his current contract instead of a supply by 
0.23% (Table 3.8). In the land rental contract, rate is the attribute where changes have a larger 
impact on the probability of keeping the current contract (Table 3.6). A one percent increase in the 
rate paid decreases the likelihood of an individual preferring to keep their own contract by 0.23%. 
Out of the services offered by the mill (e.g. planting, hauling and delivery, and the mill buys all), 
the mill buying all the production has the highest direct elasticity. Thus, when the mill buys all the 
sugarcane production from the producer, their probability of choosing their current contract instead 
of a supply contract decreases by 0.03% (Table 3.8).   
Interestingly increases in risk (i.e. the probability of late payment) do not increase the 
probability of a farmer choosing not to grow sugarcane. In general, increases in the probability of 
late payment causes the farmer to resort to his current contract. For example, an increase in 1% in 
the probability of late payment in the supply contract increases the probability of the farmer 
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choosing his current contract by 0.05%. The same effect occurs when the length of the contracts 
from the hypothetical experiment changes from 6 to 12 years. In the end, farmers are willing to 
switch from their current contracts if attributes associated with returns increase (i.e. changes in 
rate, sharepay and TRS). Hence, if mills want farmers to switch from their current contracts they 
should offer higher returns. 
 
 
3.7 Conclusions 
This paper examines farmer’s and landowner’s willingness to sign a contract with a local 
ethanol mill in the Brazilian Cerrado. It contributes to the understanding of the extensive 
expansion in sugarcane production that has occurred in this region, and to the literature on stated 
choice modeling by providing a novel manner to deal with omitted choices masked by the status 
quo option.  
A hypothetical stated choice experiment was conducted with farmers and landowners in 
Goiás and Mato Grosso do Sul. The experiment involved farmers and landowners choosing 
between three contract options (land rental contract, an agricultural partnership contract, a supply 
contract) and a status quo option. If the status quo option was chosen, individuals had to indicate 
the reason for this choice (“keep current contract” or “not grow sugarcane”). We ran a single opt-
out model and a two opt-out model. The two opt-out model, not used in past stated choice studies, 
allows for a better interpretation of the single opt-out model, commonly found in the literature. 
Data from the stated choice experiment was analyzed using a random parameter model and the 
respondent’s willingness to pay for contract attributes was calculated. Direct and cross-elasticity 
measures were also calculated to interpret the substitutability between contract options. Results 
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made it possible to identify which attributes gave farmers and landowners’ utility and which 
disutility. Farmers and landowners are more likely to sign contracts that offer higher returns, are 
shorter in length and have a lower probability of late payments.  
Results from the study provide information for the industry. To reduce the transaction costs 
and facilitate the implementation of an ethanol plant, in a particular location, mills should focus 
on designing more attractive contracts. Attractive contracts have higher returns, lower probabilities 
of late payment, are shorter in length. Other services previously used by mills to entice farmers 
into growing sugarcane were not found to be as important to producers as may have been thought. 
Hence, mills could stop offering these services and increase payments to farmers for their 
production. Farmers can negotiate the removal of these services for payment increases when 
signing a contract with the mill. For supply contracts to be enticing mills should offer to buy all 
the farmers production. This means that farmers and mills should work closely to ensure that the 
total sugarcane production will fulfill the mill’s requirements. Mills should also consider allowing 
farmers to sell the sugarcane they do not require to other mills instead of imposing a fidelity clause 
in contracts. 
Farmers and landowners seem to prefer land rental contracts over other contract options 
(except the option to keep their current contract). This has implications for the sugarcane industry, 
potentially motivating mills to vertically integrate. A mill’s decision to vertically integrate may 
have environmental and development implications. The adoption of conservation practices will 
have environmental consequences. As discussed in section 3.2.1, a tenant may have an incentive 
to overuse the land. This, in turn, may result in environmental degradation. It is possible that 
farmers, working on their own land, are more willing to adopt conservation practices to ensure the 
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quality of the land for years to come. Therefore, findings warn farmers about the potential hazards 
of giving up their autonomy on sugarcane production by signing a land rental contract.  
The decision of the mill to vertically integrate may have implications for rural development 
in this region. If by vertically integrating mills bring workers from other states, then the 
implementation of a new mill may not imply in a decrease in local unemployment. In turn, it is 
likely that local farmers prefer to hire local workers, since these have local references or are known 
to them. In this case, the economic activities of the local farmer may have a greater impact on rural 
development than those of the mill. In addition, the mills decision to vertically integrate can make 
the sustainability of the sugarcane expansion in the Cerrado more susceptible to the financial 
stability of the mill. If one mill controls the sugarcane production in a County, then its closure will 
imply in the end of ethanol and sugarcane production in that County. Hence, it may be in the 
interest of the Brazilian government to promote agricultural production by farmers, as well as the 
installation of more than one mill in a location. 
As results have shown, when there are more mills in a location (i.e. more buyers), farmers 
and landowners will prefer to grow sugarcane. This is probably linked to their increase in 
bargaining power when negotiating with the mill. Farmers are just as likely to sign any of the 
contracts (i.e. land rental, agricultural partnership or supply). When there are less mills, or 
sugarcane buyers, it is likely that farmers prefer the land rental contract to diversify their revenue 
and protect themselves from low grain or cattle prices. This fact allied with farmers’ preference 
for shorter contracts may point to the ethanol expansion in the Cerrado being sensitive to 
commodity prices. In other words, as grain and livestock become more profitable farmers will 
want their lands back for grain and cattle production. With shorter contracts (i.e. 6-year contracts), 
this switch could be done after the first sugarcane cycle.  
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The fact that farmers and landowners are willing to receive less to sign shorter contracts 
could be indicative of a lack of trust concerning contract enforcement, the financial situation of 
the mills, or the desire for more flexibility in their farming operations. Given that sugarcane 
production requires high initial investments costs that are diluted throughout its production cycle 
(i.e. six to twelve years), the first two reasons appear to be a better explanation for the preference 
for shorter contracts. The Brazilian government should be interested in promoting longer contracts 
as a form to guarantee sugarcane production in the Cerrado after public policies subside. Therefore 
it should focus on policies that promote contract enforcement as well as the establishment of 
producer associations. Associations have the advantage of providing farmers and landowners with 
more information allowing for better transparency when negotiating a contract with the mill. In 
order to understand the impact of contract enforcement and asymmetric information on the 
sustainability of the sugarcane expansion in the Cerrado further studies will need to be conducted. 
Perhaps studies should focus on farmers and landowners willingness to sign contracts at different 
levels of asymmetric information or trust. 
Findings from this study can not only guide Brazilian farmers, landowners, mills and policy 
makers but also stakeholders in other countries seeking to expand biofuel production. It highlights 
the complexity of expanding the production of a biofuel feedstock into a region with previously 
established crop and livestock production. Farmers may only be willing to sign a sugarcane 
contract with the aim of diversifying their revenues. This in turn, motivates vertical integration 
bringing consequences to rural development, the environment and the sustainability of the 
expansion of the production of the biofuel crop. 
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Table 3.1: Statistics from the 2006 Agricultural Census versus statistics from our survey 
Characteristics 
Census 
(2006)* 
Our survey 
Average area of the farm (hectares) 415 913 
Percentage who own land 87 78 
Participation in Association or Cooperative 
  
     Percentage participating in cooperatives 11 49 
     Percentage participating in an association 11 49 
Gender: 
  
     Percentage of males 92 96 
Education – Percentage who completed: 
  
     5th - 8th Grade 4 7 
     High School  4 37 
     Have a college degree 3 28 
Farms with sugarcane production: 
  
     Average sugarcane yield (ton/ha)* 70.30 87.71 
     Average Value of Sugarcane Production (R$1000) 330.18 1035.24 
Source: IBGE 2006. 
*The average yield of sugarcane comes from CONAB 2013. 
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Figure 3.1: Example choice scenario for the stated choice experiment 
  
(Please write down the number corresponding to the option you prefer)
Which option do you choose?
If you choose “Status Quo”  please answer the following:
Would you rather: (Please mark one ) 
Answer  (Enter 1 for selected option, leave blank if not used)
Stay with your current contract
Stop growing sugarcane
You produce sugarcane to the mill. 
The mill is responsible for:
I prefer to remain in my current situation
Planting: NO. Harvesting: NO
Delivery: NO.
Price is based on TRS of: 155kg of TRS/ton
Possibility of a late payment: 10%. 
Mill buys all the production: NO
Contract length: 12 years
Option 3: Supply Agreement Option 4: Status Quo
Scenario 1
Option 1: Land Rental Agreement Option 2: Partnership Agreement
Land is rented to the mill to produce sugarcane for a 
annual payment.                                                     
Rate:  15% of the value of the land.                      
Possibility of a late payment: 0%.                      
Contract length: 12 years.
Land is rented to the mill to produce sugarcane for a 
share of the production paid annually.                                                  
Rate:  50% of the value of the production based on 
155kg of TRS/ton.                                              
Possibility of a late payment: 10%.                          
Contract length: 6 years.
1 2
3 4
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Table 3.2: A description of contract attributes and levels for the stated choice experiment 
Attribute 
Contract 
Type(s)*  
Description Levels 
Late payment 
LR, AP, S Probability of the mill paying late the 
amount in the contract 0%, 10%, 20% 
Length of 
contract 
LR, AP, S Time commitment in consecutive years 
of the contractual agreement 
6 or 12 years 
TRS  
AP, S Total Recovered Sugar (TRS) value 
used to calculate the monetary value 
received for the payment in sugarcane 
110 kg of TRS               
125 kg of TRS                        
140 kg of TRS                   
155 kg of TRS 
Rate of LR 
LR Amount received by the landowner in 
return for giving up his rural property to 
the mill.    
5%; 10%; 15%  
and 20% of the  
land value. 
Share payment 
(rate of AP) 
AP Percent of the total production paid by 
the mill for the use of the land for 
sugarcane production.  
20%, 30%, 40%, 
50% of the total 
sugarcane production 
Planting S 
"Yes": mill provides the farmer with 
seedlings or a loan for the formation of 
the sugarcane plantation.  
"No": planting costs fall upon the 
supplier. 
Yes or No 
Harvesting S 
"Yes": mill is responsible for harvesting 
"No": supplier is responsible for 
harvesting. 
Yes or No 
Hauling and 
delivery 
S 
"Yes": mill is responsible for hauling 
and delivery "No": supplier is 
responsible for hauling and delivery. 
Yes or No 
Mill buys all S 
"Yes": mill buys all harvested 
sugarcane.  
"No": mill buys only the amount of 
sugarcane it needs. It pays the rest of 
the production as "cana bisada" (i.e. at 
50% the value of the harvested 
sugarcane).  
Yes or No 
*LR: land rental contract. AP: agricultural partnership contract. S: supply contract. 
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Table 3.3: Description of the variables in the econometric model 
Variable Description 
𝑅𝐿𝑅 The payment for the land rental (LR) contract that is based on the value of land 
𝑅𝐴𝑃 The payment for the agricultural partnership (AP) that is a share of the yield 
𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑒 The probability of the mill making a late payment. 
𝐿 The length of the contract in years. 
𝑇𝑅𝑆𝑘  The Total Recovered Sugar (TRS) value used to calculate the price received for the 
harvested sugarcane in the agricultural and supply contracts.  
𝑃 A dummy indicating whether the mill provides the farmer with seeds or a loan for 
planting 
H A dummy indicating whether the mill is responsible for harvesting the sugarcane 
D A dummy indicating whether the mill is responsible for hauling and delivery of the 
sugarcane 
B A dummy indicating whether the mill is responsible for buying all the sugarcane 
produced by the supplier or not 
More1 A dummy indicating whether there is more than one mill in the vicinity to which the 
producer can sell sugarcane to.  
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Table 3.4: Results from the random parameter model with single opt-out and willingness to pay 
estimates 
 
 
Willingness 
to Pay
Intercept -3.97 *** -6.75 *** -6.50 ***
(0.84) (1.43) (1.73)
Rate of LR 0.16 ***
(0.03)
TRS 0.03 *** 0.02 *
(0.01) (0.01)
Late Payment -0.06 *** -0.37 ** -0.04 -1.18 -0.06 ** -3.20
(0.02) (0.15) (0.03) (0.95) (0.02) (2.26)
Length -1.01 *** -6.37 ** -0.87 *** -27.59 ** -1.17 *** -62.06
(0.33) (2.58) (0.29) (12.56) (0.40) (41.19)
Share payment 0.04 *** 1.27 **
(0.01) (0.55)
Planting 0.71 * 37.55
(0.38) (28.06)
Harvesting 0.41 22.05
(0.37) (22.44)
Hauling and delivery 0.68 * 36.42
(0.42) (32.57)
Mill buys all 1.32 *** 70.52
(0.4) (46.76)
More than 1 buyer 0.62 0.04 0.50
(0.84) (3.13) (0.75)
Contract LR 3.30 ***
(0.50)
Contract AP 3.01 ***
(0.45)
Contract S 2.84 ***
(0.53)
Log-likelihood -588.59
McFadden Pseud R
2
0.36
AIC 1223
Observations 660
Note: Standard error are in parenthesis. Significance Levels: *** is 1%,  ** is 5%, * is 10% 
Choices
Attribute
Distances of Random Parameters Standard Deviations
Land Rental (LR) Agricultural Partnership (AP) Supply (S)
Coefficient 
Estimate
Willingness 
to Pay
Coefficient 
Estimate
Willingness 
to Pay
Coefficient 
Estimate
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Table 3.5: Results from the random parameter model with two opt-outs and willingness to pay 
estimates 
 
  
Willingness 
to Pay
Intercept -3.75 *** -6.20 *** -5.55 *** -23.62 ***
(0.98) (1.42) (1.67) (7.56)
Rate of LR 0.17 ***
(0.03)
TRS 0.03 *** 0.02 *
(0.01) (0.01)
Late Payment -0.06 *** -0.37 ** -0.04 -1.14 -0.06 *** -3.28
(0.02) (0.15) (0.03) (0.92) (0.02) (2.29)
Length -1.04 *** -6.25 ** -0.87 *** -27.75 ** -1.16 *** -62.60
(0.33) (2.53) (0.29) (12.33) (0.39) (42.92)
Share payment 0.04 *** 1.26 **
(0.013) (0.53)
Planting 0.68 * 36.70
(0.38) (27.61)
Harvesting 0.41 21.92
(0.37) (22.13)
Hauling and delivery 0.64 34.28
(0.41) (31.97)
Mill buys all 1.30 *** 70.16
(0.39) (46.57)
More than 1 Mill 0.86 -0.30 -0.03 -9.74 ***
(0.93) (0.68) (0.67) (3.43)
Contract LR 3.71 ***
(0.64)
Contract AP 2.74 ***
(0.39)
Contract S 2.47 ***
(0.4)
Opt Out 30.37 ***
(8.99)
Log-likelihood -623.93
McFadden Pseud R
2
0.41
AIC 1300
Observations 660
Note: Standard error are in parenthesis. Significance Levels: *** is 1%,  ** is 5%, * is 10% 
Choices
Attribute
Coefficient Estimate
Distances of Random Parameters Standard Deviations
Land Rental (LR) Agricultural Partnership (AP) Supply (S) Not grow sugarcane
Coefficient 
Estimate
Willingness 
to Pay
Coefficient 
Estimate
Willingness to 
Pay
Coefficient 
Estimate
100 
Table 3.6: Direct and cross-elasticities in the land rental contract 
  
Land 
Rental 
Agricultural 
Partnership 
Supply 
Current 
Contract 
Not grow 
Sugarcane 
Rate 0.66 -0.16 -0.16 -0.23 -0.02 
Risk -0.17 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.01 
Length -0.07 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.00 
More1 0.09 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 0.00 
Note: Length and More1 are arc elasticities since these are dummy variables. 
 
Table 3.7: Direct and cross-elasticities in the agricultural partnership contract 
  
Land 
Rental 
Agricultural 
Partnership 
Supply 
Current 
Contract 
Not grow 
Sugarcane 
Risk 0.01 -0.07 0.02 0.02 0.00 
Length 0.02 -0.10 0.03 0.05 0.00 
Sharepay -0.10 0.53 -0.14 -0.20 -0.02 
TRS -0.30 1.57 -0.40 -0.58 -0.05 
More1 0.01 -0.03 0.01 0.01 0.00 
Note: Length and More1 are arc elasticities since these are dummy variables. 
 
Table 3.8: Direct and cross-elasticities in the supply contract 
  
Land 
Rental 
Agricultural 
Partnership 
Supply 
Current 
Contract 
Not grow 
Sugarcane 
Risk 0.02 0.03 -0.27 0.05 0.00 
Length 0.01 0.02 -0.09 0.03 0.00 
TRS -0.10 -0.13 1.20 -0.23 -0.02 
Planting -0.01 -0.01 0.10 -0.02 0.00 
Harvesting 0.00 -0.01 0.05 -0.01 0.00 
Hauling and 
delivery -0.01 -0.01 0.09 -0.02 0.00 
Mill buys all  -0.01 -0.02 0.20 -0.03 0.00 
More1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Note: Length, Planting, Harvesting, Hauling and delivery, Mill buys all and More1 are arc 
elasticities since these are dummy variables. 
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Table 3.9: Direct and cross-arc elasticities for the presence of more than 1 mill in the option not 
to grow sugarcane 
  
Land 
Rental 
Agricultural 
Partnership 
Supply 
Current 
Contract 
Not grow 
Sugarcane 
More1 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 -0.11 
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Chapter 4 - Assessing the relationship between vertical coordination 
strategy and technical efficiency: Evidence from the Brazilian 
ethanol industry 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 The sugar-energy sector in Brazil accounts for almost 2% of the country’s Gross Domestic 
Product (Neves, Trombin and Consoli 2011). It employs 1.2 million workers, encompassing 
70,000 sugarcane producers and over 400 mills (Chaddad 2015). As one of the leading producers 
of ethanol and sugar, Brazil was responsible for half of the world’s sugarcane production in 2012 
(MAPA 2013). The production-processing interface of the Brazilian sugarcane supply chain is 
predominantly governed through two vertical coordination strategies: i) contracting – where 
farmers are contracted by the mills, and ii) vertical integration – where the mills either acquire or 
rent the land and backward vertically integrate into sugarcane production (Moraes and Zilberman 
2014; Sant’Anna, Shanoyan, et al. 2016). With the expansion of the sugarcane industry, the choice 
of vertical coordination strategy at the production-processing interface can have important 
implications not only for operational efficiency and competitive strategy of sugarcane processors, 
but also, for agricultural production and policy.  
From the operations perspective, due to technical aspects of the refining process, a number 
of factors at the sugarcane production stage (e.g. distance and harvest timeline limitations) can 
affect the efficiency at the processing stage (Chaddad 2015; Neves, Waack and Marino 1998). 
Thus, vertical integration can potentially reduce transaction costs associated with coordinating, 
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monitoring, and enforcing transactions with farmers and can, potentially, result in efficiency gains. 
From the strategy perspective, with the increased control over the production stage mills can gain 
a potential competitive advantage by ensuring a procurement base while reducing/eliminating the 
bargaining power of suppliers. Additionally, in geographic areas with limited production 
resources, such vertical coordination strategies can limit access to a procurement base for 
competitors and create barriers to entry. However, there are costs and risks associated with 
backwards vertical integration by mills into sugarcane production. Strategically and operationally 
sugarcane production and processing are very different and require distinct sets of resources and 
capabilities. Vertical integration into sugarcane production will a) expose mills to additional risks 
that are inherent in production agriculture, and b) will require/lock additional capital for acquiring 
production resources and capabilities (e.g. land, infrastructure and machinery). Taking on these 
additional costs and risk can have important implications for strategic decisions and the operational 
efficiency of the mills. 
From the policy perspective, the effect of vertical coordination strategies at the production-
processing interface of the sugarcane supply chain can be magnified through the ongoing 
expansion of the sugarcane industry from the North-Northeast region to the Center-South region 
of Brazil (Granco et al. 2015). Since the 2000’s, evidence of this expansion has been predominant 
in the Cerrado, Brazil’s second largest biome, with over 40 mills being constructed in the states 
of Goiás and Mato Grosso do Sul (Procana 2013). This expansion has provoked a change in land 
use in a region historically known for livestock and soybean production (Granco et al. 2015). 
Policy makers have long recognized the importance of potential long-term impacts of the 
expansion on production agriculture.  In 1941, the Brazilian government issued the Statute of 
Sugarcane (Brazil 1941). It sets that 40% of the sugarcane processed by mills should come from 
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independent sugarcane producers. The only exception being when sugarcane supply by 
independent producers cannot fulfill this allocation. In this case, mills may produce their own 
sugarcane. This placed a regulatory barrier to vertical integration with an aim to ensure a 
competitive market for sugarcane and to support agricultural producers. In fact, in 2013, 40% of 
sugarcane supplied to mills came from independent producers and 60% was produced under the 
management of mills (Chaddad 2015). 
Research into the relationship between vertical integration and efficiency is not uncommon 
in the literature, with no definite conclusion on the impact of vertical integration on efficiency8. 
Pieri and Zaninotto (2013) investigated the relationship between vertical integration and technical 
efficiency in the Italian machine tool industry, while Federico (2010) looked at the links between 
productivity and vertical integration. Tomiura (2007) examined vertical integration practices 
among productive and unproductive firms in the Japanese manufacturing industry. Bakhtiari 
(2011) looked at cost efficiency and vertical integration in the Australian manufacturing industry. 
Pieri and Zaninotto (2013) conclude that technically efficient firms decide to vertically integrate, 
but they cannot show evidence of an impact of vertical integration on technical efficiency. Federico 
(2010) finds a positive relationship between productivity and the decision to vertically integrate 
(Pieri and Zaninotto 2013). Tomiura (2007) finds that productive firms tend to be vertically 
integrated, while Bakhtiari (2011) finds that cost efficient firms prefer to vertically integrate (Pieri 
and Zaninotto 2013). Looking at different types of businesses, D’Aveni and Ravenscraft (1994) 
found that vertical integration was not always beneficial. Although, the authors found a low 
positive relation of vertical integration and performance, they had no conclusive evidence that the 
vertical integration of production stages provided technical benefits. Stuckey and White (1993) 
                                                 
8 Studies look at technical and cost efficiencies. 
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warn about the high setup costs and coordination risks of vertical integration, suggesting that 
vertical coordination may at times be more beneficial. D’Aveni and Ravenscraft (1994) also 
mention a study conducted by Pyrdol (1978) where vertically integrated captive coal mines had a 
lower productive performance than noncaptive mines.  
The importance of both vertical coordination and efficiency in the context of the Brazilian 
ethanol industry has been recognized by researchers. However, the previous studies in the literature 
have looked at these two issues separately.  Analyzing data from 2009 to 2012, Bastos (2013) finds 
higher levels of vertical integration in areas where sugarcane has had recent expansion, such as the 
states in the Center-West region, and lower levels in areas with a tradition in sugarcane production. 
Junior, Carlucci and Grespan (2014), when analyzing the technical efficiency of Brazilian mills, 
find a higher concentration of efficient mills in the state of São Paulo, the largest sugarcane 
producing state. Torquato, Martins and Ramos (2009) conclude that mills in counties, in the state 
of São Paulo, with a tradition of growing sugarcane are more homogeneous and closer to the cost 
efficiency frontier than those in counties where sugarcane production is more recent. 
To the author’s knowledge no study has looked at the impact of vertical coordination on 
the technical efficiency of ethanol and sugarcane mills in Brazil. Technical efficiency measures 
the mill’s ability to minimize input usage at a given level of output. Likewise, inefficiency is 
measured by feasible reductions in the quantities of inputs used (Färe, Grosskopf and Lovell 1994). 
Our study contributes to the literature by providing the analysis of the relationship between the 
vertical coordination strategy at the production-processing interface of the Brazilian ethanol supply 
chain and the technical efficiency of the mills. The main purpose of the study is to estimate the 
impact from vertical coordination on technical efficiency. The study provides insight on whether 
the strategic decision to vertically integrate leads to gains in technical efficiency. These insights 
106 
are beneficial to: (1) Brazilian stakeholders and policy makers in the sugarcane and ethanol 
industry; (2) Stakeholders and policy makers in countries looking at developing the sugarcane, 
ethanol industry (e.g. Mozambique), and; (3) Stakeholders in industries with similar characteristics 
(e.g. temporal and geographic market specificities). Examples of similar markets are second 
generation ethanol production (e.g. ethanol production from wood chip or corn stover feedstock). 
Even though this study focuses on ethanol production in Brazil, findings can aid in the analysis of 
similar industries in other parts of the world.  
This paper is divided into six sections. The first introduces the topic, discusses its 
importance and presents the main research purpose. The following section elaborates on the 
particularities of sugarcane production in Brazil and the role of vertical integration. The third 
section presents the data, followed by the fourth section which lays down the methods and 
empirical strategies employed in this study. In the fifth section results are presented along with a 
discussion. Conclusions are provided in the last section.  
 
 
4.2 Vertical integration in the Brazilian ethanol industry 
Sugarcane production in Brazil involves high location, temporal and physical asset 
specificities (de Moraes and Zilberman 2014). To minimize transportation costs and avoid 
sugarcane quality losses, sugarcane production is limited to a certain radius of the mill, restricting 
its market geographically (de Moraes and Zilberman 2014, Chaddad 2016). Sugarcane’s perishable 
nature imposes a temporal limit between harvesting and processing (de Moraes and Zilberman 
2014, Neves, Waack and Marino 1998). Although inputs and machinery for sugarcane production 
can be reverted to the production of other crops, its perennial nature implies a minimal 5-year 
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production commitment (de Moraes and Zilberman 2014). Given these specificities, suppliers and 
processors depend on each other.  
During the 21st century, Brazil increased its ethanol production capacity by expanding into 
the Cerrado, a region with little tradition in planting sugarcane until the late 1990s (Silva and 
Miziara 2011). The mills’ dependence on sugarcane suppliers increases according to: (1) the 
supplier’s participation in the sugarcane crushing capacity of the mill; (2) the number of 
neighboring mills suppliers can sell their sugarcane to (de Moraes and Zilberman 2014).   
Uncertainties in sugarcane commercialization, its oligopsony structure9 and the high level 
of specialization and investments involved in the production of sugarcane makes it difficult for a 
strong and stable network of sugarcane suppliers to develop (Bastos 2013; Sant’Anna, Granco et 
al 2016). Bastos (2013) argues that more vertically integrated mills are generally in areas that did 
not have prior sugarcane production before the Statute of Sugarcane. In areas that produced 
sugarcane production before 1941 (e.g. São Paulo), the Statute had the benefit of promoting the 
establishment of a strong supply chain (Bastos 2013).   
Years after the implementation of the Statute of Sugarcane in 1941 up until 1984/85, 
farmers and mills shared the percentages in sugarcane production used in ethanol and sugar 
production (Figure 4.1). From 1985 until 2000, mills began to take over sugarcane production, 
supplying up to 70% of the sugarcane they required for production (Chaddad 2015). Recently the 
relationship of farmers to mills in the sugarcane production has declined to a 40:60 ratio (MAPA 
2013). In fact, data points to a trend towards shares in production observed before 1984  
(Figure 4.1) 
                                                 
9 Sant’Anna, Granco, et al. (2016) find that due to distance limitations, farmers in Goiás and Mato Grosso do Sul only 
have one mill or two that it is feasible to supply sugarcane to. 
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The degree of vertical integration by state in 2012 is shown in table 4.1. Vertical integration 
at the processing and input supply stage is given by the percentage of the sugarcane production 
produced by mills, as well as, by the comparison of the areas produced by mills and farmers. Total 
vertical integration (100%) occurs in areas with a smaller number of mills (e.g. Rio Grande do Sul 
and states in the North region). Higher percentages of vertical integration are present in states with 
no previous tradition of growing sugarcane (e.g. Mato Grosso do Sul, Goiás and Mato Grosso). 
These states also contain a larger number of new plants, which adopt the strategy to vertically 
integrate due to uncertainties with sugarcane supply (Bastos 2013). States with a tradition in 
sugarcane production, such as Pernambuco and São Paulo, have less vertical integration. In the 
case of São Paulo, the share of sugarcane produced by the mills is about 50%. In states bordering 
São Paulo, such as Minas Gerais, there is less vertical integration as well. Although Minas Gerais 
does not have a tradition of growing sugarcane, it is likely that mills in this state, on the border, 
utilize spot markets available in São Paulo to acquire sugarcane (Figure 4.2).  
In a survey applied to mills in the state of Parana, Augusto, Souza and Cario (2013) find 
that mills decided to vertically integrate to gain control of sugarcane production, allowing for better 
planning and management. Chaddad (2015) believes that mills chose to vertically integrate not 
only to guarantee sugarcane supply, but also to decrease transaction costs with suppliers. Vertical 
integration also eases the implementation of technologies and agricultural practices that increased 
sugarcane productivity (Chaddad 2015). Increasing productivity in sugarcane production can be 
beneficial to a mill since sugarcane accounts for 70% of total production costs (Chaddad 2015).  
In fact, Crago et al. (2010) reports that Brazilian mills have higher sugarcane yields than 
independent farmers, 81 tons per hectare versus 75 tons per hectare, respectively. Technical 
efficiency in sugarcane production is also a function of the quality of the sugarcane. Higher levels 
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of sugar content in the sugarcane implies higher ethanol or sugar output (Chaddad 2015). The 
benefits from controlling the coordination of harvesting, hauling and transportation are: (1) to 
minimize transportation costs of a low-value and high-volume crop; and (2) to reduce quality 
losses (harvested sugarcane must be processed within 72 hours to avoid sugar content losses) 
(Chaddad 2015; Neves, Waack and Marino 1998). While vertical integration has the benefit of 
providing the mill with full control over the supply and coordination of sugarcane production, it 
requires significant capital investments and exposes the business to risks inherent in agricultural 
production (Neves, Waack and Marino 1998). Relying on farmers for the supply of sugarcane does 
not require large capital investments in production, but could increase transactions costs associated 
with harvest coordination and contract enforcement.   
Apart from securing the supply of sugarcane, mills may decide to vertically integrate to 
create barriers to entry for competing mills. By integrating backwards, a processor can control the 
supply of an input making it difficult for another mill to locate in the same region (Besanko et al. 
2009). In the case of Brazil, given that sugarcane supply is restricted to a 30 mile radius from the 
mill, vertical integration could impede a new mill from locating nearby and from competing for 
inputs, causing increases in sugarcane prices in the area. If the mill controls sugarcane production 
in the area around its location, it reduces the risk of its suppliers being poached by a competing 
mill that is new to the region. 
There are also cases when vertical integration can reduce efficiency. In fact, D’Aveni and 
Ravenscraft (1994) believe that the advantages of combining stages of production may be 
beneficial only in certain industries, such as paper/pulp production. Stuckey and White (1993) 
stress that the coordination effectiveness of vertical integration is uncertain. Cost inefficiencies 
from vertical integration may arise when the firm is less skilled than the outsourcing producer 
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(Kerkvliet 1991). The lack of competitors (i.e. market pressure) may also cause a mill to be less 
efficient (D’Aveni and Ravenscraft 1994).  Cost inefficiency may occur if the mill needs to forgo 
buying inputs cheaper at the spot market to use that from its own production (D’Aveni and 
Ravenscraft 1994). For instance, Bastos (2013) finds that demand for sugarcane from independent 
producers is higher in states such as São Paulo, where market prices are lower than sugarcane 
production costs. Cost and technical inefficiencies may also take place due to managerial 
inefficiencies such as underutilized capacity (D’Aveni and Ravenscraft 1994). Vertical integration 
increases the size of the firm which may bring about communication distortions, as well as the 
involvement in tasks where proper skills and knowledge may be lacking (D’Aveni and Ravenscraft 
1994). These aspects may result in both cost and technical inefficiency.  
It is important to realize that vertical coordination decisions and operational efficiency are 
two separate things, the first refers to a strategic decision, while the second refers to the operations 
of the mill. There are, in fact, times when a company is willing to sacrifice operational efficiency 
to vertically integrate regardless of its impact on efficiency. Among the reasons to vertically 
integrate, Stuckley and White (1993) list market failure, gains in market power, creation of barriers 
to entry and the development of markets. In referring to mills in Brazil reasons to vertically 
integrate may be to: (1) ensure a procurement base, or; (2) moderate competition for sugarcane 
(i.e. create barriers to entry) by controlling sugarcane production in the mill’s surroundings, or; (3) 
increase the mill’s bargaining power when negotiating with sugarcane suppliers. 
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4.3 Methods 
A two-stage analysis is used to examine how vertical coordination impacts technical 
efficiency. In the first stage, data envelopment analysis (DEA) is used to obtain efficiency scores 
for each of the mills. In the second stage, a Tobit model is estimated using the estimated efficiency 
scores, from the first stage, as the dependent variable. 
DEA is a nonparametric approach used to construct efficiency frontiers allowing for the 
evaluation of relative efficiency of decision making units (DMU). The benefit of using DEA is 
that no a priori assumptions about the production relationships between inputs and outputs are 
needed (Zhou, Ang and Poh 2008). The DEA assumes that all mills have access to the same 
technology. This study uses an input-oriented DEA with variable returns to scale. The decision to 
allow variable returns to scale was made after testing for whether the underlying technology 
exhibited constant, variable returns to scale or non-increasing returns to scale using code 
developed by Simm and Besstremyannaya (2016). This program tests the null hypothesis of 
constant returns to scale against the alternative hypothesis of variable returns to scale, or the null 
hypothesis of non-increasing returns to scale against the hypothesis of variable returns to scale. It 
uses test statistics developed by Simar and Wilson (2002; 2011a). Results from both tests rejected 
the null hypothesis confirming with a statistical significance level of 5% the presence of variable 
returns to scale10. 
The DEA input-oriented model measures efficiency by the firm’s ability to minimize the 
quantity of inputs given a fixed quantity of outputs (Fare, Grosskopf and Lovell 1994). In this 
study there are N  DMUs and M inputs. The M inputs are used in the production of S outputs. The 
                                                 
10 The test of constant returns to scale against variable returns to scale had a p-value of 0.02, while the test of non-
increasing returns to scale against constant returns to scale had a p-value of 0.01.  
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model determines the minimum level of input (𝑥𝑚,𝑘, 𝜃𝑛) each DMU requires to produce a certain 
level of output and be technically efficient. This is done using the following minimization problem 
for the nth DMU (Färe, Grosskopf and Lovell 1994) 11: 
 
𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝜃𝑛,𝜆𝑘
𝜃𝑛 (4.1) 
𝑠. 𝑡. ∑ λ𝑘𝑥𝑚,𝑘
𝑁
𝑘=1
≤ 𝑥𝑚,𝑛𝜃𝑛 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑚 = 1, … , 𝑀 
∑ λ𝑘𝑦𝑠,𝑘
𝑁
𝑘=1
≥ 𝑦𝑠,𝑛 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑠 = 1, … , 𝑆 
∑ λ𝑘
𝑁
𝑘=1
= 1 
(λ1, … , λ𝑁) ≥ 0 
 
where λ1, … , λ𝑁 are weights estimated by the model, 𝑥𝑚,𝑘 are the 𝑚 = 1, … , 𝑀 inputs and 𝑦𝑠,𝑘 are 
the 𝑠 = 1, … , 𝑆 outputs. θ𝑛 is the input-oriented technical efficiency of mill n ranging from 0 to 1. 
The closer θ𝑛 is to one the more efficient the mill is (Färe, Grosskopf and Lovell 1994). Mills with 
θ𝑛 =1 are fully efficient. When θ𝑛is less than one it provides information on reductions in input 
use that could be made to produce the same level of output. 
Once the technical efficiency for each DMU has been calculated, the effect of vertical 
integration on the efficiency of the mill was estimated. Vertical integration can be measured as the 
                                                 
11 We acknowledge that there are studies that argue for bootstrapping DEA scores Simar and Wilson (2011b) but after 
comparing the results of the bootstrapped DEA with the non-bootstrapped DEA we found grave inconsistencies. 
Although the bootstrapped DEA provides a symmetric distribution we believe resulting efficiencies are not 
representative of the original data. For instance, mills under the non-bootstrapped DEA that are highly efficient (e.g. 
have a score of 0.98), under the bootstrapped DEA become highly inefficient (e.g. have a score of 0.15). 
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quantity of a good transferred from one stage of production to another inside a firm (Perry 1989). 
In this study, vertical integration is measured as the percentage of the total crushed sugarcane used 
for production that came from land controlled by the mill. Thus, mills with a higher percentages 
of own sugarcane production are assumed to be more vertically integrated.  
Prior to estimating the impact of vertical integration on technical efficiency, we checked 
that the assumption of separability held. Technical efficiency scores (𝜃𝑛) are only interpretable in 
a second-stage regression analysis when a separability condition applies (Simar and Wilson 2011b; 
Daraio, Simar and Wilson 2015). The separability condition assumes that environmental variables 
do not impact the efficiency frontier. That is, the possible set of combinations of inputs and outputs 
is the same regardless of the presence of environmental variables. Daraio and Simar (2005) 
describe environmental variables as factors that the producer has no control over but that may 
influence production. We tested for this condition by comparing the conditional to the 
unconditional DEA technical efficiency scores and found that the separability condition holds (see 
Appendix C). The DEA was calculated in R-Studio using the rDEA (Simm and Besstremyannaya 
2016) and Benchmarking packages (Bogetoft and Otto 2015). 
Given that the separability assumption holds, we measured the impact of vertical 
coordination on technical efficiency score using a two-sided Tobit regression with an upper limit 
censuring of 1 and a lower limit of 0. The efficiency score, the dependent variable, ranges from 0 
to 1, such that mills with an efficiency score closer to one are more efficient and closer to the 
efficiency frontier. In the literature, there are different views on the use of the Tobit model in the 
second stage regression. Simar and Wilson (2011b) argue strongly against the use of the Tobit 
model. We decide, though, to follow Hoff (2007) who argues that the Tobit model is sufficient for 
regressing DEA scores against exogenous variables. Nevertheless, we provide estimates for two 
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more commonly suggested models: Simar and Wilson’s algorithm #1 (see Simar and Wilson 2007; 
Tauchmann 2016) and the fractional regression model with a logistic distribution (see Williams 
2016; Ramalho, Ramalho and Henriques 2010). The Tobit model estimated in this study was: 
 
 
 
 
where  perown  is the percentage of crushed sugarcane that was produced by mills; mixed is a 
dummy that is 1 if the mill produces both ethanol and sugar and 0 otherwise; sp is a dummy 
variable that is 1 if mill is in the state of São Paulo and 0 otherwise; cw is a dummy variable that 
is 1 if the mill is in the Center-West region and 0 otherwise; alpe is a dummy variable that is 1 if 
the mill is in the states of Alagoas or Pernambuco and 0 otherwise; and age is how old the mill is 
in years (see Table 4.2 for summary statistics of the variables). Second stage regressions were 
estimated using Stata 14. Standard errors are obtained through a bootstrap procedure with 
replacement using 5000 repetitions to correct for the serial correlation of the DEA efficiency 
estimates as mentioned by Simar and Wilson (2007). We checked for misspecification in the Tobit 
model by running the link test (Pregibon 1979). The link test involves refitting the estimated model 
with the values of the predicted dependent value and its squared term. If the coefficient of the 
predicted y squared is statistically significant than the model is misspecified12. We also used 
inefficiencies (1-𝜃𝑛) as the dependent variable to run the bctobit test for misspecification written 
by Vincent (2010)13.  
                                                 
12 The coefficient of the predicted dependent variable squared had a p-value of 0.313 and was not found to be 
statistically significant at a 5% level of significance. 
13 Bctobit tests the tobit specification, using the LM-Statistics, against a model that is non-linear in the regressors with 
heteroskedastic and non-normally distributed errors (Vincent 2010). Our test statistic of was 0.212 was compared with 
the critical value of 4.59, such that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected with a 5% level of statistical significance. 
𝜃𝑛 = 𝛼𝑛 + 𝛽1𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑛 + 𝛽2𝑚𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑𝑛 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑃𝑛 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑊𝑛 + 𝛽5𝐴𝐿𝑃𝐸𝑛 + 𝛽6𝑆𝑃 ∗ 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑛
+ 𝛽7𝐶𝑊 ∗ 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑛 + 𝛽8𝐴𝐿𝑃𝐸 ∗ 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑛 + 𝛽6𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛 + 𝑒𝑛 
           
(4.2) 
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The choice of exogenous variables was guided by previous studies. The region of the 
Center-West along with the states of São Paulo, Alagoas and Pernambuco are where most of the 
mills in the sample are concentrated (Figure 4.2). São Paulo is the largest sugar, ethanol and 
sugarcane producer in Brazil, where Bastos (2013) finds mills to be less vertically integrated and 
Junior, Carlucci and Grespan (2014) find the presence of more efficient mills than in other 
Brazilian states. In terms of the Center-West, this region has experienced a recent sugarcane 
expansion with over 40 new mills installed since 2000 (Sant’Anna, Granco, et al. 2016). Alagoas 
and Pernambuco are in the Northeast region, where sugarcane production began in Brazil. Given 
past studies (Junior, Carlucci and Grespan 2014; Bastos 2013) we would expect there to be more 
technical efficient mills in São Paulo and in the Center-West and older and, perhaps, less technical 
efficient mills in Alagoas and Pernambuco. We interact the location dummies with the proxy for 
vertical integration to understand how vertical integration in these areas impacts technical 
efficiency.  
Other variables were age and mixed. The type of mill (i.e. mixed or not) was controlled for 
to account for differences in the mills due to the diversity of their output production set. We expect 
mixed to have a positive effect (i.e. mills that produce two products instead of one are more 
efficient), since mixed mills may likely have newer technology in place in comparison to mills that 
produce only one good. We expect age to have a negative impact on efficiency. The older the mill, 
the older the technology they may utilize. The impact of perown is ambiguous. Perown should 
have a positive effect if through vertical integration mills become more efficient. That is, by having 
more control over the coordination of planting, harvesting and hauling of sugarcane, mills can 
increase efficiency in ethanol and/or sugar production. On the other hand, if mills are integrating 
for reasons other than increasing efficiency and coordination in sugarcane production (e.g. to gain 
116 
independency from trading partners), the effect of perown on the efficiency of the mill is not 
known and could be negative.  
Marginal effects were estimated after the estimation of the Tobit regression given the 
nonlinear nature of the model. Marginal effects allow us to evaluate the effect of a one unit change 
of an exogenous variable on technical efficiency (Onukwugha, Bergtold and Jain 2015). Marginal 
effects for the exogenous variables, with the exception of the interaction terms, are estimated as 
average partial effects. The average partial effect was estimated by obtaining separate marginal 
effects for each observation and then taking the average over individual marginal effects 
(Onukwugha, Bergtold  and Jain 2015). For instance, the marginal effect (ME) of different levels 
of vertical integration (perown) on technical efficiency (𝜃) is: 
 
𝑀𝐸𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑛 =
𝜕𝜃
𝜕𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑛
  (4.3) 
 
Marginal effects of interaction terms are interpreted as changes in the marginal effects due 
to changes in another variable of interest (Onukwugha, Bergtold and Jain 2015). Generally, the 
marginal effect of the interaction term is the partial derivative of the marginal effect of one of the 
variables in the interaction (Onukwugha, Bergtold and Jain 2015). In the equation (4.2) the 
interaction terms consist of a dummy and a continuous variable. Thus, the marginal effect of the 
interaction term is estimated as the difference in the marginal effects of perown at each of the 
dummy values (Onukwugha, Bergtold and Jain 2015). For example, the marginal effect (ME) of 
perown*cw on technical efficiency (𝜃) is the marginal effect of perown at cw=0 minus the 
marginal effect of perown at cw=1: 
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𝑀𝐸𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑛∗𝑐𝑤 =
𝜕𝜃
𝜕𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑛
|
𝑐𝑤=1
−
𝜕𝜃
𝜕𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑛
|
𝑐𝑤=0
  (4.4) 
 
Asymptotic standard errors for the marginal effects were estimated using the delta method 
(Onukwugha, Bergtold and Jain 2015). 
 
 
4.4 Data 
Information on mills in Brazil were collected from the 2013 Brazilian Sugar and Ethanol 
Guide (Procana 2013). From the 422 mills in the guide, only 204 had all the information needed 
for the study14. In 2013, Brazil produced 38.4 million tons of sugar and 23.2 billion liters of 
ethanol. The 204 firms considered produced 48% of the ethanol and 54% of the sugar produced 
(Procana 2013). Two inputs15 (capacity and crushed sugarcane), and two outputs16 (sugar and 
ethanol) were modeled in the input-oriented DEA model (Table 4.2). Of the inputs, capacity is a 
proxy for the capital of the mill, representing a long-term variable, while sugarcane would 
represent a short-term input variable of the production process. Of the 204 mills, 60 produced only 
ethanol and 6 only sugar, while the rest produced both ethanol and sugar. Information on capacity 
was gathered for the year before (i.e. Procana 2012) for 12 mills that did not report this information 
in the 2013 Brazilian Sugar and Ethanol Guide17. Most of the mills in the sample are in São Paulo 
                                                 
14 Some of the issues encountered were: firms with more than a mill declaring consolidated information; mills not 
producing in 2013; and, mills only declaring partial information. 
15 Information on sugarcane yield and labor were not added. Labor was only rarely reported by the mills and would 
significantly reduce the sample size. Yield information is not reported and would require dividing the amount of 
crushed sugarcane over the total area reported which might introduce measurement errors, as well as, endogeneity 
issues in second stage regressions estimated. 
16 The amount of energy sold by the mills was not considered as an output due to the limited information available. 
For the same reason, the amount of labor was not considered as an input. 
17 We assumed that the capacity of the mill will remain unchanged from one year to the next. 
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(69 mills), a state responsible for over 50% of the sugarcane produced in the country. The North 
region was the region with the least number of mills (4 mills). From the Center-West, an area that 
has recently experienced sugarcane expansion, there were 37 mills in the sample. 
Considering the sample for this study, in 2013 the amount of sugarcane used by a single 
mill in the production of ethanol and sugar varied from 33 thousand tons to 7 million tons. 
Sugarcane crushing capacity of the mills ranged from 800 to 42,000 tons of sugarcane per day. 
The average mill produced 62 thousand metric liters of ethanol and produced  
91.5 thousand tons of sugar (Table 4.2).  
The second stage of the analysis used the calculated input-oriented technical efficiency 
scores along with other data from the 2013 Brazilian Sugar and Ethanol Guide which included the 
percentage of crushed sugarcane produced by mills out of the total amount of sugarcane used 
(Perown), and information on the location of the mill. The age of the mill was calculated by adding 
the years from when the mill started operating up to 2013. The year that the mill began operations 
was obtained from the websites of the individual mills, as well as, search engines for company 
profiles (Graphiq Inc 2017; Bloomberg 2017). In the cases where the mill was sold to another 
company, the start of production is that of when the buying company started production.  
In the sample, there are mills that are totally vertically integrated (i.e. Perown is 100%) 
and those that have all their sugarcane supplied by a third party (i.e. Perown is 0%). On average 
mills produce 64% of the sugarcane they crush. Hence, mills that produce a portion of the 
sugarcane they require (e.g. 64%) need to combine more than one vertical coordination strategy to 
acquire their sugarcane (e.g. vertical integration and contracts). Mills in areas where sugarcane 
production ranges from 2,808 to 10 million tons, produced themselves 99% of the sugarcane they 
crushed (Figure 4.1). Mills in the expansion region (i.e. Center -West) are on average 80% 
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vertically integrated. Areas with a longer history in sugarcane production (i.e. Alagoas, 
Pernambuco and São Paulo) were 62% vertically integrated.  
The sample was comprised of mills that had just started in that year (i.e. 1 year old) and 
mills that had over a century of existence (Table 4.2). The oldest mills were in Alagoas and 
Pernambuco with an average age of 65 years. The oldest mill in these two states had 152 years. 
Younger mills were in the Center-West, where on average mills were 11 years of age. 
 
 
4.5 Results 
Results from the input-oriented DEA show that out of 204 plants analyzed, 20 were found 
to be fully efficient (i.e. 𝜃 = 1) (Table 4.3). Every region (i.e. North, Northeast, Southeast, South 
and Center West) had at least one efficient mill. Like Junior, Carlucci and Grespan (2014), we 
found that most of the efficient mills (i.e. 6 of them) were in São Paulo. Mills in the Center-West 
appear to be more homogeneous in terms of efficiency, as the standard deviation is the lowest 
among all the regions (Table 4.3). This may arise due to most of the mills operating in this region 
starting after 2000. In ten of the states, there were no fully efficient mills. These states do not have 
a large number of mills, hence the low efficiency scores could be a result of the lack of market 
pressure, as described by D’Aveni and Ravenscraft (1994). The least efficient mill, with an 
efficiency score of 0.53, is in the state of Minas Gerais. Mills in this state appear to be more 
heterogeneous in comparison to other states, due to their higher standard deviation. The standard 
deviation of the efficiency scores is 0.10. On average, the least efficient mills are in the North 
region while the most efficient mills are in the Center-West region (Table 4.3). 
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Considering the total sample, mills on average have an input-oriented technical efficiency 
score of 0.88 and a standard deviation of 0.08. There are 21 firms in the top 10th percentile  
(Figure 4.3). Mills on the efficiency frontier have a score of one and those away from the frontier, 
the inefficient mills, have a score below one. Close to 10% of the mills were fully efficient, and 
less than 12% had an efficiency score below 0.8 (Figure 4.3). 
The second stage regressed 204 observations using a two sided Tobit model. Following 
UCLA Statistical Consulting Group (2017) we calculate a rough estimate of the Pseudo R2 by 
squaring the correlation of the predicted efficiency scores (𝜃𝑛) with the actual efficiency scores 
(𝜃𝑛). The model accounts for 12% of the variation in the dependent variable. The Wald test shows 
that the hypothesis that the sum of all the coefficients is zero is rejected (Table 4.4). Corresponding 
coefficients of the three estimated models (Tobit, Simar Wilson Algorithm #1 and fractional) have 
the same signs though they are of different magnitudes (Table 4.4). This indicates that the results 
are relatively robust to different functional forms and that all three models can equally describe 
the data generated process (Table 4.4). Marginal effects have the same sign and relative 
magnitudes between the models (e.g. cw has a higher effect followed by alpe then sp) (Table 4.5). 
Average partial effects of the interaction terms were not found to be statistically significant at a 
5% level in any of the models, though their signs and relative magnitudes are the same. The major 
concern could be the fact that the marginal effect of perown is not statistically significant in the 
Simar Wilson Algorithm #1 model but it is in the other two models (Table 4.5). We argue, though, 
that the size of the marginal effect of vertical integration is small enough for it not to change the 
conclusions of this paper. Average marginal effects and the marginal effects of the interaction 
terms are not calculated in the same manner. Our discussion concentrates on the marginal effects 
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of the Tobit regression, given the nonlinear nature of the model and the greater difficulty in 
interpreting the coefficient estimates. 
The average marginal effects for the location dummies and vertical integration by itself 
had a statistically significant impact on technical efficiency (Table 4.5). The marginal effect related 
to the age of the mill and the fact that the mill produced two goods instead of one were statistically 
insignificant, but had the expected sign. Older mills may have older technology, reducing technical 
efficiency. The mill’s age may not have an effect on technical efficiency since older mills may be 
updating their facilities. By assigning sugarcane between ethanol and sugar production mixed mills 
may be able to more efficiently allocate inputs.  
The remainder of the results discussion will focus on the marginal effects of impacts from 
increases in vertical integration on technical efficiency (Table 4.5). An increase in vertical 
integration by 1% implies a decrease of 0.0004 in technical efficiency. This negative effect may 
be capturing management inefficiencies. It is a small impact. Consider, for instance, an average 
mill with 64% of vertical integration, a 10% increase in vertical integration would mean a change 
in technical efficiency from 0.8834 to 0.8790, which when rounded to two decimal places remains 
at 0.88. This result is similar to Pieri and Zaninotto (2013) who do not find evidence of vertical 
integration significantly impacting technical efficiency. It appears that the decision to vertically 
integrate is not linked to the desire to increase technical efficiency. Even if mills have higher 
sugarcane productivity (Chaddad’s 2015) or produce higher yields (Crago et al. 2010), vertical 
integration of the production process does not lead to gains in technical efficiency. This result does 
not rule out gains in efficiency from other forms of vertical coordination. Quasi-vertical 
122 
integration, such as mills signing supply or crop share contracts with farmers or overseeing 
harvesting, hauling and delivery services could possibly bring gains in technical efficiency18.  
Marginal effects from location dummies are all positive (Table 4.5). Mills located in the 
Center-West have a higher technical efficiency score relative to mills in other nonmodeled states 
of Brazil, by 0.05. The marginal effect from the Center-West location is also the largest relative to 
the other locations controlled (i.e. SP and ALPE). This difference could come from the fact that 
mills in the Center-West are newer and may have newer technology. When analyzing mills in the 
Center-South, Pereira et al. (2016) find that mills only adopt technologies with proven efficiency. 
Also, there is evidence of quasi-vertical integration in this region. Sant’Anna, Granco, et al (2016) 
finds that mills in Mato Grosso do Sul and Goiás attract local farmers to sugarcane production by 
providing them with sugarcane seedlings, payment advances and consulting.  
The marginal effect of a mill being in Alagoas or Pernambuco from that of not being in 
one of the unmodeled regions is 0.05. Given the regression of the sugarcane sector in these states 
(Andrade 2001) it is likely that the mills that have survived are the efficient ones. Similar to our 
study, Junior, Carlucci and Grespan (2014) does find efficient firms in the state of Alagoas. Mills 
located in São Paulo also have a larger efficiency score than in other areas not controlled for in the 
second stage. The difference in technical efficiency score is of 0.04. Due to the larger number of 
mills in São Paulo, it is likely that pressure from competing mills has forced mills in this state to 
be more efficient.  
In order to understand the impact from vertical integration in the different locations we 
plotted the predicted technical efficiency scores against 1% changes in vertical integration (Figures 
4.3 to 4.5). The plots demonstrate the predicted technical efficiency scores at each level of vertical 
                                                 
18 We were unable to account for this scenario. There was no data available on quasi-vertical integration. 
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integration for mixed mills, while remaining factors are held constant. We chose mixed mills since 
these were the majority of mills in the sample and they represent the state-of-the-art in mill 
technology. Plots show that differences in technical efficiency, between mills in the Center-West 
or in São Paulo and those unmodelled, occur when mills are about 60% vertically integrated. For 
mills in the Center-West and São Paulo, technical efficiency does not seem to change with vertical 
integration, considering a confidence interval of 95% (Figures 4.4 and 4.5). It appears that it is the 
location rather than the level of vertical integration that is impacting the technical efficiency of the 
mill.  
Vertical coordination could explain why we do not see changes to technical efficiency at 
higher levels of vertical integration in the Center-West (Figure 4.4). In this region, contract 
negotiations are part of the sugarcane industry. In general, in Goiás and Mato Grosso do Sul and 
other states of the Center-West, farmers find it hard to grow sugarcane without a contract 
(Sant’Anna, Granco, et al. 2016). Hence, it is likely that the results are showing how vertical 
coordination through contracting may be just as beneficial, in terms of technical efficiency, as 
vertical integration. The occurrence of vertical integration in the Center-West may be a 
management strategy to create barriers to entry to other mills. Given that sugarcane has recently 
expanded into this region, mills settling in the Center-West may want to control sugarcane 
production in surrounding lands to limit new mills from settling in. New mills would bring more 
competition for sugarcane.  
In the state of São Paulo, the presence of a sugarcane spot market may explain why 
technical efficiency does not change with higher levels of vertical integration. As suggested by 
D’Aveni and Ravenscraft (1994), competitive markets may be pressuring farmers to be more 
efficient. If so, it may be difficult for mills to be more productive than their suppliers. This may 
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explain why mills in São Paulo are less likely to vertically integrate than in other states (Bastos 
2013). The occurrence of vertical integration in São Paulo may be a management strategy for mills 
to depend less on suppliers such that mills increase their bargaining power with suppliers and 
reduce the rivalry for procurement.  
The technical efficiency of mills in Alagoas and Pernambuco changes as the percentage of 
vertical integration increases (Figure 4.6). The statistically significant difference between mills in 
these states and those in other unmodeled states occurs from the level of 40% to 70% of vertical 
integration. As vertical integration increases, mills in these states start to have the same technical 
efficiency as those in unmodeled states, at a lower level of technical efficiency, Bastos (2013) 
reports a constant high level of vertical integration in the Northeastern states in past years. As 
Andrade (2001) reports, the sugarcane sector in Pernambuco is regressing. A declining sugarcane 
market may be a reason why we still see mills vertically integrating (Stuckey and White 1993). 
Another reason may be the costs associated with dis-integration. Stuckey and White (1993) argue 
that vertical integration may be difficult and costly to reverse. The state of Pernambuco, for 
instance, has a history of consolidated economic groups being responsible for their own sugarcane 
production (Andrade 2001). This suggests that mills may have decided, in the past, to vertically 
integrate and now find it too costly to dis-integrate. In addition, current policies in place in Brazil 
seem to favor sugarcane production in the Center-South (e.g. the Sugarcane Agroecological 
Zoning identifies larger areas for sugarcane production in the Center-South states (Sant’Anna, 
Granco, et al. 2016; Manzatto 2009)). This discourages new farmers from entering sugarcane 
production or current producers from investing in sugarcane production.   
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4.6 Conclusion 
The purpose of this study was to assess the relationship between vertical coordination and 
input-oriented technical efficiency using data envelopment analysis and a Tobit censored model. 
Inputs considered in the DEA model were the amount of crushed sugarcane and the mills’ crushing 
capacity. Outputs were the quantities of ethanol and sugar produced. The sample consisted of 204 
Brazilian mills responsible, in 2013, for half of the country’s total production of sugar and ethanol. 
The Tobit censored model controlled for the percentage of crushed sugarcane produced on lands 
owned or rented by mills, if the mill produced two goods (i.e. ethanol and sugar), the age of the 
mill, location dummies and interaction terms. The interaction terms consisted of the percentage of 
crushed sugarcane produced by the mill interacted with different locational dummy variables (São 
Paulo, Center-West region and Alagoas and Pernambuco).  
Results indicate that vertical integration and the location of the mill have a statistically 
significant impact on efficiency. The age of the mill, as well as, its level of specialization (i.e. if it 
can produce two products instead of one) does not impact technical efficiency. Differences in 
technical efficiency between mills in different locations are more significant at higher levels of 
vertical integration.  
Vertical integration, by itself, has a minimal negative marginal effect on efficiency. Hence 
technical efficiency is not the main driver of vertical integration. In fact, losses in technical 
efficiency are a cost from the decision to vertically integrate. Although vertical integration may 
not be motivated by gains in operational efficiency there are other benefits from vertical 
integration. According to agribusiness theory (Peterson, Wysocki and Harsh 2001; Williamson 
1985; Milgrom and Roberts 1990; Macaulay 1963; Vukina and Leegomonchai 2006) motivators 
for vertical integration could be: (1) to establish a procurement base; (2) to moderate competition 
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by creating barriers to entry; (3) to reduce rivalry for inputs whereby increasing bargaining power 
with suppliers. When deciding on vertical coordination strategies mills will balance the costs and 
benefits from each strategy. Our study has found that technical efficiency is located on the cost 
side. Thus, if a mill still decides to vertically integrate it implies that the benefits overcome the 
losses in technical inefficiencies. If, though, the benefits disappear overtime then the balance 
between cost and benefits might point against vertical integration.  
Mills in states with little sugarcane production (i.e. North region) may be vertically 
integrating to ensure a procurement base (reason 1). If the strategic purpose is to guarantee 
sugarcane supply, then vertical integration will persist until a supply market is established. Once 
a strong supply chain is in place it would be expected for mills to rely more on suppliers for their 
input needs. Mills in the Center-West, where sugarcane has recently expanded into, may be 
deciding to vertically integrate to create barriers to entry (reason 2). The aim of reducing rivalry 
for sugarcane and to increase the bargaining power with suppliers, may be what motivates vertical 
integration in the regions with the highest sugarcane production (e.g. São Paulo) (reason 3). In the 
cases of reasons (2) and (3), the strategic benefits from vertical integration are not expected to 
dissipate over time since the decrease in rivalry and the barriers to entry will remain. Mills appear, 
thus, to be willing to sacrifice in technical efficiency for the strategic benefits gained from vertical 
integration. Hence, the minimal negative impact from vertical integration and the different vertical 
coordination strategies that can be witnessed throughout the country. 
It is important to understand the factors motivating vertical integration in Brazil. As 
discussed, vertical integration is not a recent phenomenon and public policies have been in place 
since 1941 to contain it. Allowing firms to vertically integrate in the Center-West (Cerrado 
region), where sugarcane production has recently expanded into, can have serious implications to 
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the sustainability of sugarcane, ethanol and sugar production in Brazil. If all of the mill’s sugarcane 
supply comes from its own production, then sugarcane production becomes more sensitive to the 
financial stability of the mill. For example, by controlling the production around the mill, a firm 
can create barriers to entry to new mills. This means that if the mill goes into bankruptcy then it is 
likely that sugarcane, ethanol and sugar production will cease in that location. In turn, when there 
is more than one mill in a location with independent farmers supplying sugarcane to mills, 
sugarcane production is likely to continue after the closure of one of the mills. Therefore, if the 
government wishes to not only guarantee the benefits from the sugarcane expansion to farmers but 
also ensure the sustainability of the industry it needs to understand the mill’s motives to vertically 
integrate.  
Findings from this study imply that drivers of vertical integration vary according to the 
characteristics of the states and regions where mills are located. In the Center-West region mills 
may decide to vertically integrate to create barriers to entry to new mills. The first mills to location 
may decide to control all sugarcane production within a 30-mile radius of itself, limiting new mills 
from locating next to it. New mills would mean increased competition for inputs, by preventing 
new mills from locating nearby and avoiding increases in input prices. In this case, the government 
can put antitrust laws in place or even motivate farmers to negotiate with firms before the mill is 
built in a certain location. Long term contracts instead of vertical integration can also be an option 
in this situation. As seen in the chapter 3, though, farmers want to receive higher returns to sign 
longer contracts, and the government may need to provide further measures to guarantee contract 
enforcement.  
Findings from this study also provide guidance to industries highly dependent on one input 
and with high location specificity. It points to the fact that vertical integration requires sacrificing 
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technical efficiency. Also, it suggests that there may are other vertical coordination strategies that 
may be more beneficial for technical efficiency. For instance, to establish a supply market, the 
industry can seek partnerships with farmers, offering them technical support and financial help to 
start producing sugarcane. Policy makers deciding to entice mills to a new location need to put in 
place policies to limit vertical integration or allow for negotiations between suppliers and 
producers before the installation of the mill. In this way, the strategy to vertically integrate to create 
barriers to entry, such as may be the case in the Center-West, could possibly be avoided. 
Nevertheless, further studies on the strategic benefits from vertical integration in ethanol 
production are required to fully understand the benefits and costs from vertical integration. There 
are other outside factors, such as the environmental laws (e.g. burn ban) that may be impacting the 
decision to vertically integrate. This article has shown that gains in technical efficiency are not a 
major driver for vertical integration. There may are other vertical coordination strategies that may 
be more beneficial to increases in technical efficiency.  
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Figure 4.1: The evolution in the percentages of crushed sugarcane supplied by the mills and by 
farmers between 1948/49 and 2012/13 in Brazil 
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Figure 4.2: Sugarcane production in the Center-South of Brazil in the crop year 2011/12 
Source: IBGE (2014) and CONAB (2013) 
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Table 4.1: Sugarcane supply share and average area cultivated by farmers and mills in the crop    
year 2011/12 
States and Regions 
Cane production share Land cultivated by  
Mill(%) Farmer(%) Mills (ha) Farmers (ha) 
North         
Acre 100% 0% 526.22 0.00 
Amazonas 100% 0% 3,870.64 0.00 
Para 100% 0% 12,115.82 0.00 
Rondonia 84% 16% 2,328.74 437.97 
Northeast         
Alagoas 66% 34% 11,732.95 6,098.28 
Bahia 69% 31% 4,332.74 1,908.60 
Paraiba 55% 45% 7,710.81 6,365.15 
Pernambuco 60% 40% 8,559.10 5,611.60 
Piaui 83% 17% 11,619.26 2,417.05 
Rio Grande do 
Norte 
79% 21% 11,385.73 3,039.37 
Sergipe 74% 26%     
Southeast         
São Paulo 57% 43% 14,680.91 10,971.56 
Minas Gerais 58% 42% 9,470.81 6,960.16 
Espirito Santo 57% 43% 6,037.94 4,618.50 
Rio de Janeiro 11% 89% 1,338.32 10,985.42 
South         
Parana 90% 10% 18,272.56 2,127.75 
Rio Grande do Sul 100% 0% 1,876.97 0.00 
Center West         
Mato Grosso do Sul 73% 27% 16,806.98 5,671.26 
Goiás 77% 23% 15,126.91 4,184.86 
Mato Grosso 87% 13% 21,705.23 3,024.44 
Brazil 64% 36% 13,110.12 7,348.45 
Source: CONAB 2013.       
 
 
 
 
  
137 
Table 4.2: Summary statistics of inputs, outputs and exogenous variables used  
 
  
Variables Description N Minimum Mean Maximum
Standard 
Deviation
Inputs
sugarcane
204 33.11    1,484.69   7,601.58   1,155.33  
capacity 204 800.00  10,130.19 42,000.00 6,707.17  
Outputs
ethanol
204 0.00 62.00        295.85      52.37       
sugar
204 0.00 91.51        638.70      99.99       
Exogenous
perown
204 0.00 64.27        100.00      29.29       
mixed
204 0.00 0.68          1.00          0.47         
cw Dummy that is 1 when the mill is in the 
Center-West and 0 otherweise
204 0.00 0.18          1.00          0.39         
cw=0 167 0.00 0.61          1.00          0.29         
cw=1 37 0.00 0.80          1.00          0.27         
sp Dummy that is 1 when the mill is in São 
Paulo and 0 otherweise
204 0.00 0.34          1.00          0.47         
sp=0 135 0.00 0.66          1.00          0.30         
sp=1 69 0.00 0.62          1.00          0.27         
alpe Dummy that is 1 when the mill is either 
in Alagoas or Pernambuco and 0 
otherweise
204 0.00 0.16          1.00          0.36         
alpe=0 172 0.00 0.65          1.00          0.31         
alpe=1 32 0.00 0.62          0.90          0.19         
age 204 1.00 28.33        152.00      27.84       
Amount in 1,000 tons of sugarcane crushed by 
the DMU
Percentage (%) of sugarcane crushed that was 
produced by the mill 
Dummy that is 1 when the mill produces two 
goods and 0 otherweise
Age of the mill in years
Amount of sugar produced in 1,000 tons by 
each DMU
Amount of ethanol produced in 1,000,000 liters 
by each DMU
Amout of sugarcane daily crushing capacity 
Interaction of a dummy indicating if the 
mill is in the Center West region with 
perown
cw*perown
sp*perown
alpe*perown
Interaction of a dummy indicating if the 
mill is in the state of Sao Paulo with 
perown
Interaction of a dummy indicating if the 
mill is in the states of Alagoas or 
Pernambuco with perown
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Table 4.3: Input-oriented efficiency scores by region and state with variable returns to scale 
States and Regions N Minimum Mean Maximum 
Standard 
Deviation 
North 4 0.70 0.82 1.00 0.13 
Acre 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 . 
Amazonas 1 0.75 0.75 0.75 . 
Para 1 0.85 0.85 0.85 . 
Rondonia 1 0.70 0.70 0.70 . 
Northeast 50 0.60 0.88 1.00 0.09 
Alagoas 20 0.80 0.92 1.00 0.06 
Bahia 6 0.60 0.72 0.85 0.09 
Paraiba 6 0.80 0.90 1.00 0.08 
Pernambuco 12 0.74 0.88 1.00 0.06 
Piaui 1 0.84 0.84 0.84 . 
Rio Grande do Norte 1 0.72 0.72 0.72 . 
Sergipe 4 0.87 0.92 0.96 0.04 
Southeast 101 0.53 0.88 1.00 0.08 
São Paulo 69 0.71 0.89 1.00 0.06 
Minas Gerais 26 0.53 0.88 1.00 0.10 
Espirito Santo 4 0.73 0.75 0.76 0.01 
Rio de Janeiro 2 0.81 0.82 0.83 0.01 
South 12 0.78 0.86 1.00 0.06 
Parana 11 0.78 0.85 0.91 0.05 
Rio Grande do Sul 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 . 
Center  West 37 0.77 0.91 1.00 0.06 
Mato Grosso do Sul 9 0.81 0.90 1.00 0.06 
Goiás 19 0.77 0.91 1.00 0.07 
Mato Grosso 9 0.83 0.90 1.00 0.05 
Brazil 204 0.53 0.88 1.00 0.08 
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Figure 4.3: Cumulative distribution function of the reciprocal of the input-oriented technical 
efficiency measure under variable returns to scale. 
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Table 4.4: Results for the Tobit, Simar Wilson and Fractional regression models 
  
Tobit 
Simar Wilson 
Alg #1 
Fractional 
Regression 
Perown -0.0006   -0.0004   -0.0044   
  (0.0004)   (0.0003)   (0.0031)   
Mixed 0.0118   0.0489 *** 0.1576   
  (0.0159)   (0.0160)   (0.1336)   
Cw 0.0294   0.0205   0.2536   
  (0.0665)   (0.0608)   (0.6619)   
Sp 0.0063   0.0013   0.0638   
  (0.0361)   (0.0376)   (0.3072) 
  
Alpe 0.1482 * 0.0964   1.6323 * 
  (0.0902)   (0.0928)   (0.8485)   
Age -0.0002   -0.0004   -0.0024   
  (0.0003)   (0.0003)   (0.00279)   
cw*perown 0.0005   0.0009   0.0047   
  (0.0008) 
  
(0.0007) 
  
(0.0076) 
  
sp*perown 
0.0006 
  
0.0008 
  
0.0052 
  
  (0.0005)   (0.0005)   (0.0043)   
alpe*perown 
-0.0013 
  
-0.0004 
  
-0.0157   
  (0.0003)   (0.0013)   (0.0115)   
Constant 0.885 *** 0.8444 *** 1.9624 *** 
  (0.0314)   (0.0250)   (0.2585)   
Sigma 0.082   0.078       
  (0.0054)   (0.0057)       
Wald chi2 (7) 17.94   35.282   23.47   
Prob>chi2 0.036   0.000   0.005   
Note: Standard errors are in parenthesis.  
Significant levels: *** is 1%, ** is 5%, * is 10%. 
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Table 4.5: Marginal effects from Tobit, Simar Wilson and Fractional regression models 
  
Tobit 
Simar Wilson 
Alg #1 
Fractional 
regression 
Perown -0.0004 * -0.00004   -0.0004 *** 
  
(0.0002)   (0.0003)   (0.0002) 
  
mixed 0.0107   0.0489 *** 0.0160   
  
(0.0144)   (0.0160)   (0.0136) 
  
cw 0.0526 *** 0.0801 *** 0.0505 *** 
  (0.0189)   (0.0236)   (0.0182) 
  
sp 0.0401 *** 0.0540 *** 0.0385 *** 
  (0.0123)   (0.0165)   (0.0113) 
  
alpe 0.0513 *** 0.0723 *** 0.0479 *** 
  (0.0161)   (0.0259)   (0.0156) 
  
age -0.0002   -0.0004   -0.0002   
  (0.0003)   (0.0003)   (0.0003) 
  
Interactions             
cw*perown 0.0005   0.0009   0.0005   
  (0.0006)   (0.0007)   (0.0006) 
  
sp*perown 0.0006   0.0008   0.0006   
  (0.0004)   (0.0005)   (0.0004) 
  
alpe*perown -0.0009   -0.0004   -0.0010   
  (0.0009)   (0.0013)   (0.0009)   
Note: Standard errors are in parenthesis.  
Significant levels: *** is 1%, ** is 5%, * is 10%. 
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Figure 4.4: Predicted efficiency scores at a 95% confidence interval for different levels of 
vertical integration for mixed mills in the Center-West (cw=1) and outside (cw=0) 
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Figure 4.5: Predicted efficiency scores at 95% confidence interval for different levels of vertical 
integration for mixed mills in São Paulo (sp=1) and outside (sp=0) 
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Figure 4.6: Predicted efficiency scores at 95% confidence interval for different levels of vertical 
integration for mixed mills in Alagoas or Pernambuco (alpe=1) and outside (alpe=0) 
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Appendix A - Misspecification tests 
This appendix presents the misspecification tests conducted for each of the equations in the 
system. The results presented are the ones for the final equations estimated. Equations were 
corrected to achieve statistical reliability of the results. 
We tested the residuals from all equations after 3SLS. Except for sugar supply to the rest 
of the world, residuals from all equations passed the normality assumption. Given the results from 
past studies we do not believe this jeopardizes the validity of our results. 
 
 A.1 Sugar demand equation 
In order to correct for serial correlation in the residuals, lags for two and three months were 
added to the sugar demand equation. To control for lower sugar consumption in the month of 
February a dummy was added. A trend squared was added to control for the growth in sugar 
demand over time. Misspecification test results are in table A.1. 
 
 A.2 Sugar supply equation 
In order to control for serial correlation a one-month lag of sugar supply was added to the 
sugar supply equation.  A dummy was added to control for outliers in sugar supply (i.e. dum3). 
Another dummy was added to control for a structural break in sugar supply, as well as its iteration 
with the lag of sugar supply. Further misspecification test results are in table A.2. 
 
 A.3 Sugar supply to the rest of the world 
In order to control for serial correlation a one-month lag of sugar exports was added to the 
equation. In addition, dummies (dum3, dum4 and dum7) were added to control for usual patterns 
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in sugar exports. It was not possible to correct the heteroskedasticity and normality issues. We 
tried using weighted least squares to correct for the heteroscedasticity, but it did not result in a 
good fit for the model. In addition, other tests indicated misspecification of the weighted least 
squares model. Further misspecification test results are in table A.3. 
 
 A.4 Ethanol supply  
In the case of the ethanol supply equation one and three-month lags of ethanol supply were 
added as instruments of the 3sls equation to correct for serial autocorrelation. Hydrous prices 
squared were also added to the ethanol supply equation to control for the nonlinear relationship 
between ethanol supply and prices. Further misspecification test results are in table A.4. 
 
 A.5 Anhydrous ethanol demand  
In the anhydrous demand, a squared trend is added to control for growth in anhydrous 
ethanol demand. In addition, a dummy was added to control for outliers. Further misspecification 
test results are in table A.5. 
 
 A.6 Hydrous ethanol demand  
In the hydrous ethanol demand, a dummy was added to control for times when hydrous 
ethanol consumption was lower than usual (i.e. February 2010 and March and April 2011). 
Although the hydrous ethanol demand equation does not pass the normality of the residuals test as 
an individual ordinary least squares equation, the residuals do pass normality tests as a 3SLS. 
Further misspecification test results are in table A.6. 
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Table A.1: Misspecification test results for the sugar demand equation 
Assumption Test Used Test Statistic P-value Conclusion of Test 
Normality Shapiro-Francia test 𝜒2 = 2.67  0.2630 Fail to reject null, 
support for normality  
Shapiro-Wilk test 1.21 0.07 Fail to reject null, 
support for normality 
Specification Ramsey regression 
specification-error 
test 
F(3,179)=1.21 0.3093 Fail to reject null, 
support for lack of 
omitted variables 
 Linktest Insignificant 
ℎ𝑎𝑡2 
0.269 Support for a correctly 
specified model 
Heteroskedasticity Breusch-Pagan and 
Cook-Weisberg tests 
𝜒2 = 0.99 0.3193 Fail to reject null, 
support for constant 
variance 
 Information Matrix 𝜒2 = 77.36 0.000 Rejects null, no 
support for constant 
variance 
Serial correlation Kendall’s rank 
correlation  
 0.1732 Fail to reject null, 
support for 
independence 
𝑅2   0.96  
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Table A.2: Misspecification test results for the sugar supply equation 
Assumption Test Used Test Statistic P-value Conclusion of Test 
Normality Shapiro-Francia test 𝜒2 = 4.77  0.092 Fail to reject null, 
support for normality  
Shapiro-Wilk test 1.541 0.06 Fail to reject null, 
support for normality 
Specification Ramsey regression 
specification-error 
test 
F(3,177)=0.93 0.429 Fail to reject null, 
support for lack of 
omitted variables 
 Linktest Insignificant 
ℎ𝑎𝑡2 
0.909 Support for a correctly 
specified model 
Heteroskedasticity Breusch-Pagan and 
Cook-Weisberg tests 
𝜒2 = 3.56 0.0592 Fail to reject null, 
support for constant 
variance 
 Information Matrix 𝜒2 = 55.12 0.688 Fail to reject null, 
support for constant 
variance 
Serial correlation Kendall’s rank 
correlation  
 0.9418 Fail to reject null, 
support for 
independence 
𝑅2   0.87  
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Table A.3: Misspecification test results for the sugar supply to the rest of the world equation 
Assumption Test Used Test Statistic P-value Conclusion of Test 
Normality Shapiro-Francia test 𝜒2 = 13.12  0.004 Rejects null, no 
support for normality  
Shapiro-Wilk test 3.59 0.0001 Rejects null, no 
support for normality 
Specification Ramsey regression 
specification-error 
test 
F(3,179)=1.36 0.256 Fail to reject null, 
support for lack of 
omitted variables 
 Linktest Insignificant 
ℎ𝑎𝑡2 
0.655 Support for a correctly 
specified model 
Heteroskedasticity Breusch-Pagan and 
Cook-Weisberg tests 
𝜒2 = 9.70 0.002 Rejects null, no 
support for constant 
variance 
 Information Matrix 𝜒2 = 56.05 0.047 Rejects null, no 
support for constant 
variance 
Serial correlation Kendall’s rank 
correlation  
 0.5393 Fail to reject null, 
support for 
independence 
𝑅2   0.78  
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Table A.4: Misspecification test results for the ethanol supply equation 
Assumption Test Used Test Statistic P-value Conclusion of Test 
Normality Shapiro-Francia test 𝜒2 = 0.89  0.639 Fail to reject null, 
support for normality  
Shapiro-Wilk test 0.145 0.44 Fail to reject null, 
support for normality 
Specification Ramsey regression 
specification-error 
test 
F(3,174)=1.50 0.2166 Fail to reject null, 
support for lack of 
omitted variables 
 Linktest Insignificant 
ℎ𝑎𝑡2 
0.477 Support for a correctly 
specified model 
Heteroskedasticity Breusch-Pagan and 
Cook-Weisberg tests 
𝜒2 = 0.66 0.415 Fail to reject null, 
support for constant 
variance 
 Information Matrix 𝜒2 = 108.36 0.038 Rejects null, no 
support for constant 
variance 
Serial correlation Kendall’s rank 
correlation  
 0.173 Fail to reject null, 
support for 
independence 
𝑅2   0.97  
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Table A.5: Misspecification test results for the anhydrous ethanol demand equation 
Assumption Test Used Test Statistic P-value Conclusion of Test 
Normality Shapiro-Francia test 𝜒2 = 0.06  0.97 Fail to reject null, 
support for normality  
Shapiro-Wilk test 0.245 0.40 Fail to reject null, 
support for normality 
Specification Ramsey regression 
specification-error 
test 
F(3,179)=2.09 0.104 Fail to reject null, 
support for lack of 
omitted variables 
 Linktest Insignificant 
ℎ𝑎𝑡2 
0.797 Support for a correctly 
specified model 
Heteroskedasticity Breusch-Pagan and 
Cook-Weisberg tests 
𝜒2 = 0.73 0.3919 Fail to reject null, 
support for constant 
variance 
 Information Matrix 𝜒2 = 39.41 0.205 Fail to reject null, 
support for constant 
variance 
Autocorrelation Kendall’s rank 
correlation  
 0.576 Fail to reject null, 
support for 
independence 
𝑅2   0.94  
 
 
 
  
152 
Table A.6:  Misspecification test results for the hydrous ethanol demand equation 
Assumption Test Used Test Statistic P-value Conclusion of Test 
Normality Shapiro-Francia test 𝜒2 = 17.98  0.0001 Rejects null, no 
support for normality  
Shapiro-Wilk test 3.433 0.0003 Rejects null, no 
support for normality 
Specification Ramsey regression 
specification-error 
test 
F(3,182)=2.45 0.065 Rejects null, 
indication of omitted 
variables 
 Linktest Insignificant 
ℎ𝑎𝑡2 
0.184 Support for a correctly 
specified model 
Heteroskedasticity Breusch-Pagan and 
Cook-Weisberg tests 
𝜒2 = 1.58 0.21 Fail to reject null, 
support for constant 
variance 
 Information Matrix 𝜒2 = 87.05 0.000 Rejects null, no 
support for constant 
variance 
Autocorrelation Kendall’s rank 
correlation  
 0.082 Fail to reject null, 
support for 
independence 
𝑅2   0.97  
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Appendix B - The role of trust and welfare on contract choice 
In the Cerrado region it has been reported that the mills’ arrival may bring benefits to the 
community as well as to the farmer (Sant’Anna, Granco, et al. 2016). Also, farmers in this region 
stress the importance of trust and a having a good relationship with the local mill (Sant’Anna et 
al. 2016). Sartorius and Kirsten (2007) find that trust can affect the attributes in a sugarcane supply 
contract. They also argue that the presence of trust reduces the necessity for detailed and costly 
contracts and the likelihood of exploitation due to asymmetric information.  
In this appendix, we discuss the impact of trust and the relationship between the local mill 
and the community of farmers. The main objective is to investigate whether trust and welfare, from 
the relationship with the local mill, can change the farmer’s contract preferences. We account for 
trust and the relationship between the mill and the rural community, or famer, by estimating indices 
using factorial analysis. The indices are used to model heterogeneity in the means of the random 
parameters in the two opt-out model.  
Trust and welfare form a strong basis of the relationship between a local mill and the 
farming community and can affect farmers’ contract choices. Sartorius and Kirsten (2007) find 
that trust can affect the attributes of sugarcane supply contracts in developing countries. Fischer 
(2013) argues that trust is a vital element for commercial exchange. Trust is of special importance 
when contracts are incomplete (Fischer 2013). Personal characteristics of the trade partner and 
communication help build trust (Fischer 2013). In our case, we believe that changes in the welfare 
of the community and in the welfare of the farmer can affect their trust in the local mill, as well 
as, their contract choice.  
A factorial analysis was conducted in Stata 14 using answers to questions related to the 
relationships between local mills and the community and local mills and farmers. In particular, the 
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questions focused on transparency, welfare, distrust and bargaining power (Table B.1). We 
conducted factor analysis using varimax rotations to produce uncorrelated orthogonal factors (Kim 
and Mueller 1978; StataCorp 2015). Factors one and two had eigenvalues of 3.09 and 1.22, 
respectively. Together they explain over 60% of the variation in the data. Factor one explains 36% 
and factor two 24%. Results from the pattern mix indicate that factor 1 is mostly defined by 
questions related to the relationship between the mill and farmers (trust), while factor 2 is mostly 
related to the questions related to welfare. Factor 1 was defined mainly be questions 4, 14, 15 and 
Factor 2 by questions 2, 3 and 12. These are all questions related to private benefits of the farmer 
and social welfare.  
Cronbach’s Alpha was measured to determine the reliability of the scales. Computing the 
cronbach’s alpha involves correlating the values for each scale item with the sum of all scores and 
comparing that to the variance for individual scores (Goforth 2015; Weesie 1997):  
 
𝛼 =
𝑘∗ 𝑐̅
?̅?+(𝑘−1)𝑐̅
 (B.1) 
 
where k is the number of scales, 𝑐̅ the mean of all covariances and ?̅? the mean of each items 
variance. Cronbach’s alpha was 0.67 which lies in the recommended minimum range of 0.65 and 
0.8 (Goforth 2015). 
Results from the factor analysis were used to create indices for trust (factor 1) and for 
welfare (factor 2). Indices were estimated using regression techniques after normalizing all 
variables used to estimate the factors by subtracting its mean and dividing by its standard deviation 
(StataCorp 2015). These indices were used as independent variables in the random parameters 
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logit model to define the conditional random parameters, such that equations (3.8-3.12) now 
become: 
 
𝑎0𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖 + 𝛼2𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖 + 𝜎𝑎𝜇𝑎𝑖, 
𝑏0𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖 + 𝜎𝑏𝜇𝑏𝑖, 
𝑐0𝑖 = 𝜏0 + 𝜏1𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖 + 𝜏2𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖 + 𝜎𝑐𝜇𝑐𝑖, 
𝑑0𝑖 = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖 + 𝛿2𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖 + 𝜎𝑑𝜇𝑑𝑖, and 
𝑒0𝑖 = 𝜀0 + 𝜀1𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖 + 𝜀2𝑤𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖 + 𝜎𝑒𝜇𝑒𝑖. 
(B.2) 
(B.3) 
(B.4) 
(B.5) 
(B.6) 
 
where (𝛼, 𝛽, 𝜏, 𝛿, 𝜀) are the means of the ASCs; 𝝁𝒂𝒊, 𝝁𝒃𝒊, 𝝁𝒄𝒊, 𝝁𝒅𝒊, 𝝁𝒆𝒊 are random terms, which are 
assumed to have a normal distribution N(0,1); and 𝝈𝒂, 𝝈𝒃, 𝝈𝒄, 𝝈𝒅, 𝝈𝒆 represent the standard 
deviation of the distribution of each ASC (Louviere, Hensher and Swait 2000). Differently from 
the random parameters in equations equations (3.8) to (3.12) in the paper, these are conditioned on 
the indices for trust and welfare, trying to explain preference heterogeneity across contract options 
at the mean (Hensher, Rose and Greene 2015). The rest of the two opt-out model specification and 
estimation follows the discussion presented in the empirical model and estimation section 5.0. 
Direct and cross-elasticities were calculated using equations (3.15) and (3.16) and the willingness 
to pay was estimated using equations (3.17) and (3.18). 
The number of observations in the model that considers trust and welfare is lower than that 
in the previous two opt-out models. This is due to missing answers to the questions considered. 
Individuals that did not answer the questions considered in the factor analysis were dropped. 
Nevertheless, the McFadden R2 is higher in the model that controls for trust and welfare, while the 
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AIC is lower. This indicates that this model is a good fit for the data. Results are reported in tables 
B.2 to B.7. 
Trust and welfare have a statistically significant impact on the ASCs of the land rental 
contract and the option not to grow sugarcane (Table B.3). Coefficients on the trust and welfare 
measure the sensitivity of marginal utility of the ASC to changes in trust and welfare. These 
changes have a higher impact on the decision not to grow sugarcane. As farmers form greater trust 
in the mill they have more disutility from choosing not to grow sugarcane or from choosing 
contracts with less autonomy (i.e. the land rental contract). It is likely that as farmers gain trust in 
the mill, they prefer contracts that involve working closer with the mill (e.g. agricultural 
partnership). If there are increases in welfare from the arrival of the mill in a county, then farmers’ 
disutility from not growing sugarcane increases.  
Modeling the random parameters with trust and welfare caused changes to the two opt-out 
model coefficients and willingness to pay for contract attributes (Table 3.5 and B.2). The intercepts 
from the contract generate less disutility to the farmer, except for the case of the supply contract. 
Hence, contracts in the hypothetical experiment bring less disutility, than in the previous two opt-
out models, in comparison to a farmer’s current contract. Controlling for trust reduces the disutility 
from longer contracts. The coefficients related to risk (i.e. probability of late payment) also provide 
less disutility than in the previous two opt-out model for the land rental and the agricultural 
partnership contracts. This coincides with a lower willingness to pay for a lower probability of late 
payments. Considering the supply contract, the coefficients related to planting, harvesting and 
delivery are greater in size then in the two opt-out model without trust and welfare indices. The 
contract attribute of the mill buying all the production (i.e. mill buys all), on the other hand, has a 
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lower marginal utility than before. In terms of the option not to grow sugarcane, controlling for 
trust and welfare decreases the disutility from the presence of more than 1 mill in the area.  
Trust and welfare reduce the magnitude of the negative elasticities and increase the 
magnitude of the positive elasticities (Table B.4). Similar to the two opt-out model without the 
modeling of the random parameters, farmers are willing to switch from their current contract when 
offered higher returns. Changes in the attributes related to returns (i.e. rate in the land rental 
contract and, TRS and share pay in the agricultural partnership and supply contracts) decrease the 
probability of the farmer preferring to keep his current contract and increase the probability of him 
preferring another contract. Offering harvesting and planting services increases the probability of 
the farmer choosing the supply contract. These elasticities are greater than in the previous two opt-
out model.  
To summarize, between the two types of two opt-out models, the signs of the coefficients 
and elasticities remain unchanged. Nevertheless, by conditioning the random parameter on trust 
and welfare indices, the magnitude of the coefficients and the elasticities change. With trust and 
welfare, attributes in the previous two opt-out model, that brought utility, are larger, while those 
that bring disutility are smaller. The same occurs for the elasticities. Changes in beneficial 
attributes (e.g. rate) increases even more the probability of a contract being signed (for the case of 
the direct elasticities).  The fact that the ASC from land rental is sensitive to changes in trust may 
point to the farmers’ preference for contracts involving more collaboration with the mill (e.g. 
agricultural partnership) as their trust in the mill increases. The option not to grow sugarcane is 
more sensitive to changes in trust and welfare. Changes in these increases the disutility from not 
growing sugarcane. The conditioning of the random parameters on trust and welfare highlights 
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how farmers in the Cerrado region are willing to grow sugarcane, and prefer to sign a contract 
with a mill they trust and have a relationship with. 
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Table B.1: Questions representing trust and welfare and, factor 1 and 2 loadings 
  
Questions Scaling Factor 1 Factor 2
1. The mill is owned by a (1) Brazilian Company,        
(0) otherweise -0.01 0.16
Do you agree with: 
2. "The mill has contributed to the well-being of my community" (1) Agree, (0) Disagree 0.19 0.63
3. "The mill has contributed to my well-being" (1) Agree, (0) Disagree 0.28 0.73
How do you feel about the following:
4.  "Farmers in the region feel they cannot trust the local mill" (1) Agree, (0) Disagree -0.45 -0.06
5. "The local mill reports back to the farmers on the quality of their sugarcane" (1) Agree, (0) Disagree 0.06 0.20
6.  "Larger farms have higher bargaining power with the local mills when signing a contract" (1) Agree, (0) Disagree -0.10 -0.04
7. "Farms closer to local mills have higher bargaining power when signing a contract" (1) Agree, (0) Disagree -0.08 0.13
8. Do you feel that the mill has not fulfilled its side of the contract? (1)No, (0) Yes 0.25 0.24
9. How many times has the mill been late with a payment? Open Answer 0.04 0.08
10. How many times has the mill skipped a payment? Open Answer 0.08 0.08
Indicate if you agree or disagree with the following:
11. "I wish I could accomplish my objectives without signing a contract with the mill" (1) Agree, (0) Disagree -0.16 -0.12
12. "My profits have decreased since signing the contract with the mill" (1) Agree, (0) Disagree -0.14 -0.46
13. "Due to the contract I have a more constant income" (1) Agree, (0) Disagree 0.38 0.28
14. "I trust the management of the mill" (1) Agree, (0) Disagree 0.85 0.12
15.  "I always trust that the direction of the mill will do as promissed" (1) Agree, (0) Disagree 0.85 0.16
16. "It is difficult to communicate with the mill" (1) Agree, (0) Disagree -0.32 -0.22
17. "I am familiar with the business conducted by the mill: who they sell to, their management 
philosophy and practices"
(1) Agree, (0) Disagree
0.13 -0.09
18. "I receive a “fair” value for my sugarcane bought by the mill" (1) Agree, (0) Disagree 0.15 0.11
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Table B.2: Results from two opt-out model with random parameter modeled with trust and 
welfare indices and willingness to pay estimates 
  
  
Willingness 
to Pay
Intercept -3.54 *** -6.14 *** -5.76 *** -24.61 **
(0.87) (1.44) (1.73) (12.34)
Rate of LR 0.17 ***
(0.03)
TRS 0.03 *** 0.02 *
(0.01) (0.01)
Late Payment -0.05 *** -0.31 ** -0.03 -1.08 -0.07 *** -3.39
(0.02) (0.14) (0.03) (0.96) (0.02) (2.34)
Length -0.98 *** -5.78 ** -0.86 *** -27.65 ** -1.09 *** -56.25
(0.33) (2.43) (0.3) (12.95) (0.4) (38.17)
Share payment 0.04 *** 1.28 **
(0.01) (0.56)
Planting 0.76 * 39.20
(0.39) (28.82)
Harvesting 0.48 24.99
(0.38) (23.25)
Hauling and delivery 0.67 * 34.43
(0.41) (30.71)
Mill buys all 1.23 *** 63.70
(0.4) (42.61)
More than 1 Mill 0.36 -0.32 0.12 -8.66 **      
(0.85) (0.7) (0.74) (4.19)
Contract LR 3.50 ***
(0.55)
Contract AP 2.85 ***
(0.42)
Contract S 2.57 ***
(0.49)
Opt Out 19.83 **     
(10.07)
Log-likelihood -593.2
McFadden Pseud R
2
0.43
AIC 1254
Observations 648
Note: Standard error are in parenthesis. Significance Levels: *** is 1%,  ** is 5%, * is 10% 
Distances of Random Parameters Standard Deviations
Attribute
Choices
Land Rental (LR) Agricultural Partnership (AP) Supply (S)
Not grow 
sugarcane
Coefficient 
Estimate
Willingness 
to Pay
Coefficient 
Estimate
Willingness 
to Pay
Coefficient 
Estimate
Coefficient 
Estimate
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Table B.3: Coefficients from modeling heterogeneity in the mean of the random parameter 
model 
  Coefficient Standard Error 
Land Rental     
Welfare -0.6226 
 
(0.55) 
Trust -0.7238 * (0.45) 
Agricultural Partnership 
Welfare -0.6832 
 
(0.46) 
Trust 0.60111 
 
(0.40) 
Supply 
   
Welfare -0.3262 
 
(0.48) 
Trust -0.1223 
 
(0.38) 
Not Grow Sugarcane 
 
Welfare -17.225 ** (7.24) 
Trust -10.403 * (6.03) 
Significance Levels: *** is 1%, ** is 5%, * is 10%  
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Table B.4: Direct and cross-elasticities in the land rental contract 
  
Land 
Rental 
Agricultural 
Partnership 
Supply 
Current 
Contract 
Not grow 
Sugarcane 
Rate 0.72 -0.15 -0.16 -0.23 -0.03 
Risk -0.16 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.01 
Length -0.07 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.00 
More1 0.04 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 
Note: Length and More1 are arc elasticities since these are dummy variables. 
 
Table B.5: Direct and cross-elasticities in the agricultural partnership contract 
  
Land 
Rental 
Agricultural 
Partnership 
Supply 
Current 
Contract 
Not grow 
Sugarcane 
Risk 0.01 -0.06 0.01 0.02 0.00 
Length 0.02 -0.09 0.03 0.04 0.00 
Sharepay -0.10 0.50 -0.13 -0.19 -0.02 
TRS -0.30 1.45 -0.38 -0.56 -0.06 
More1 0.01 -0.03 0.01 0.01 0.00 
Note: Length and More1 are arc elasticities since these are dummy variables. 
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Table B.6: Direct and cross-price elasticities in the supply contract 
  
Land 
Rental 
Agricultural 
Partnership 
Supply 
Current 
Contract 
Not grow 
Sugarcane 
Risk 0.03 0.03 -0.28 0.06 0.00 
Length 0.01 0.01 -0.09 0.02 0.00 
TRS -0.11 -0.13 1.21 -0.24 -0.02 
Planting -0.01 -0.01 0.11 -0.02 0.00 
Harvesting -0.01 -0.01 0.06 -0.01 0.00 
Hauling and delivery -0.01 -0.01 0.09 -0.02 0.00 
Mill buys all  -0.01 -0.01 0.18 -0.03 0.00 
More1 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 
Note: Length, Planting, Harvesting, Hauling and delivery, Mill buys all and More1 are arc elasticities 
since these are dummy variables. 
 
Table B.7: Direct and cross-price elasticities in the option not to grow sugarcane 
  
Land 
Rental 
Agricultural 
Partnership 
Supply 
Current 
Contract 
Not grow 
Sugarcane 
More1 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.10 
Note: More1 are arc elasticities since these are dummy variables. 
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Appendix C - Testing for separability 
Prior to running a second stage regression using DEA scores, a modeler must check if the 
separability assumption holds. This involves estimating conditional and unconditional DEAs. If 
the separability assumption holds, that is, if the environmental variables (i.e. vertical integration) 
do not impact the efficiency frontier, then the unconditional DEA scores can be used in the second 
stage regression. 
Consider a vector of input quantities 𝑋 𝜖 𝑅+
𝑝
, a vector of output quantities 𝑌 𝜖 𝑅+
𝑞
and a 
vector of environmental variables 𝑍 𝜖 𝑅𝑟. The environmental variables are variables not present in 
the vector of inputs nor of outputs but, nevertheless, may affect the distribution of the efficiency 
scores including the production possibility frontier (Daraio, Simar and Wilson 2015). The 
environmental variables can impact the production process through: (1) the set of feasible input 
and output combinations 𝜓𝑍; (2) through the joint density function 𝑓𝑋𝑌𝑍(𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧); or (3) both (1) 
and (2) (Daraio, Simar and Wilson 2015).  𝜓𝑍 is the set of possible pairs of inputs and outputs for 
a firm when there are environmental variables Z. In this case (Daraio, Simar and Wilson 2015): 
 
𝜓𝑍 =  {(𝑋, 𝑌)|𝑋 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑠 𝑌 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑍 = 𝑧} (C.1) 
 
If environmental factors are not present, then the set of possible pairs of inputs and outputs 
for a firm becomes: 
 
𝜓 =  {(𝑋, 𝑌)|𝑋 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑠 𝑌} (C.2) 
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The separability test tests the null hypothesis of separability (i.e. 𝐻0: 𝜓
𝑍 = 𝜓) against the 
alternative hypothesis ( 𝐻𝐴: 𝜓
𝑍 ≠ 𝜓, 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑠𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑧 ∈ 𝑍) (Daraio, Simar and Wilson 2015). If the 
null hypothesis is rejected, meaning that the seperability assumption does not hold, the 
environmental variables must be accounted for in the DEA. This is done by using conditional DEA 
(Daraio, Simar and Wilson 2015).  
To check for separability we compared the conditional efficiency scores with the 
unconditional efficiency scores. Conditional efficiency scores were obtained by splitting the 
sample into groups with different quantities of environmental variable factors Z. This means that 
DMU’s were split into groups according to the percentage of sugarcane that was crushed that came 
from land under their control. First the unconditional DEA was estimated followed by the 
estimation of the conditional DEA. For the conditional DEA, the minimization problem described 
in (1) was run separately for each group. Conditional and unconditional scores were compared, as 
in Bădin, Daraio and Simar (2012), by taking the ratio (𝑅0) of the efficiency scores:  
 
𝑅0(𝑥, 𝑦|𝑧) =
𝜃(𝑥,𝑦|𝑧)
𝜃(𝑥,𝑦)
 (C.3) 
 
Conditional DEAs were run by splitting the sample into groups of 3, 4 and 5 depending on 
their percentage of crushed sugarcane that was produced by the mill. The groups and their sizes 
are presented in table C.1. In all cases the conditional efficiency scores matched that of the 
unconditional DEA. Groups contain over 30 DMUs in each subgroup to ensure that the DEA is 
relevant. Since the efficiency scores from the conditional DEAs and the unconditional DEAs were 
close to identical we decided that there was no need to run statistical tests. Results from the pooled 
and conditional DEA are presented in table C.2.  
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Table C.1: The characteristics of the groups considered in the conditional DEA 
Groups Category N 
3 [0%-50%] 52 
  (50%-80%] 81 
  (80%-100%] 75 
4 [0%-50%] 52 
  (50%-70%] 53 
  (70%-85%] 46 
  (85%-100%] 57 
5 [0%-45%] 44 
  (45%-65%] 44 
  (65%-80%] 42 
  (80%-95%] 38 
  (95%-100%] 36 
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Table C.2: Comparison of the conditional and unconditional DEA efficiency scores 
 
Three (3) Four (4) Five (5) (1)/(3) (1)/(4) (1)/(5)
1 0.965 0.965 0.965 0.965 1.000 1.000 1.000
2 0.850 0.850 0.850 0.850 1.000 1.000 1.000
3 0.903 0.903 0.903 0.903 1.000 1.000 1.000
4 0.534 0.534 0.534 0.534 1.000 1.000 1.000
5 0.808 0.808 0.808 0.808 1.000 1.000 1.000
6 0.747 0.747 0.747 0.747 1.000 1.000 1.000
7 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
8 0.923 0.923 0.923 0.923 1.000 1.000 1.000
9 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
10 0.710 0.710 0.710 0.710 1.000 1.000 1.000
11 0.878 0.878 0.878 0.878 1.000 1.000 1.000
12 0.775 0.775 0.775 0.775 1.000 1.000 1.000
13 0.793 0.793 0.793 0.793 1.000 1.000 1.000
14 0.847 0.847 0.847 0.847 1.000 1.000 1.000
15 0.806 0.806 0.806 0.806 1.000 1.000 1.000
16 0.814 0.814 0.814 0.814 1.000 1.000 1.000
17 0.858 0.858 0.858 0.858 1.000 1.000 1.000
18 0.929 0.929 0.929 0.929 1.000 1.000 1.000
19 0.927 0.927 0.927 0.927 1.000 1.000 1.000
20 0.877 0.877 0.877 0.877 1.000 1.000 1.000
21 0.872 0.872 0.872 0.872 1.000 1.000 1.000
22 0.898 0.898 0.898 0.898 1.000 1.000 1.000
23 0.911 0.911 0.911 0.911 1.000 1.000 1.000
24 0.894 0.894 0.894 0.894 1.000 1.000 1.000
25 0.839 0.839 0.839 0.839 1.000 1.000 1.000
26 0.891 0.891 0.891 0.891 1.000 1.000 1.000
27 0.878 0.878 0.878 0.878 1.000 1.000 1.000
28 0.891 0.891 0.891 0.891 1.000 1.000 1.000
29 0.845 0.845 0.845 0.845 1.000 1.000 1.000
30 0.817 0.817 0.817 0.817 1.000 1.000 1.000
31 0.852 0.852 0.852 0.852 1.000 1.000 1.000
32 0.931 0.931 0.931 0.931 1.000 1.000 1.000
33 0.903 0.903 0.903 0.903 1.000 1.000 1.000
34 0.959 0.959 0.959 0.959 1.000 1.000 1.000
35 0.874 0.874 0.874 0.874 1.000 1.000 1.000
36 0.870 0.870 0.870 0.870 1.000 1.000 1.000
37 0.883 0.883 0.883 0.883 1.000 1.000 1.000
38 0.842 0.842 0.842 0.842 1.000 1.000 1.000
39 0.967 0.967 0.967 0.967 1.000 1.000 1.000
40 0.855 0.855 0.855 0.855 1.000 1.000 1.000
41 0.953 0.953 0.953 0.953 1.000 1.000 1.000
42 0.708 0.708 0.708 0.708 1.000 1.000 1.000
43 0.810 0.810 0.810 0.810 1.000 1.000 1.000
44 0.858 0.858 0.858 0.858 1.000 1.000 1.000
45 0.892 0.892 0.892 0.892 1.000 1.000 1.000
46 0.971 0.971 0.971 0.971 1.000 1.000 1.000
47 0.847 0.847 0.847 0.847 1.000 1.000 1.000
48 0.811 0.811 0.811 0.811 1.000 1.000 1.000
49 0.801 0.801 0.801 0.801 1.000 1.000 1.000
50 0.986 0.986 0.986 0.986 1.000 1.000 1.000
51 0.978 0.978 0.978 0.978 1.000 1.000 1.000
dmu
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52 0.879 0.879 0.879 0.879 1.000 1.000 1.000
53 0.847 0.847 0.847 0.847 1.000 1.000 1.000
54 0.947 0.947 0.947 0.947 1.000 1.000 1.000
55 0.888 0.888 0.888 0.888 1.000 1.000 1.000
56 0.783 0.783 0.783 0.783 1.000 1.000 1.000
57 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
58 0.778 0.778 0.778 0.778 1.000 1.000 1.000
59 0.905 0.905 0.905 0.905 1.000 1.000 1.000
60 0.858 0.858 0.858 0.858 1.000 1.000 1.000
61 0.908 0.908 0.908 0.908 1.000 1.000 1.000
62 0.898 0.898 0.898 0.898 1.000 1.000 1.000
63 0.894 0.894 0.894 0.894 1.000 1.000 1.000
64 0.859 0.859 0.859 0.859 1.000 1.000 1.000
65 0.930 0.930 0.930 0.930 1.000 1.000 1.000
66 0.856 0.856 0.856 0.856 1.000 1.000 1.000
67 0.834 0.834 0.834 0.834 1.000 1.000 1.000
68 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.857 1.000 1.000 1.000
69 0.910 0.910 0.910 0.910 1.000 1.000 1.000
70 0.794 0.794 0.794 0.794 1.000 1.000 1.000
71 0.809 0.809 0.809 0.809 1.000 1.000 1.000
72 0.919 0.919 0.919 0.919 1.000 1.000 1.000
73 0.812 0.812 0.812 0.812 1.000 1.000 1.000
74 0.898 0.898 0.898 0.898 1.000 1.000 1.000
75 0.882 0.882 0.882 0.882 1.000 1.000 1.000
76 0.842 0.842 0.842 0.842 1.000 1.000 1.000
77 0.912 0.912 0.912 0.912 1.000 1.000 1.000
78 0.770 0.770 0.770 0.770 1.000 1.000 1.000
79 0.931 0.931 0.931 0.931 1.000 1.000 1.000
80 0.886 0.886 0.886 0.886 1.000 1.000 1.000
81 0.883 0.883 0.883 0.883 1.000 1.000 1.000
82 0.837 0.837 0.837 0.837 1.000 1.000 1.000
83 0.818 0.818 0.818 0.818 1.000 1.000 1.000
84 0.918 0.918 0.918 0.918 1.000 1.000 1.000
85 0.827 0.827 0.827 0.827 1.000 1.000 1.000
86 0.912 0.912 0.912 0.912 1.000 1.000 1.000
87 0.845 0.845 0.845 0.845 1.000 1.000 1.000
88 0.885 0.885 0.885 0.885 1.000 1.000 1.000
89 0.894 0.894 0.894 0.894 1.000 1.000 1.000
90 0.977 0.977 0.977 0.977 1.000 1.000 1.000
91 0.880 0.880 0.880 0.880 1.000 1.000 1.000
92 0.833 0.833 0.833 0.833 1.000 1.000 1.000
93 0.844 0.844 0.844 0.844 1.000 1.000 1.000
94 0.872 0.872 0.872 0.872 1.000 1.000 1.000
95 0.920 0.920 0.920 0.920 1.000 1.000 1.000
96 0.937 0.937 0.937 0.937 1.000 1.000 1.000
97 0.985 0.985 0.985 0.985 1.000 1.000 1.000
98 0.853 0.853 0.853 0.853 1.000 1.000 1.000
99 0.937 0.937 0.937 0.937 1.000 1.000 1.000
100 0.789 0.789 0.789 0.789 1.000 1.000 1.000
101 0.853 0.853 0.853 0.853 1.000 1.000 1.000
102 0.862 0.862 0.862 0.862 1.000 1.000 1.000
(continued)
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103 0.973 0.973 0.973 0.973 1.000 1.000 1.000
104 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
105 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
106 0.939 0.939 0.939 0.939 1.000 1.000 1.000
107 0.859 0.859 0.859 0.859 1.000 1.000 1.000
108 0.890 0.890 0.890 0.890 1.000 1.000 1.000
109 0.903 0.903 0.903 0.903 1.000 1.000 1.000
110 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
111 0.885 0.885 0.885 0.885 1.000 1.000 1.000
112 0.891 0.891 0.891 0.891 1.000 1.000 1.000
113 0.938 0.938 0.938 0.938 1.000 1.000 1.000
114 0.847 0.847 0.847 0.847 1.000 1.000 1.000
115 0.874 0.874 0.874 0.874 1.000 1.000 1.000
116 0.919 0.919 0.919 0.919 1.000 1.000 1.000
117 0.961 0.961 0.961 0.961 1.000 1.000 1.000
118 0.904 0.904 0.904 0.904 1.000 1.000 1.000
119 0.957 0.957 0.957 0.957 1.000 1.000 1.000
120 0.954 0.954 0.954 0.954 1.000 1.000 1.000
121 0.879 0.879 0.879 0.879 1.000 1.000 1.000
122 0.981 0.981 0.981 0.981 1.000 1.000 1.000
123 0.893 0.893 0.893 0.893 1.000 1.000 1.000
124 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
125 0.969 0.969 0.969 0.969 1.000 1.000 1.000
126 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.997 1.000 1.000 1.000
127 0.983 0.983 0.983 0.983 1.000 1.000 1.000
128 0.911 0.911 0.911 0.911 1.000 1.000 1.000
129 0.904 0.904 0.904 0.904 1.000 1.000 1.000
130 0.974 0.974 0.974 0.974 1.000 1.000 1.000
131 0.941 0.941 0.941 0.941 1.000 1.000 1.000
132 0.929 0.929 0.929 0.929 1.000 1.000 1.000
133 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
134 0.905 0.905 0.905 0.905 1.000 1.000 1.000
135 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
136 0.906 0.906 0.906 0.906 1.000 1.000 1.000
137 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
138 0.942 0.942 0.942 0.942 1.000 1.000 1.000
139 0.854 0.854 0.854 0.854 1.000 1.000 1.000
140 0.981 0.981 0.981 0.981 1.000 1.000 1.000
141 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
142 0.990 0.990 0.990 0.990 1.000 1.000 1.000
143 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
144 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
145 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
146 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
147 0.854 0.854 0.854 0.854 1.000 1.000 1.000
148 0.977 0.977 0.977 0.977 1.000 1.000 1.000
149 0.830 0.830 0.830 0.830 1.000 1.000 1.000
150 0.872 0.872 0.872 0.872 1.000 1.000 1.000
151 0.803 0.803 0.803 0.803 1.000 1.000 1.000
152 0.900 0.900 0.900 0.900 1.000 1.000 1.000
153 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
(continued)
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154 0.940 0.940 0.940 0.940 1.000 1.000 1.000
155 0.892 0.892 0.892 0.892 1.000 1.000 1.000
156 0.991 0.991 0.991 0.991 1.000 1.000 1.000
157 0.858 0.858 0.858 0.858 1.000 1.000 1.000
158 0.891 0.891 0.891 0.891 1.000 1.000 1.000
159 0.967 0.967 0.967 0.967 1.000 1.000 1.000
160 0.910 0.910 0.910 0.910 1.000 1.000 1.000
161 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
162 0.912 0.912 0.912 0.912 1.000 1.000 1.000
163 0.976 0.976 0.976 0.976 1.000 1.000 1.000
164 0.845 0.845 0.845 0.845 1.000 1.000 1.000
165 0.747 0.747 0.747 0.747 1.000 1.000 1.000
166 0.848 0.848 0.848 0.848 1.000 1.000 1.000
167 0.680 0.680 0.680 0.680 1.000 1.000 1.000
168 0.677 0.677 0.677 0.677 1.000 1.000 1.000
169 0.764 0.764 0.764 0.764 1.000 1.000 1.000
170 0.776 0.776 0.776 0.776 1.000 1.000 1.000
171 0.603 0.603 0.603 0.603 1.000 1.000 1.000
172 0.749 0.749 0.749 0.749 1.000 1.000 1.000
173 0.763 0.763 0.763 0.763 1.000 1.000 1.000
174 0.739 0.739 0.739 0.739 1.000 1.000 1.000
175 0.731 0.731 0.731 0.731 1.000 1.000 1.000
176 0.850 0.850 0.850 0.850 1.000 1.000 1.000
177 0.898 0.898 0.898 0.898 1.000 1.000 1.000
178 0.983 0.983 0.983 0.983 1.000 1.000 1.000
179 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
180 0.910 0.910 0.910 0.910 1.000 1.000 1.000
181 0.831 0.831 0.831 0.831 1.000 1.000 1.000
182 0.805 0.805 0.805 0.805 1.000 1.000 1.000
183 0.744 0.744 0.744 0.744 1.000 1.000 1.000
184 0.904 0.904 0.904 0.904 1.000 1.000 1.000
185 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
186 0.869 0.869 0.869 0.869 1.000 1.000 1.000
187 0.902 0.902 0.902 0.902 1.000 1.000 1.000
188 0.842 0.842 0.842 0.842 1.000 1.000 1.000
189 0.902 0.902 0.902 0.902 1.000 1.000 1.000
190 0.892 0.892 0.892 0.892 1.000 1.000 1.000
191 0.913 0.913 0.913 0.913 1.000 1.000 1.000
192 0.894 0.894 0.894 0.894 1.000 1.000 1.000
193 0.848 0.848 0.848 0.848 1.000 1.000 1.000
194 0.872 0.872 0.872 0.872 1.000 1.000 1.000
195 0.844 0.844 0.844 0.844 1.000 1.000 1.000
196 0.807 0.807 0.807 0.807 1.000 1.000 1.000
197 0.827 0.827 0.827 0.827 1.000 1.000 1.000
198 0.716 0.716 0.716 0.716 1.000 1.000 1.000
199 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
200 0.699 0.699 0.699 0.699 1.000 1.000 1.000
201 0.867 0.867 0.867 0.867 1.000 1.000 1.000
202 0.906 0.906 0.906 0.906 1.000 1.000 1.000
203 0.956 0.956 0.956 0.956 1.000 1.000 1.000
204 0.944 0.944 0.944 0.944 1.000 1.000 1.000
(continued)
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